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
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THE CIFT OF U.S. Navy League

CONVENTION ADDRESSES

The Navy League issues papers, such as these written by the country's leading men, and dealing with the vital topics of the day. The League will gladly send copies of all such papers to interested applicants, — it being understood, of course, that the papers express the author's opinions, which are not necessarily those of the League.

Published 1916 by the NAVY LEAGUE OF THE UNITED STATES

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Washington, D. C.

U.S.S. NEVADA
Typical of all that Sea Power Means

ADDRESSES

BEFORE THE

ELEVENTH ANNUAL CONVENTION

OF THE

NAVY LEAGUE ₩ UNITED STATES

Washington, D. C. April 10-13, 1916

ROBERT M. THOMPSON, Chairman of the Convention HENRY H. WARD, Vice-Chairman

CONVENTION COMMITTEE

HENRY H. WARD, Chairman

CASSIUS B. BARNES

GEO. X. McLanahan

FREDERICK L. HUIDEKOPER

Louis A. Osborne

SIDNEY M. BALLOU

NEVIL MONROE HOPKINS



NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS, SOUTHERN BUILDING WASHINGTON, D. C.



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NEVIL MONROE HOPKINS.

NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS, SOUTHERN BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D. C.

All regular Sessions of the Convention will be open to the Public. Ladies are welcome to the Convention as well as at the Banquet.

PLAN OF THE CONVENTION

The Navy League National Convention is planned upon the theory that the logical approach to the great problem of preparedness demand that certain steps should be taken, including:

- 1. A National Defense Commission.
- 2. A Navy General Staff.
- 3. An Immediate Naval Program without arbitrary limitations.

That is, a call upon the General Board of the Navy for an immediate report as to a naval building and personnel program now necessary to meet the present emergency and to be immediately authorized by Congress and immediately inaugurated. Such a report would take into account the increase of shipbuilding facilities during the past nine months and should be independent of arbitrary cost limitations.

Failing to get that report without delay, the Navy League recommends immediate legislative action, authorizing and inaugurating immediately the first year building and personnel program recommended under limitations by the General Board, July 30, 1915.

303849

PROGRAM

FIRST DAY, APRIL 10, 1916. Opening Session Robert M. Thompson, Chairman.

10 o'clock A. M.
INVOCATION AND PRAYER
"OUR PURPOSES"
Afternoon Session, Sidney M. Ballou, Chairman. 2:30 o'clock P. M.
Hon. David Jayne Hill
Hon. Sidney M. Ballou"Comparison of Naval Strengths"
PROFESSOR ALBERT BUSHNELL HART { "Naval Defense of the Monroe Doctrine"
Dr. Morton Prince"A Two-Power Fleet as a National Policy"
Evening Session.
8:15 o'clock P. M.
DB. NEVIL MONBOE HOPKINS"The Making of a Navy" (Lecture and Motion Pictures.)
SECOND DAY, APRIL 11, 1916
Morning Sesssion, Perry Belmont, Chairman.
10 o'clock A. M.
J. Beenard Walker $ \begin{cases} \text{"The Rise and Decline of the } \\ \text{United States Navy in its Relato the International Situation"} \end{cases} $
Hon. Henry White
Hon. Augustus P. Gardner
GEORGE PARMLY DAY"The Yale Battalion of Field Artillery"
- CHARLES A. RICHMOND"Guarding Our Inheritance"
Afternoon Session, William H. Stayton, Chairman,
2:30 o'cloca P. M.
("The Defense of the Nation as
CHARLES MARTINDALE
CHARLES MARTINDALE

THIRD DAY, APRIL 12, 1916

Morning Session, Charles G. Curtis, Chairman.

10 c'clock A. M.

10 CCIOCK A. M.
HENRY A. WISE WOOD
ISAAC N. SELIGMAN"How Shall Preparedness Be Financed"
CHARLES G. CUBTIS
REAR ADMIRAL BRADLEY A. FISKE, U.S.N"(Naval Strategy" (A paper published in the Naval Institute, April, 1916)
Afternoon Session, Henry H. Ward, Chairman
2:30 o'clock P. M.
Hon. Herbert L. Satterlee
EDMUNE JAMES JAMES"Our Naval Policy"
S. STANWOOD MENKEN { "How We Can Best Secure the Necessary Measure of Preparedness"
Dr. Joseph Marshall Flint { "Organization and Problems of a Military Hospital" (Illustrated)
Evening Session
7:30 o'clock P. M.
BANOUET
Colonel Robert M. Thompson, Presiding.
Speakers
Hon. David Jayne Hill Henry Breckingidge Clarence Ousley
FOURTH DAY, APRIL 13, 1916
Morning Session, A. B. Lambert, Chairman.
⊥) o'clock A. M.
E. K. Roden"Why We Need a Navy General Staff"
Lt. Comdr. Henry C. Mustin, U.S.N"The Naval Aeroplane"
ALEXANDER GRAHAM BELL "Preparedness for Aerial Defense"
LAWRENCE Y. SPEAR"The Submarine" (Illustrated)
Afternoon Session, Clarence Ousley, Chairman. 2:30 o'clock P. M.
Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
Poultney Bigelow
FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY BY BUSINESS SESSION.
Control Contro

TRIP TO ANNAPOLIS

On April 14th, a trip was arranged to the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis, to witness a demonstration of its work Special cars left Washington at 9 o'clock a.m.

RESOLUTIONS

ADOPTED APRILL 13, 1916 BY THE

NATIONAL CONVENTION OF THE NAVY LEAGUE OF THE UNITED STATES

On Thursday, April 13, the Committee on Resolutions, appointed at the National Convention of the Navy League of the United States, presented the following Report:

REPORT

April 13, 1916.

To the Eleventh Annual Convention, Navy League of the United States:

Your committee on Resolutions, having given careful consideration to the various resolutions presented at the Convention and referred to this Committee for action, begs leave to submit the following report:

After giving careful consideration to the work of the Convention, it has seemed best that the only resolution to be reported to the Committee for adoption by the Convention is the one relating to a National Defense Commission, a Navy General Staff and the Immediate Naval Program. The text of this resolution is embodied in a separate report transmitted herewith.

The other resolutions and proposals referred to the Committee have had its careful consideration, and while it finds many of them commendable in every sense of the word, it feels that the best interest of the cause of preparedness will be accomplished by confining formal action of the Navy League at this Convention to the resolution embodied in the separate report already referred to.

Very respectfully,

DAVID JAYNE HILL,
CHARLES MARTINGALE,
CHARLES G. CURTIS,
EDMUND JANES JAMES,
WILLIAM H. STAYTON,
J. BERNARD WALKER,
CLARENCE OUSLEY,
ALBERT BUSHNELL HART,
JOHN N. MCCORMICK,
EDWIN TATHAM,
Committee on Resolutions.

The foregoing report was unanimously adopted, whereupon the Convention moved to consideration of the further report of the Committee on Resolutions.

The Convention, upon unanimous recommendation of the aforesaid Committee, adopted the following Resolution:

After giving careful consideration to the recent testimony of Naval Experts before Congress and to the addresses made at this Convention by prominent men who have made special studies of the needs of our Navy; upon consideration of the complexity of the problems involved; and convinced, as we are, of the peril of the situation, this Convention unanimously adopts the following Resolution:

Resolved, That in our opinion the navy is entirely inadequate in strength, not only in ships and personnel, but in many other essentials, to properly defend us against aggression, and this unhappy condition will of necessity continue until we adopt some well considered and enduring policy;

Resolved, therefore, That our officers and directors are hereby empowered and instructed to take prompt steps to have prepared and introduced into Congress, and to urge the passage of, bills providing for

- (1) A National Defense Commission.
- (2) A Navy General Staff.

And, until the recommendation of these bodies can be received, and to meet the present necessities, a bill providing for

(3) An Immediate Enlargement of the Navy, in both ships and personnel.

The plan under which the Convention was called provided that in calling for an immediate enlargement of the navy in ships and personnel, the General Board of the Navy be asked for an immediate report as to a naval building and personnel program now necessary to meet the present emergency and to be immediately authorized by Congress and immediately inaugurated, such report taking into account the increase of shipbuilding facilities during the past nine months and being independent of arbitrary cost limitations; and that, failing to get such a report without delay, immediate legislative action be secured authorizing and immediately inaugurating the first year building and personnel program recommended under limitations by the General Board, July 30, 1915.

HENRY H. WARD, Chairman Convention Committee.

Introductory Address by

PERRY BELMONT

A convention assembled, as this one is, for a patriotic purpose renders it difficult, even for a presiding officer, to resist the temptation of making an extended speech. You will, however, I trust, permit me to say a few words by way of introduction.

Three fundamental steps are essential to an American Navai and Military policy: The creation of a council of national defense, substitution of equality of military service for our volunteer service, and issuance of national defense bonds.

It is unfair to Congress, a great legislative body, composed of men of ability, with a desire to legislate for the country's good, that they should be expected to establish a permanent naval policy, a permanent military policy, and to formulate a financial plan to carry such policies into effect, without having the aid of a council of national defense, or a commission, if you choose to call it that. The Navy League has, for many years, advocated the establishment of such a council; and recently it has become evident that, in co-operation with a council or commission of national defense, there should also be a staff of national industrial organization and mobilization; for every man in the trenches there should be a number of men working for him, for the production of munitions, of food, and in transportation. At the very threshold of this undertaking a council of national defense is essential.

A proposition for a bond issue is generally unpopular,—but if a form of national defense bond were adopted as a means of presenting directly to the American people the opportunity of investing in a government bond, through the postal savings banks, or in some other manner without the intervention of banks or bankers, the aroused patriotism of the country would certainly bring about a successful issue of such a bond. It would be the best test of the attitude of the American people in regard to the establishment of an American Navy and an American Army commensurate with American standards, and demanded by present international conditions.

That is the first step. We have long urged it, and we now again demand it. We will not relax our efforts until it is secured.

Compliance with the Democratic platform declaration of 1912, to provide for the national defense in its broadest sense, including the establishment of a council of national defense, would have removed the question from politics and would have resulted long since in a recommendation to enforce a naval and military programme and a financial plan to carry the programme into effect.

We are, of course, mainly interested in the sea power of our country,—the fleet and its adjuncts,—but our armed forces include the army as well.

The next of the three necessary steps to be taken is equality of service and military training. Under an organized democracy, with equality of service for every citizen as the national principle, there should be a classification according to occupation and married state. There is no sounder principle of democracy than the recognition of the duty of every citizen to serve his country under arms. The present volunteer system would, in time of war, interfere with industry by drawing indiscriminately from all trades and callings. Labor essential in producing war efficiency is, under the classification referred to, the last to be called to the colors. Those of military age having no occupation, or whose occupation does not enter into the production of war efficiency, are the first to be called. Therefore it is that the proposition has strong popular elements, and no politician would lose in standing should he advocate equality of service.

The third step is to formulate a financial policy to carry into effect what we are advocating. It is evident that we must look forward to increased taxation in all its forms. But in providing for the national defense, we are planning for the future as well as the present, and therefore the burden should be distributed beyond one generation.

The Navy League, through its officers, has, from time to time, advocated a national bond issue. In some quarters that was interpreted, or misinterpreted, as meaning an appropriation of \$500,000,000. That was not the idea of the League. Recently the subject has been considered from the point of view of a national defense bond of small denomination. The postal savings bank bonds are as low as \$20.

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
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COL. ROBERT M. THOMPSON, PRESIDENT OF THE NAVY LEAGUE

THE NAVY LEAGUE, ITS FOUNDERS AND ITS WORK

ROBERT MEANS THOMPSON

President of the Navy League of the United States

It is my pleasant duty to welcome you on behalf of the Officers and Directors of the Navy League. I congratulate you that you have come here as representatives of patriotic citizens of the United States. I congratulate your constituents upon being represented here by men and women such as you are. I congratulate you because you are, during this week, to hear great national problems discussed by men of great ability with a patriotic message to deliver to you and to the country. It seems fitting at this time that I should briefly sketch the origin of the Navy League, the principles for which it has stood, and the work that it has done.

The Navy League of the United States, suggested in 1901, finally incorporated in 1903, had its roots in the Civil War, because it was founded by men who served in the navy during that war, but who resigned during the stagnation of promotion that existed between the close of the Civil War and the beginning of the Spanish War. Most of them returned to the service during the Spanish War and were connected with the Naval Militia both before and after the war.

Inspired by love for the navy and for their country, having a first-hand knowledge of the horrors of war, and believing that owing to our geographical position war would come to us only across the sea, and that, therefore, an efficient and adequate fleet was the best defense against invasion, they founded the Navy League, to urge the creation and maintenance of such a fleet; and the same or similiar men have controlled the Navy League from that day to this.

They set out certain definite propositions, and from that day to this they have taught the same lessons.

They said, and still say, that an adequate navy is the surest, best, and cheapest insurance of peace;

That in the navy the fleet is the important and chief end—the Navy Department, the Navy Yards, and the Naval

2 The Navy League, Its Founders and Its Work

Academy are only auxiliaries to the fleet, and are useful only as they contribute to procuring and maintaining the best possible adequate fleet with the money appropriated by Congress;

That as the organization of the Navy Department, the Navy Yards, and the Naval Academy had grown up from conditions that no longer existed, modern methods, such as were employed by other great manufacturing establishments should be adopted, to prevent the loss and waste that otherwise were sure to follow the conflict and duplication of effort of the half dozen independent bureaus that composed the Navy Department;

That as the question as to what was an adequate navy was a highly technical one, it should be referred to the only qualified experts, — the selected officers of the navy, who should communicate directly with Congress;

That as the duty imposed upon the navy was to prevent the invasion of this country by any military nation capable of landing on our shores an army of a strength sufficient to overcome the resistance of such army as we might maintain, an adequate navy means a navy that could control the seas as against the navies of such nations, and so prevent transports with troops reaching our shores; and, therefore, the size and strength of our fleet must depend upon the fleets the military nations maintained;

That as we bordered on two oceans and had two coasts to defend, we must consider the needs of both coasts;

That the fleet did not mean ships and guns alone, but the officers and men necessary to man and fight them;

That under modern conditions a fleet to be efficient must be always ready for war, the men hardened and trained, the officers, and especially the admirals, experienced and efficient; that under existing laws our officers rarely became admirals until they were sixty years of age or over, and retired from service at sixty-two; that under these conditions it was impossible to have properly trained admirals, and that the employment in war of an untrained and inexperienced admiral practically insured defeat and disaster;

That the relations between the army and navy were unsettled, and that in time of peace much useless expense might be caused from (and in time of war, danger and disaster follow) lack of co-operation,



The Navy League, therefore, recommended the creation of general staffs for the army and navy — with administrative as well as advisory duties — and a Council of National Defense, composed, for example, of the great officers of the government, the ex-Presidents and Vice-Presidents, and representatives of the railroads and other great industries, that would have to mobilize and co-operate in time of war, believing that if such a body could be convinced by the experts of the army and navy, its recommendations to the country and to Congress would be accepted and appropriate legislation follow.

The Navy League urged a change in the methods of promotion by which selected officers could reach the grade of admiral at or under the age of fifty years, and a large increase in the number of officers in the junior grades, so as to allow an expansion of the navy when required and to provide for the wastage of war if it came: and to this end it urged an increase in the number of midshipmen at the Naval Academy, and provisions for their entrance at a lower and more uniform age. It costs as much to educate a young man of twenty for four years at the Naval Academy as it does a boy of fifteen — and the latter will give five years more of service, and, on the average, of better service than the former.

All these things the Navy League has asked for from its beginning until now. Gradually its teachings have borne fruit. Congress has ordered that three hundred more midshipmen be sent to the Naval Academy, and if this be continued it will more than double the existing corps.

Secretary Daniels has asked for a law that will authorize promotion by selection.

In the last Presidential campaign both national conventions adopted planks in favor of an adequate navy, and a Council of National defense. A step toward a general staff has been taken by the creation of a Chief of Operations in the Navy Department, with some of the duties of a general staff.

The country has awakened to the necessity of a real preparation for defense. It is demanding, and Congress must enact, legislation that will give the Navy Department efficient and continuing military administration, supply enough officers and men, and sufficient ships of the various kinds, necessary to provide an adequate and properly balanced fleet.

4 The Navy League, Its Founders and Its Work

There will remain certain questions to be settled: Shall the ships, armor, guns, and munitions be built by the government, or by private works?

The Navy League is satisfied whichever way is adopted, provided the work is done in the most efficient and least expensive manner.

It recommends the appointment of a commission of experts to examine and decide this question, once for all.

Again, there is the question of payment, one party favoring payment for the arrearages of the past fifteen years and the needs of the next twenty years by an increase of the taxes of the next five years; the other party believing in a bond issue to be paid by a sinking fund — thus escaping any material increase over our present appropriations for the Navy and the consequent increase of taxation.

The Navy League says: Settle this question as you please, but give us our men, ships, and guns as soon as possible.

England is spending millions of dollars a day because she failed to spend thousands at the proper time. In the face of such possibilities, why waste time over trifles — taxes or bonds, either or both, take your choice, but decide —"he gives twice who gives quickly."

And so we who for years have borne the heat and burden of the day see, or think we see, the end approaching. We have earned, we believe, the approbation of the majority of our fellow citizens — and the hatred of that class which is opposed to preparedness. To the Bryans, Henry Fords, Jordans, Tavenners, et al., we are anathema.

We trust that you will love us for the enemies we have made.





LAUNCHING OF A BATTLESHIP

The first Maine was built in a ship house and launched through the great door in the end. The ship is built in a "cradle" that slides on greased "ways," wide timbers sloping into the water. To move several thousand tons of steel from the land into the water in less than a minute is no mean engineering feat.

NAVY LEAGUE PURPOSES

· HENRY H. WARD Vice-President of the Navy League

When, in the summer of 1914, Europe was thrown into war the Navy League was in a unique position as a national organization. Its organizers, many years before, had realized, as but few of our citizens had, what should be the true purpose of a navy and how real was the need of a navy for the defense and protection of the United States. Previous to that time, and, indeed, for many years afterward, there seemed to be no serious public convictions in regard to the mission of a navy. Most of us readily accepted the assumption that a navy was merely a necessary part of the government equipment; but just why it should be so, and for what definite purposes we made our annual naval expenditures, and what were the principles and theories upon which a navy should be established and maintained, were understood and thought of by the few.

The small group, many of them men of naval or military experience, that founded the Navy League, saw that a navy is not a mere plaything, nor an outward expression of national pride, but that, if it exists at all, it must exist for some real national purpose. Moreover, these men saw that the country could not hope to go on year after year unthreatened by the outer world. They began to study the problems of the day and those which they could see would face the nation in the future. Through the forming of the Navy League they gradually brought to their support a few thousand others who realized that some day this country would need, in the navy, a real arm of defense, commensurate with the interests to be guarded and strong enough to withstand an attack of which the strength could in some measure be gauged by the richness of the prize to be gained.

It was a difficult task to awaken any considerable number of people to the realities of the situation. Through lack of imagination, or because of concentration on other pursuits, or because of ignorance or indifference, there were few who could be brought to consider that within their lifetime, at least, the United States would be seriously menaced. Many had lived in self-deception; many seemed intellectually incapable of entertaining the idea of war, least of all a serious war in which this country might be involved. But just because the task of enlightenment was hard, those who were studying these same problems were forced to work thoroughly in order to bring the truths before the country. Let it not be thought that these problems were studied singlehanded. The history and literature on the subject, the conclusions of experts, the formulated policies of the nations of the world, are at command, and should be the guide.

Thus, when the war in Europe broke out, and when the people of our country, in daily increasing numbers, began to realize the possible seriousness of the situation and to take note of various patriotic movements that sprang up to consolidate and make effective individual opinion and effort, it was possible to indicate what were the accepted methods of solution of problems of national defense and by what methods our own immediate problems could best be solved.

Year after year the Navy League had urged upon Congress, upon heads of departments, and upon the people themselves the very steps and very measures upon which to-day we are all concentrated.

It seemed clear that, however desirable may be the awakening of the citizen to any question of national importance, it is equally desirable that by intelligent direction of his efforts he shall avoid a waste of energy or building only temporarily. It was seen how desirable it is in the first enthusiam for the new ideas and in a moment of national crisis that he shall not build badly; that his efforts shall be to an end that the established opinion of the most expert thinkers has marked as logical and It was seen that, as an apparently inevitable consequence of our form of government, politics has been one of the greatest obstacles to scientific preparation of the navy. It was seen that mere recrimination, the blaming of the man of the past, or the attack upon the man of the present, was of little value and would often defeat the end in view. It was plain that it was always well to examine closely into existing conduct of affairs: to watch that present waste, present misdirection, present apathy or blindness be not overlooked; but it was seen that it was far from wise to use mere comparisons with the past as a means of correcting existing evils or shortcomings.

It is for these reasons that the Navy League comes to you to-day with clean hands, knowing no politics, knowing no person or individual interest. It attacks where it sees wrong; it supports where it sees right. It will not discuss the past; it looks to the present and to the future. It recognizes its own great responsibilities and opportunities for national service, and will tolerate no staining of its purposes.

Before the law-maker and the administrator of to-day are responsibilities greater than have ever before faced our national officers. The door of opportunity is wide open before them as never before. We see the country threatened by dangers of a magnitude never before considered possible. We purpose that those responsible officers of the government upon whom these responsibilities rest and to whom these opportunities are open shall have our full support in all that they do to seize these opportunities, and our unsparing condemnation should they fail, or should party or individual consider profit.

In the effort to fulfill its high mission the League looks confidently to its members to shirk no individual responsibility; to shield no one; and to demand from citizen and public officers nothing but the highest type of public service.

The eminent students and scholars who, in patriotic service, have come to contribute to this convention fruits of their thought and experience will lighten the task for all. They will show how the dimensions of our problem can be determined, and what are the means for its solution; and they will not fail to show that under all, the foundation rock upon which the structure of adequate preparedness rests is one upon which we can all find a place—that foundation rock, a better citizenship.

THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY

DAVID JAYNE HILL


The course of conduct made necessary for a nation does not depend entirely upon itself. Its peace and its safety are affected in great measure by the attitude and ambitions of other nations. For this reason it is impossible to lay down in advance the entire foreign policy which a country should pursue. Its course must of necessity be adjusted to meet the emergencies which from time to time require specific action.

There are, however, certain essential elements of policy, which are not dependent upon changing circumstances. These are determined by the purposes for which a government exists, and spring directly from its primary source of authority. They are, therefore, neither partisan, nor temporary, nor open to discussion. They are binding at all times upon all administrations, and cannot be set aside by any public act, or neglected without culpable delinquency. It is these essential elements alone that I propose to consider upon this occasion.

THE PRIMARY OBLIGATIONS OF OUR GOVERNMENT

In the formation of the American Union the purposes actuating its founders were distinctly realized and expressed. They are contained in the Preamble of the Federal Constitution. "We the People of the United States,"—runs this august declaration,—"in order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common Defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States.

The one purpose specified in this Preamble referring to other than purely domestic matters, is the provision for the "common defense," not of the States but of the People. It is deserving of notice that there is here no reference to any State. It is the "common defense" of the People — that is, of the individual citizens who are engaged in the act of forming this





more perfect Union,—that is here in question. The duties of the States and the obligations of the Union to the States are reserved for consideration in the body of the Constitution itself, and should be regarded as logical consequences of the primary purposes which inspired the creation of a general government capable of treating with foreign nations.

THE PROTECTION OF THE CITIZEN.

The first of the essential elements of American foreign policy is, therefore, the protection of the individual citizen, in so far as he needs to be defended, against injury by any foreign Power. It was for this purpose, among others, that the national government was formed. Only such a government, capable of negotiating with other sovereign States upon equal terms, and of meeting them if necessary with armed resistance, could accomplish this purpose. The separate States formed from the British colonies were abundantly able to protect life and property within their own borders. It was when the American citizen went beyond these borders that he needed protection. Here the commonwealth of which he was a member could not follow him. Upon the high seas, in foreign lands, his State was powerless to offer him protection against outrage. The Articles of Confederation, under which the people of the United States existed from 1777 to 1789, had created "a league of friendship" between the States for the defense of the United States against invasion; but this league was wholly inadequate for that wider protection which American citizenship demanded.

THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS

It was impossible that such a situation should long continue. More than anywhere else in the world, the idea of the importance of the individual citizen entered into the political conceptions of the American colonists. The whole edifice of government was founded upon it. The State, in this conception, has no other foundation than the inherent rights of its citizens. All the American constitutions have centered about that idea. It is only of late that the peace, or the ease, or the pleasure of the majority has been considered of more importance than the inalienable rights of the individual.

We may have drifted very far from the principles upon which this government was founded, and undoubtedly new and revolutionary tendencies have recently become fashionable; but it cannot be disputed, that the Constitution of the United States created a direct relation between the national government and every individual within its jurisdiction — a relation which instituted a new legal right for every citizen, and a new obligation for the whole nation. That new compact for the "common defense" of the people was designed to secure for every citizen, however poor or weak, or otherwise defenseless, an effective protection against wrong, wherever he might be, in the innocent exercise of his legitimate business; and it involves the duty of this government, in all its branches, to place behind the enforcement of that right, in behalf of its humblest citizen, the whole power of the nation. That is the spirit of the Constitution, which is "the supreme law of the land."

PROTECTION GUARANTEED TO THE STATES

The constitutionally ordained means for enforcing this supreme law are the army and the navy; which Congress has the power, and the consequent duty, in the case of the army to "raise and support," and in the case of the navy to "provide and maintain."

In addition to the defense of the Union itself, and of the rights of the citizens beyond the jurisdiction of the States, the Constitution imposes specifically upon the Congress the obligation to insure the execution of Section IV of Article IV, which reads: "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion."

The entire government, presumably with a full comprehension of its obligations, is solemnly bound by its oath of office to support the Constitution; and hence to sustain these guarantees. This involves a grave responsibility; and for meeting it effectively the government is answerable to the people, who have confided to it their security.

OUR LOSS OF NATIONAL PRESTIGE

We are here to-day to speak for the American people, and to ask that this responsibility be fittingly discharged. Un-

happily, we are here to speak not only for the living but also for the dead; for, in a time of alleged peace with all nations, several hundred American citizens,— men, women, and children,— within the past year, have been done to death, on sea and land, without cause or provocation. Not only so, but at least two States of the Union have been invaded by armed foes, and not only civilians but our uniformed soldiers have been shot down upon our own soil.

Until recently, notwithstanding repeated warnings, no effort has been made by our government to "raise and support" an army, or to "provide and maintain" a navy, sufficient to prevent a recurrence of such outrages upon a vastly greater scale, and no adequate effort is now in prospect. It has remained for public spirited citizens,—the Navy League, the National Security League, the American Defense Society, and other private organizations, - to warn the country of its danger, to arouse the people to a sense of their duty, and to plead with the government for prompt and adequate action. necessary, and it is still necessary, to continue this insistence. Is it to be wondered at that the exposure of our physical and moral lack of preparation for action, and even the absence of determination, really, promptly, and adequately to prepare to defend our soil and our citizens, has caused a complete loss of our former prestige as a nation, and rendered our government a practically negligible quantity as an international influence?

THE QUESTION OF THE HOUR


The pressing question of the hour is: Have we as a people abandoned the essential policies of a self-respecting nation? Have we ceased to maintain the principle: All for everyone, and everyone for all? Have we become so self-centered, so fond of ease, so fearful of personal danger, so indifferent to the fate of others, so negligent of national duty, that we can satisfy ourselves with empty words, and consent to be the passive spectators of our national disgrace? If we have, then we must consent in the future to be the prey and the victims of those who may feel that it is not only safe for them, but what we ourselves will patiently endure, if they complete our infamy by systematic insult and spoilation.

The Essential Elements of Foreign Policy

12

After many years of earnest and unremitting effort to promote permanent peace, I shall not be thought capable of pleading for or lightly counselling a resort to war; but, in the name of peace, I implore the American people promptly to make themselves so strong that their words and their rights will be respected in the world. To do this, we must be prepared to act; for at present it is admitted that we are not prepared to act effectively, and abroad it is believed that we shrink from the very thought of action. The vital necessity at this moment is that that condition be promptly changed.

Others who will address the convention, with more authority than I can claim, will point out what the needs for effective action are; but more fundamental than any plans for fitting our armies and fleets for service, is the question: Do we intend to maintain the standards of civic duty set up by our fathers, and unflinchingly sustained by them? If we do,—and in spite of all the discouragements, I believe we do,—then we must firmly resolve, cost what it may, that henceforth no power possessed by this nation shall be spared, not only to defend from hostile invasion every foot of our thousands of miles of sea and land frontiers, but to vindicate the right to personal safety of every law-abiding man, woman, and child justly possessed of American citizenship, wherever their legitimate business or the necessity of their situation may require them to be.



She mounts ten 13 ½ inch and twelve 6-inch guns. She is protected against serial attack by deck armor, and also against torpedo attack.

Ten of her 6-inch guns are grouped near the forward turrets. Her speed is 21 knots. H.M.S. IRON DUKE

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COMPARISONS OF NAVAL STRENGTH

SIDNEY M. BALLOU

The relative rank of the navies of the world is a mixed question of fact and opinion. There should be no question as to the facts and not much room for difference of opinion. Nevertheless, the subject is a favorite field of controversy, and diverse conclusions often reached are explicable only on the supposition that the subject has been approached with a determination that the facts must be made to support a predetermined conclusion. In the hands of partisans all statistics are dangerous, and the multitude of figures that can be used to express the functions of modern battleships afford a wide scope for those that have already made up their minds what the result should be.

AVAILABLE FACTS

Prior to the outbreak of the war, the number of ships built and building, together with their main characteristics, was known with reasonable exactness. No nation whose navy is any practical concern to us had any method of building battleships in time of peace except upon appropriations authorized by its legislature, and no warship ever appeared on the face of the waters whose coming had not been a matter of public record from the date of the appropriation. Writers of imaginary fiction were the only persons able to create fleets of battleships secretly and by stealth.

With regard to the main characteristics of vessels under construction, secrecy was sometimes attempted. Ships of a new type or class were frequently kept under cover as long as possible, and the exact size or arrangement of guns concealed. It must be borne in mind, however, that this was only a temporary expedient. A nation that could keep the plans of a battleship a secret up to the date of actual completion was doing very well. After that a battleship cannot be hidden in a cellar, and there are too many trained eyes to see to make any further pretence of concealment worth while. The most conspicuous example of secret plans was the *Dreadnought*, but

since the date of her completion all her essential features have been public property.

Since the beginning of the war, however, it has been possible for the nations at war to lay down ships of an unknown number and size. On the other hand it is improbable that any vessels of large size — battleships or battle cruisers — laid down after that date have been completed.

Building programs since the beginning of the war have undoubtedly been extensive. Against the conjectural number of ships started since the war began we may roughly balance the equally conjectural possibility of a general fleet action or other chances of future losses during the duration of the war. Losses up to date, however, are known with reasonable certainty and are allowed for.

For the basis of present comparison, therefore, if we confine ourselves to capital ships, we can safely assume that the larger ships laid down before the outbreak of the war are completed. If we compare these with our own ships laid down before the same date we shall get the best comparison available, and this will very nearly represent, especially as to larger vessels, the fighting ships now in commission.

In thus comparing present conditions, however, we must emphasize, once for all, that a comparison of conditions in the immediate future would be strikingly different. With many of the belligerents straining their building resources to the utmost, the United States has thus far proceeded at its very leisurely ante-bellum rate. It is only the lack of specific information, and the desirability of getting at least a starting point, that makes present conditions, based on vessels laid down before the war, of any value.

METHODS OF COMPARISON

When we begin to compare the ships of different navies, our main difficulties begin. The comparison of guns alone can be made on the basis of caliber, of weight of projectiles, of range, of muzzle velocity, of flatness of trajectory, of rapidity of fire, and of length of life, and anyone with a proposition to prove will have little difficulty in picking out the particular feature that will best suit his needs. Guns are but one element of a battleship, however, which in addition should have defensive

armor, speed, great radius of action, and a host of minor but desirable characteristics. All this, moreover, concerns only the individual ship. Every navy is composed of a multitude of ships, of every size, class, type, age, and purpose. To be of any value in time of war, each of these ships must be manned by a thoroughly trained crew.

FALSE STANDARDS

In this complexity it is no wonder that the average citizen seeks for some simple standard of comparison. One sapient statesman figured out that the vessels of the United States Navy if strung out in a line would cover 16 miles, while the German Navy similarly disposed would cover but 12 miles, wherefore their proportionate strength was as 16 to 12. With equal intelligence he might have added their masthead heights and arrived at a vertical column as a similar basis of comparison. Methods like these we may dismiss briefly as partisanship gone mad.

Other false standards, however, are more generally accepted. Too often, for example, the average citizen is prone to seize upon some particular feature of a ship and to exploit it at the expense of all the rest. The elements which seem to bulk largest in the popular minds are the caliber of the guns and the speed of the ship.

As to the first, we hear complaints by the score that the Queen Elizabeth has 15-inch guns while our battleships still under construction have only 14-inch guns. To these critics it is incomprehensible that our navy should be so out of date. To them nothing matters but the size of the gun: if a gun is bigger it must be better, and we should have the best. In this connection it is seldom that anything is heard of the corresponding disadvantages that go with increased caliber. One would think, for example, that the number of big guns that a ship could carry would strike the popular mind as being as important as their size, but somehow it doesn't.

The other popular criterion of superiority is speed. This is the most spectacular feature of a ship, and the reasons for its popularity are manifest. The ability of anything, from a man to a motor, to move fast, is not only of value to itself but will usually attract a tremendous crowd to see it do it. The singling out of speed as the all important factor sometimes leads to ludicrous results. A recent article reviewed in detail the fate of the unfortunate Bluecher, whose twenty-five knots was too slow to enable it to escape its pursuers, and moralized on the like fate awaiting the American Navy, whose most recent battleship, the Pennsylvania, was fully four knots slower. It never occured to the writer to inquire why a Pennsylvania should ever wish to escape from a Bluecher.

The Queen Elizabeth figures largely in this discussion too. It may be remarked in passing that whatever may have been the reason for building this divison of twenty-five knot battleships, Great Britain was not enough satisfied with the result to continue the experiment with her next class of dreadnoughts, but returned to the more conservative speed of twenty-two knots.

The average citizen has got past the stage where he will buy an automobile on the representation that it is the fastest car on the market. He knows he is giving up too much else to get that speed. Some day he will realize that battleships are built on the same principle.

STANDARDS OF COMPARISON

1. Displacement

The trouble with such standards of comparison is that they pick out one desirable feature of a battleship and neglect all the rest. All battleships are compromises. Upon a given displacement, or total weight, the more guns you have, the less you have left for armor; the bigger the guns the fewer they must be. Speed is a direct function of the proportion of the total weight and space you are willing to allot to boilers and machinery, the radius of action is likewise dependent on the number of tons of fuel allowed. No one of these can be ever emphasized except at the expense of all the rest.

Herein lies the hint of the first and most important standard of comparison. The total displacement or weight of a battleship is the sum of all its desirable qualities. Displacement costs money, but the more displacement you put at the service of the naval designer the better ship you will get.

It is not that size is a virtue in itself. The increased size and weight of the hull, together with the additional target it

offers, are the disadvantages of bigness. The increased weight of the hull alone, however, is not in proportion to the increase in total displacement, and the increase in size puts so much more weight at the disposal of the designer to be used in the four fighting qualities, guns, armor, speed, and endurance, that it is an axiom that the bigger the ship the better fighter it will be.

This, then, makes the total displacement, as the sum of the fighting qualities of a vessel, the principal criterion of its power. The best distribution of this weight among the fighting qualities may be a matter of opinion, even among experts. Even now, for example, there may be a serious difference as to the advisability of putting fewer sixteen-inch guns instead of the present number of fourteen-inch on our next battleships. This does not mean, however, that the officers concerned do not recognize and agree upon the relative advantages and disadvantages of each course, but merely these advantages and disadvantages are so evenly balanced that they differ as to which should, in the long run, receive the most consideration. In such a discussion, the layman had better stay out. Amateur advice as to the designing of our next battleships would be ridiculous, yet amateur criticism of the designs amounts to the same thing.

Taking tonnage alone as a criterion, we may get our first rough measure of comparison of the navies of the world. This is given in the following table, recently issued by the Office of Naval Intelligence of our Navy Department.

RELATIVE ORDER OF WARSHIP TONNAGE.

TABLE I.

Order on July 1, 1914 (tonns	age completed)	As would have been the case if vessels building July 1, 1914, had been completed.		
Nation.	Tonnage.	Nation.	Tonnage.	
Great Britain	2,158,250	Great Britain	2,713,756	
Germany	951,718	Germany	1,304,640	
United States	774.353	United States	914,218	
France	665,748	France	899,915	
Japan	519,610	Russia	701,253	
Italy	285,460	Japan	699,916	
Russia	270,861	Italy	497,815	
Austria-Hungary	221,526	Austria-Hungary	372,008	

One last word as to displacement. There are advocates of moderate displacement of individual ships on the theory that if a nation has so much money to put into battleships it were better distributed in more units of smaller size than concentrated in larger units. The writer does not believe the fundamental postulate sound,—that is, that a nation has a fixed sum to put into naval construction. But apart from this, in a comparison of navies and not of ships, the total tonage in fighting craft will again be the approximate measure of their fighting strength.

STANDARDS OF COMPARISON

2. Age

Unfortunately, we cannot rest wholly upon this one standard of displacement. To reach any just comparison, another element is absolutely necessary to be considered. This is the age of the ship. It is not so much that the ship itself deteriorates with age, as it is the relative deterioration from improvement in design and construction. In this sense age, like displacement, covers a multitude of details. Naval construction is a progressive science. Improvement in guns, armor, machinery, and hull construction are made constantly, so the sum total of these is a factor of considerable importance.

This can perhaps be best illustrated to the average citizen by the analogy between the progress in designing and building battleships and the progress in designing and building automobiles. The multitude of improvements, large and small, which makes the motor of to-day a more efficient machine than the motor of ten years ago, finds a close parallel in the corresponding progress in naval construction.

As a typical illustration of the importance of the factor of age, we may compare the thirteen-inch guns on the *Kearsarge* (built in 1898) with the twelve-inch guns on the *Arkansas* (built in 1911). On paper the thirteen-inch gun looks bigger; actually, the *Arkansas's* gun is more than twice as powerful, the penetration of face hardened armor at 9,000 yards being respectively 16.4 inches and 7.2 inches, in favor of the modern gun.

FURTHER NECESSITY OF SIMPLIFICATION

With these two factors,—that is, given the age and displacement of fighting ships,—a very just estimate of the relative

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	GREAT BRITAIN.F					
Type of Vessel.	Built.		Buildin			
	No.	Tons.	No.	Tor		
Battleships 3 (dreadnaught type)	20	423, 350	16	42		
Battleships (predreadnaught)	40	589, 385		ļ		
Coast-defense vessels 5						
Battle cruisers	9	188, 200	1	2		
Armored cruisers	34	406, 800		·		
Cruisers 7	7.4	382, 815	17	6		
Torpedo-boat destroyers	167	125, 850	21	2		
Torpedo boats	. 49	11, 488				
Submarines	75	30, 362	22	1		
Total tons built and total tons						
building		2, 158, 250		55		
Total tons built and building	2, 713, 756					

¹ Colonial vessels included.

² Does not include Idaho and Mississippi,

3 Battleships having a main battery of all considered as dreadnaughts because of low s
4 Battleships of (about) 10,000 or more to

battleships of (about) 16,000 of more to lina and Michigan.

5 Includes smaller battleships and monitor 6 Armored cruisers having guns of largest of They have an increase of speed at the expens

⁷ All unarmored warships of more than 1,5 protection have been sacrificed to secure extr and oldest now have protective decks. 8 Includes 3 submarines authorized in 1913

ı 	IT	ALY.		Austria-Hungary.				
Built.		Bui	Building.		Built.		Building.	
8	Tons.	No.	Tons (esti- mated).	No.	Tons.	No.	Tona (esti- mated).	
3	62, 644	7	187, 150	3	60, 030	5	118, 010	
8	96, 100			6	74, 613			
 				6	41, 700		ļ	
9	74, 020			2	13, 380			
6	18, 830	2	4, 888	5	13, 815	5	21, 216	
6	16, 807	15	14, 203	18	9, 450			
В	11, 584	2	272	39	6, 852	24	5, 886	
9	5, 475	8	5, 842	6	1, 686	6	5, 370	
	285, 460		212, 355	••••	221, 526		150, 482	
-	497	, 815	<u> </u>		372,	008		

rearmed within 5 years.

values of two navies may be formed. Further difficulty, however, now awaits us, in the effort to reduce even these factors to a comprehensive form. This difficulty lies, first in the multitude of various craft to be considered, and second in the difficulty of combining the factors of age and displacement to express a definite result.

VARIOUS SOLUTIONS

These difficulties may be solved in various ways, none completely satisfactory. Ships may be classified as dreadnoughts, pre-dreadnoughts, battle cruisers, armored cruisers, etc., with reasonable exactness, though the classes sometimes merge in a way to give the captious full opportunity to dissent from the individual classification of many border line ships. The age question may be dealt with by drawing a dead line, usually at twenty years from the date of launching for battleships, and fifteen years for torpedo craft, excluding all beyond this, and drawing no distinction within the age limit. A table on this basis was recently prepared by the Office of Naval Intelligence of our Navy Department and is presented herewith as Table II.

RELATIVE FIGHTING VALUES

Another method consists in determining for each vessel in the navy a definite relative fighting value. To be of any value this must be the work of an expert — and, it is unnecessary to add, of an unprejudiced expert. Some years ago, the late Fred T. Jane of England, publisher of "All the World's Fighting Ships," was accustomed to include such a table in the annual editions of his work. The present writer has taken the liberty of reviving this system and of bringing it up to date. Fighting values are assigned on a scale of twelve points, with due allowance for tonnage, age, and other factors affecting efficiency. The maximum value is assigned only to dreadnoughts of over thirty thousand tons displacement. The result is printed herewith as Table III.

To keep this table within comprehensible limits it is confined wholly to armored ships. These are the backbone of the fighting strength of a navy. A fair comparison of armored

ships will give a very just idea of the relative fighting strength of two navies. Nevertheless, in order to get the full value of its armored ships, as well as for those phases of warfare not involving the clash of major forces, it is necessary that a navy should have its due proportion of lighter craft, particularly scout cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. That these classes are not included in Table III, is not to be taken that they are negligible, but merely that they would complicate the problem beyond limits. In general it may be said that the German, French, and Japanese Navies are fairly supplied with their proportion of lighter craft, that the British Navy is particularly strong, and that the American Navy has practically no effective scouts and is woefully weak in all unarmored vessels.

Outside of this, the main disadvantages of Jane's method (Table III.) are that there is too much room for difference of individual opinion in the assignment of fighting values and that the classes merge into each other in such a way that even a unit sometimes seems too large a measure of difference. The chief advantage of it is that the final result can be expressed in a single figure.

Perhaps the justest criticism that can be passed on this table is, that the discount for age and obsolescence is not heavy enough. On the other hand, it must not be assumed that by the assignment of a value of 12 to the Pennsylvania and of 4 to the armored cruisers of the West Virginia class it is meant to imply that three West Virginias would be a match for one Pennsylvania. The number of obsolescent armored cruisers necessary to fight one dreadnought would run into enormous figures, and the comparison would be valueless, because that is not what obsolescent armored cruisers are for. In time of war the West Virginia class would do its own work, including that of fighting vessels of a similar age and class in the enemy Navy, and it is on this basis that fighting values are assigned.

PERSONNEL

In this connection, too, we must recur again to one subject that throws its shadow across all comparisons based on material. A Navy must have trained men. The minimum requisite training, moreover, is in excess of that required to make an infantryman. Nobody speaks of an increase in the number of rifles

manufactured as an increase in the Army, yet everybody speaks of the number of naval guns manufactured and mounted on ships as an increase of the Navy. No fallacy could be more dangerous. A stationary personnel means a stationary Navy; guns without men trained to shoot them, and ships without men trained to run them, do not increase naval strength except to the extent that rifles stored in an armory may be said to increase military strength. In time of war, a modern warship with a green crew would not be a fighting machine, it would be merely an expensive steel coffin.

We may interrupt our comparisons of material, then, long enough to give some consideration to the question of personnel. Every foreign naval power has a reserve of trained personnel sufficient to man its reserve ships in time of war. The United States has not. Our authorized active personnel has been absolutely stationary for many years, so that when a new ship is put in commission it is necessary to lay up a corresponding tonnage in older ships. These older ships still figure in our material strength, but in time of war we should have to train crews to man them.

Counting our Naval Militia as a trained reserve, the United States had, as of July 1, 1914, a total of 83 trained men available for every ten thousand tons of displacement of her navy. Germany and Japan had 123 men to every thousand tons, and France 177 men. England had the low proportion of 80 men before the war, due to her vast number of reserve ships, but now her fleet is fully manned on a basis of 150 men per thousand tons. In the meantime, the proportionate number of the United States has sunk to 76 men per thousand tons.

COMPARISON OF INDIVIDUAL DREADNOUGHTS

Returning to comparison of ships, the writer presents a final table in which a great deal is sacrificed to simplicity, yet which, it is believed, presents striking facts in a comprehensible way.

This is a table (Table IV.) of each individual dreadnought and battle cruiser of the five leading naval powers, with its displacement, arranged according to the year in which the vessel was laid down.

This table ends, like the others, with the ships laid down

prior to July 1, 1914. Since that time the United States has laid down three dreadnoughts, the California (now renamed New Mexico), the Idaho, and the Mississippi. Two more are to be laid down some months hence, when government yards can be made ready to receive them. During the same time France has laid down at least four, the Tourville, Lyons, Lillie, and Duquesne. Of the other nations we have no definite knowledge, but it is safe to say they are proceeding in no such leisurely and haphazard fashion as we are. The strong probabilities, therefore, are that the farther the table was carried the weaker would be the relative rank of the United States.

It is not denied that a comparison based wholly on dreadnoughts and battle cruisers requires considerable justification and explanation. In the first place, it must be restated and emphasized, that a navy should have a due proportion of unarmored craft, and that the United States Navy is particularly weak in modern light cruisers.

In the next place, the pre-dreadnought fleets of battleships are by no means obsolete, in any proper sense of that term. They are, however, of diminishing importance, and each succeeding year finds them of less relative value.

At present our main fighting fleet is a mixture of dreadnoughts and pre-dreadnoughts. The pre-dreadnoughts handicap the dreadnoughts in many ways, particularly in neutralizing the superior speed of the latter. Some day there will come to us, as to other navies, a critical point, when the relative number of dreadnoughts will be so large and the relative handicap of the pre-dreadnoughts so great, that the fleet will actually be stronger if it goes into action with dreadnoughts alone. When this time comes, the pre-dreadnoughts will be sloughed off, and will become in fact what they are already in name, second-line battleships. It is probable that Great Britian has already reached and passed this point; that is, if challenged by the whole German fleet the British line of battle would consist wholly of dreadnoughts, unhandicapped by slower and inferior vessels. next nation to reach this point will have an immense superiority over its rivals. Herein lies the importance of comparing dread-Table IV. is for those who are looking to the nought fleets. future, and wish to see whither we are drifting. It tells its own story.

CONCLUSION

It is significant that each method of comparison gives the same relative rank to the five leading naval powers. Great Britain's superiority is manifest. The substantial margin of the strength of Germany over the United States is equally patent. The United States and France are so closely matched that the strong probabilities are that only the uncertainty of the extent of construction after July 1, 1914, and the consequent necessity of stopping with vessels laid down before that date prevents a demonstration that the United States is occupying fourth place instead of third. A little in the rear is Japan, now similarly pressed by Russia.

One suggestion in conclusion. There are over fifty independent nations in the world represented at the last Hague Convention. There are less than half a dozen with whom we have to compare naval strength. This means that there are less than half a dozen with whom it is possible that we should have war which would even remotely threaten our commerce or our territory. Is not this worth something?

NAVAL DEFENSE OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE


ALBERT BUSHNELL HART

Professor of Government in Harvard University

This meeting is one of those useful combinations of experts and laymen, of the man who knows and the man who is willing to learn, of the man who can point the way and the man who can follow. I confess that I am here as a learner, my own naval experiences being chiefly confined to being launched on board a United States revenue cutter in the fresh waters of the Cuyahoga River, at Cleveland, about fifty years ago. I was also for a time one of the commissioners of the Massachussets Nautical Training School, where we three commissioners thought we ranked a live commander of the United States Navy, who had to take orders from us,—so far as they did not conflict with his orders from the Navy Department.

We are here to help organize the forces of our country for peace. No aspersion, none of the malevolent falsehoods that are being distributed through the United States, is more false or more hurtful than the presumption that the purpose of those who wish to see their country in a posture of defense, in a posture of military and naval preparedness, is that their country may be an aggressive force in the world. God knows we are far enough from the point of self-defense. We are oceans wide and years of time from any point of military and naval strength which would justify even the most haphazard statesman from entering upon an aggressive campaign against our neighbors and friends.

For defensive warfare, the first thing that this country needs is a general staff. We need a naval staff, we need a more powerful military staff, we need the same kind of thing in all departments. There is not a great railroad in the country that has not an organization to which we may fairly attach the name of general staff. Imagine, if you can, a railroad with a superintendent of motive power, a superintendent of maintenance of way, a bureau of purchasing, a general freight agent, a general ticket agent,— and those people acting each in his



U.S.S. OHIO

The old ship of the line Ohio, the type that formed the backbone of the fleet early in last century. She was launched in 1820—carried twelve 8-inch smooth bore guns and seventy 84 pounders. When fully manned her crew was 820.

own sphere without any superior council from which may issue general orders, to secure common action. Such a confusion is not possible, except in our defensive organization. Indeed, the principle of the general staff is better exemplified in the big-domed building at the end of the Avenue, than anywhere else in the country. How does Congress get on? Through the powerful motive influence of a steering committee, which is no other than a legislative general staff. Not a single member of Congress fails to understand that some sort of central council is necessary; everyone subordinates many things that he would desire, in order to secure common action.

In fact, the general staff in Congress shows the disposition to be the general staff of the whole country, and of every department of the public service, particularly the navy. I judge so because of the remarkable professional acumen recently shown by a high official of the general staff of the House of Representatives, who, in discussing the question of ships, invented a very simple formula that entirely satisfied him. "Ascertain," said he, in a public speech which has been circulated throughout the country,—"ascertain the best type of ships, and then pass a resolution that all of the rest of the battleships shall be built on that model and thus shorten the process by six months."

Prodigious thought!

Mr. Speaker of the Navy League, I move that the Navy League be hereby instructed forthwith to bring in a bill for the purchase of a dozen battle-cruisers, Style No. 3 (C. O. D.).

When somebody in debate threw out the suggestion that other nations had bigger guns than we on battleships, this military sage said: "Seventeen-inch guns? Put on the biggest guns obtainable or that can be obtainable on every one of those battleships that you build."

This man who has been sixteen years in Congress and has occupied a position of considerable responsibility, assumes that the country knows no more about naval construction than he does. That is the cheerful way in which he disposes of the whole complicated and highly technical question of building warships. His easy and delightful method makes me think of the suggestion of the Mayor of Chicago some years ago, that they introduce gondolas, which would be such an ornament to the waters in the public parks. Whereupon one of the council-

men brought in a motion to the effect that "His Honor, the Mayor, be hereby instructed to purchase a pair of the best Venetian gondolas and let them raise a family of little gondolas."

The naval knowledge of some members of Congress who are charged with our defense and safety seems very like that of Wallace Irwin's Admiral Buttertoast:

"Men," said the admiral, "I abhor to litter my boat With shot and shell;

And it's very untidy to go to war and scent my ship With the powder smell.

So load the cannon with perfumed soap And sachet powder of heliotrope."

Unless we have ships equal in strength, in power, and in speed to those of the most highly equipped modern nation, we have no navy. Unless we have trained sailors who can hold their courses as true and as straight as can the German and the French and the Austrian and the British, then, indeed, our country is without defense.

I did not come here to speak so much of the navy as of one of the great purposes to which a navy can be devoted, to which it must be devoted if this country is to stand by those principles of the defense of its own citizens and its own interests of which the Chairman has just been speaking. I came here to call your attention particularly to a development of American policy, going on from day to day and from week to week, growing ever stronger and more significant, for the maintenance of which we absolutely must have a navy, a powerful navy, a navy constantly advancing, a navy ready at all times for instant service.

One of the main reasons for a strong navy is the Monroe Doctrine. It must be presumed that the American people, through their chosen statesmen as mouthpieces, are aware of what they mean by that Doctrine. It is now nearly a century since a Presidential message was put forth under the name of President Monroe, though, as all the world knows, the ideas and much of the phraseology were chiefly due to John Quincy Adams. That Doctrine has ever since been the pet diplomatic principle of good Americans. The Monroe Doctrine is one of those things to which we are all passionately devoted, without quite understanding it. It is like the good old lady's fondness

for the comforting word "Mesopotamia." The Monroe Doctrine is a fashion, if you will, but it is absolutely real. I suppose there is not one person here who would say that the chief diplomatic duty of the United States is to European powers; not one who would deny that we have a greater influence, purpose and need in the Western Hemisphere than any European power.

If there is such a Doctrine, if there is a something, however intangible, to which the American people have given their adhesion and their allegiance, the first question is: Exactly how far does that principle extend, and how far have we the physical means for making it good?

The Monroe Doctrine has been singularly successful, so far, in accomplishing its purpose, without firing a gun. It is an exceedingly interesting fact to which the pacifists and the antipreparedness people are welcome, that up to the present time the Monroe Doctrine, to use the vernacular, has not cost us a cent. That is, we have so far maintained whatever it is that we mean by the Monroe Doctrine without war and without money appropriations. What Monroe was afraid of was not so much that European powers might appear in other parts of America, as that they might appear within the boundaries of the United States. The Monroe Doctrine, from the beginning, has been a defensive doctrine. We have been genuinely interested in the welfare and progress of our neighbors, but still more interested in the welfare and progress of the people of the United States. In a certain sense it has always been a selfish Doctrine. Monroe was not thinking so much of Bolivar and the people of Mexico as he was thinking of his own territory, and what would make the American people the safest and would give the most elastic, the most durable, form to the government of which he was at the time the head.

It is one of the wonders of the world that the little United States did so well at sea in the War of 1812, with hardly ten millions of people and a navy made up of a few frigates of the medium class and never a ship of the line, never what could be called a battleship. The United States throughout the war never had a real army, but did somehow impress the nations. I will tell you how they did it. At the commencement of a college with which I have had some familiarity during the last forty years,

the late Charles Francis Adams declaimed against the money that was spent on battleships. If Charles Francis Adams were here to-day he would be on the other side of the question. He was a man who could change his mind, and who did it frequently. At that time, however, he was against the building of battleships. Whereupon President Eliot replied, "You do not know how much the money put into a battleship may do for the country;" and he mentioned the frigate Constitution, which was built for about \$300,000, and described the effect of the Constitution on the destinies of this country. The United States was able for many years thereafter to produce an effect on foreign powers, not because we were highly prepared, but because Europe, and particularly Great Britain, had a warm remembrance of the extraordinary success of the little American Navy in the War of 1812, when England had a thousand vessels, and the United States had not a dozen which were worthy to be considered ships of war.

During the course of the war the American Navy and privateers captured fifteen hundred British merchantmen, and thus inflicted a lesson never forgotten by John Bull, who has a particular respect for those who "lam" him. He came to the conclusion that if the United States was able to do such a thing as that, it was better to make this country a friend than an enemy.

Again, during our Civil War, Napoleon III made an attempt to plant a colony of France on our borders. It is a very curious fact that Secretary Seward never mentions in his whole correspondence the Monroe Doctrine. Mr. John Bigelow, in his recent Memoirs, gives himself credit for having suggested to Seward that he had better avoid that phrase. He did not avoid the thing. Was it the silent moral influence of the United States that moved Louis Napoleon to take his troops out of Mexico? Was it simply his conviction of the sincerity of the American people? Was it his ultimate belief that, on the whole, popular government was the right thing for America? Not a bit of it.

A lady called on me some years ago, and asked me if I could tell her why her father, the late General Armstrong, was ordered to Texas toward the end of the war. I answered, "Of course. He was one of the men who were sent down to that boundary in order to hint to the French Emperor that his country needed his troops at home." The hint was effective.

Even General Grant supposed that he was going to march into Mexico and made his arrangements accordingly. He learned that it was not necessary. Was it the silent dignity, the power, the vast reserve strength of the United States that saved us from the national danger of having alongside of us a colony of what at that moment was supposed to be the greatest military power in the world? No. It was the existence of an army sufficient to do the job of cleaning up Mexico if necessary. Now a similar necessity has arisen for us. Probably if we had had distributed along the border of Texas, during the last year and a half, a hundred thousand men, or the half of a hundred thousand, instead of a paltry fifteen thousand, the United States would not be to-day in a situation so embarrassing, so mortifying to a sense of national dignity and national honor, as the present.

I am trying to say that the Monroe Doctrine, although we have never actually fought a battle in behalf of it, has nevertheless at various times engaged the attention of our government, and especially that when the great principle of the Monroe Doctrine was attacked at its foundation, by the attempt actually to plant a colony of a foreign European power on soil adjacent to ourselves, the military force of the United States was all that stopped the French invasion of Mexico. The patriotic Mexicans of that time were saved from becoming the servants of servants, because the United States possessed not only a moral force, but a physical force, sufficient for the exigency.

Since that time, the question of being obliged to fight for the Monroe Doctrine was hardly raised, until we come to the year 1902. Far be it from me to write the inner history of that episode. There are people who know more than I do about the details, when the British, the Germans, and the Italians formed a combination for a naval expedition against Venezuela. The Venezuelans were great sinners, undoubtedly. It is hard to get on with a set of people whose government is constantly changing. One of the main reasons for the difficulties in Latin America is that when a man gets to be dictator he feels very much like the Pasha of Many Tales described by Captain Marryat. That wise functionary objected to the introduction of writing because, as he said, when a man comes to the custom-

house and pays his dues, you have to give him a receipt; when you attempt to collect them a second time he presents that receipt. If it had not been for the bit of writing you could get your money over again. Some such transactions made trouble with regard to Venezuela, which passed a law by which it compelled the naturalization of foreigners: then, when a man was a mere Venezuelan, they could plunder him, and there would be nobody to show a receipt.

The situation was grave. I know not how far I am at liberty to speak freely, but I have some reason to believe that the German government was in very close confidential diplomatic relations with the then President of the United States over this controversy in 1902. Those communications took the form of very positve suggestions as to what would be or would not be to the advantage of Germany, and what was desired by our government. These suggestions took the form of a time limit within which a communication from Germany would be welcomed. The communication was received, and the result was that the German, English, and Italian Governments all agreed that they would make only a kind of a Pickwickian attack upon Venezuela; they would not land troops; they would simply blockade the harbors, bombard the coast, and might capture a few coasters - which was exactly what happened. In the end Venezuela agreed to an arbitration, and the whole matter was cleared up. The United States, in 1902, had a respectable naval force, without which these delicate suggestions and hints and innuendoes would not have been exactly practicable.

Within the last ten years the United States is entering upon an entirely different field in its relations with Latin America. We hardly realize where we are, because we are not using the proper terms to describe it. We say that we have established a custom-house in Santo Domingo; that we have an influence in Nicaragua; that suggestions have been made as to the proper persons to elect to office in the Republic of Panama. Nothing is gained by those circumlocutions. The simple fact is that the United States, with its eyes open, through three successive Presidental terms, has added already five protectorates, and is likely, within a few years, to add six more. The first was Cuba, the second was Panama, the third was Santo Domingo. How did Santo Domingo come to be a protectorate? Because the

President of the United States was satisfied, in 1907, that unless something was done, some foreign power, not named in the affidavits, would proceed to land and take possession of that island republic.

I am not familiar with that country. There are gentlemen here who doubtless know how sound and solid and enduring the government of Santo Domingo may have been ten years ago. Whatever the circumstances, the important truths are that American marines were landed; that an American custom-house official was sent down there, backed by a treaty with Santo Domingo, which was not ratified by the Senate for two years, but which nevertheless was kept going by a modus vivendi; that the Dominican government, such as it was, agreed that the United States should collect the duties in the custom-house, apportion a part to the government down there and a part to the payment and amortization of the Dominican debts.

It is a curious fact that the present half revenue, when collected, is more than the whole had been under the previous government. When you send down marines and they take possession of the capital of the country, when you send a custom-house officer with a few men to protect him, when all the world knows that your gunboats are on call for further protection, genuine national government, good or bad, ceases. The country affected is no longer independent, and has become a protectorate of the United States.

Cuba became formally such a protectorate in 1902 by the famous self-denying ordinance known as the Teller Resolution of 1898, which was solidified by the so-called Platt Resolution of 1902. I had the opportunity, a few days ago, to make some inquiries as to the exact course of the Platt Resolution, and I have it on authority which I think is undeniable that it sprang from — shall we say the Cabinet? — was prepared by Elihu Root, and simply presented by Senator Platt. That document made Cuba just as independent as — well, as Servia is at the present moment; as independent as the Turkish Empire under German control; as independent as Hungary in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Under the Platt amendment, it is stipulated — and the Cubans have signed and subscribed to it — that no relations are to be entered into with foreign countries which are considered prejudicial by the United States. Fur-

thermore, the United States reserves the right, if necessary, to send troops in order to restore order and to keep up the government of Cuba; and it has already once exercised that right. That means that Cuba, with its two million people, is no longer an independent country. It is a protectorate of the United States—as much of a protectorate as those native States in India which are still allowed by the British Government to keep up to their separate Rajah and the semblance of authority.

The third of these protectorates is the Republic of Panama. In 1903, when the Canal treaty was made with Panama, that country had been independent—I was going to say for only a few minutes. I will say, a few days; and it then lost whatever independence it might have had. Panama is as much a dependency of the United States as Cuba, although there is no writing to that effect. It is incredible that the Panama Government should be allowed to do anything that in any way prejudices our hold upon the Canal; and, in fact, if it is not thought expedient by our State Department that A shall be elected President, then the Panamanians expediently elect B.

Next we come to Haiti. Anybody who knew the circumstances in that island ten years ago, could have predicted that Haiti would follow the train to Santo Domingo into dependence on the United States. And it has done so, with the exception that the treaty gives us more authority than in Santo Domingo. The whole financial system is to be put in the hands of our country.

Fifth, and up to this time last, we come to Nicaragua, where a force of our marines have for several years maintained a government which could not have been supported without such aid, or else our troops would not have been there.

Now let us travel a little farther. Of the six Central American powers, Panama and Nicaragua are already absorbed into our system of dependent States. That leaves four others, and negotiations have already begun with Honduras and perhaps Guatemala. It is inconceiveable that those four States will long escape the same rule as Nicaragua. We cannot maintain ourselves in Nicarauga if the neighbors are to be obstreperous.

All this is not so important to us as the question of Mexico—a question that has been a serious one for the United States for half a century. In the War of 1848, when the whole Mex-

ico would have been annexed to the United States,— for men like James Buchanan urged it, — the only thing that prevented annexation was that slender reed, the conscience of President James K. Polk, who said that he had promised in a public message not to seize Mexico, and therefore he would accept the treaty by which we took only a part of Mexico.

Ever since that time we have felt a special responsibility for that unfortunate country; we have treated it as a sister republic, as a neighboring nation, as a great territorial problem. We have seen it time after time overwhelmed by despots, till at last it fell into the hands of the first man who was both able and benevolent as a despot. That is, he was benevolent within limits. He was benevolent to his friends, so long as they remained his friends.

As for the native critics of his regime, they did not criticise long at a time. Diaz saw to that. That is the reason why he lasted so long. At last the dynasty, or the regime, of Diaz gave way, in 1910. Nearly six years have gone by, and still day after day is worse than the previous day, culminating in an insult to the United States so gross that it is almost inconceivable, followed by a punishment that we hope will be effective, but which involves great dangers. Other armies have penetrated into other countries and have found their way blocked for their return. Such an outcome is not impossible for our little force now beyond the borders.

When, in 1880, President Hayes, in a public message, said that any Isthmus Canal, when accomplished, would be "a part of the coast line of the United States," he prophesied what would eventually become of Mexico. I should be willing to risk a reputation which I have not yet acquired as a political prophet by saying that within five years the so-called Republic of Mexico will come to occupy toward the United States the same status as the Republic of Cuba; that is, that it will be an "independent republic" under the benevolent superintendence of the United States, defined by something resembling the Platt Amendment for Cuba.

Is there any other way? Would any gentleman like to take the train this evening and go down to Mexico in order to bring about any other settlement? I believe that that will be the outcome — not because I like it; not at all; it means that if we

were to bring Mexico into that relation, we should then be paramount lords over more than twenty million Latin Americans, to whom we would owe the duty of protection and from whom we could not exact the duty of service. That is the difficulty with the whole situation.

Where does this visible, and to me unwelcome, program place us with regard to the Monroe Doctrine and the navy? The Monroe Doctrine, as uttered by recent Presidents, phrased with great distinctness by President Roosevelt and then by President Taft and then by Senator Lodge, is a declaration by which the United States has pledged itself not to allow a disturbance of the present territorial relations of the western world. Why? Because, in the long run, any such disturbance means trouble for us. Put it to yourselves. Suppose that on the first day of August, 1914, Southern Brazil had been a German colony, and Mexico had been an English colony, and Northern Brazil had been a French colony, and Venezuela had been an Austrian colony -- how would that have affected our relations in the war? Should we not have become involved with those colonies, which would be warring with each other, till we would be plunged into the general war?

The Monroe Doctrine is a self-protective document, and that is the reason why the American people adhere to it with such tenacity. We have agreed to defend South America; we have agreed to defend the isles of the sea. Cuba and Porto Rico are our country; the two halves of the Island of Haiti; now Central America; probably Mexico. That is, we have already extended the boundary of our own responsibility beyond anything that we have ever dreamed.

Have we made it a part of this extension to increase the naval strength which is absolutely necessary for the support and defense of that Doctrine? I say, naval strength. In the first place, of course, we can expect very little defensive support from these dependencies. If the American nation should be engaged in war, we might raise a few thousand Haitian soldiers and Honduran rangers and a Panama regiment, and so on; but the main defense of these regions must always be troops from the continent. It is exceedingly unlikely, in case there should be a general Pan-American war, that any troops would ever be sent to us from American allies at a distance, because the

difficulties of passage are too great. Suppose the Brazilians feared a German invasion,—would they send a hundred thousand men in order to prevent the Germans from landing in New Jersey! I trow not. The defense of the main United States, and also of the protected countries that are threatened, must be by the navy, because any attack made upon them from Europe must be through a navy.

Until two days ago I thought it possible that there might be such attacks. Since the recent assurance by a representative of the German Empire that Germany has not the slightest intention of attacking us, our fears are entirely groundless. But suppose Great Britain should attack us; what should we do? Suppose another power across the western ocean should attack us. I have been in Japan and know the Japanese. They are good people; but I am content that they should be near neighbors to China, rather than to the United States. They are people who push toward the line of least resistance.

The only thing that has stood between the annexation of certain parts of the western world by European powers has been the known position of the United States and the belief that the United States at the moment was in a position not only to resent, but to resist. How are we going to back up our resentment? The Monroe Doctrine, as a piece of paper upon which are imprinted certain black characters, has come to the end of its usefulness. You cannot longer impose it upon peoples who can raise such fleets as have been raised by Germany and France and Great Britain during the present war. You can no longer restrain such persons by calling their attention to the theory that it is dangerous to encounter "eventual opposition."

This meeting, and every other gathering of Americans, must accept one or the other of two lines of action: either we must give up the Monroe Doctrine on the ground that the American people care nothing for what happens, or else stand behind the Doctrine from top to bottom. That is the choice, and there is no other.

If the country is willing to take the responsibility of supporting the Doctrine,—and it evidently is, from its adding those five dependencies within a few years, with its eyes open,—everybody can understand what the eventual result must be. The United States being pledged to keep the Monroe Doctrine


in force, it must absolutely carry out that pledge in the only physical way in which it is possible. Above all, we must defend the Panama Canal — one of the greatest blessings of mankind and at the same time one of the most difficult treasures to safeguard within the domain of the United States. It may be destroyed by a single bomb dropped from a single airship, and, being destroyed, it may cut our navy in two.

Something was said here about our having a navy second to none. I will put it otherwise. We need a navy second to no responsibility that we have incurred, sufficient to protect the interests of the American citizens on the high seas, sufficient to maintain our authority in neighboring protected States. The navy must be brought up to that point, or else we are disgraced, and inevitably will receive the most terrible humiliation that has been placed upon any nation since the clash in France in 1870.

To be secure is within our power. We are the American people; this is our country. Not only the other end of the Avenue is sole owner of the government or the navy. It is the American Navy. The object of the navy is to subserve the interests of the whole American people. It is the right of the American people to decide what they want, first, in a foreign policy, and next in a defensive policy.

Why talk about an aggressive navy! It will take ten years at any rate of progress that is likely to be secured, to build up a navy that will simply be sufficient to safeguard the great interests we have already undertaken. Let us press forward to that task, remembering the poet's warning:

"Oh, woe betide the man or ever he was born That did not draw the sword before he blew the horn."



A submarine of the Holland type. Her weapon is the torpedo. It is instructive, even if humiliating, to contrast her with the foreign submarines that come into our harbors.

A TWO-POWER FLEET AS A NATIONAL POLICY

MORTON PRINCE

If we are going to argue for an enlarged and efficient navy, as I propose to do, our arguments must necessarily be based on the functions which a navy is intended to fulfill and the political policies which a nation commits itself to maintain. If, for example, we are to maintain as a national policy the threat of the Monroe Doctrine,—for, after all, the Monroe Doctrine is in reality a threat to attack any nation that seeks to extend its "system of government" to this hemisphere,—we must have a navy adequate to back up that threat when the time comes. otherwise it is nothing more than a bluff. And so it is with the functions which a navy is intended to perform. Every one is familiar with the conventional functions which the United States Navy is expected to fulfill in case of a defensive war: such, for example, as forming the first line of defense in case of an attempted invasion, the protection of colonial possessions, the protection of our commerce and destruction of the enemy's commerce, and so on. These functions have been discussed at length over and over again.

But there is one function that is a consequence of a political policy to which we always have been, and probably always shall be, committed, and that is of paramount importance, but which, it would seem, has not been adequately emphasized and brought into focus of attention. It is, to be sure, implied in the principle of "naval defense,"—assumed, perhaps, as a matter of course,—but if the political policy which I am about to mention is to be maintained, this particular function becomes almost paramount for the United States, and must be one, at least, of the determining factors in the question: What is an adequate navy for us? It, therefore, in my judgment, should receive more specific, more intensive, and fuller discussion than has as yet been accorded to it.

Let me first speak of this political policy to which I have referred, and in consequence of which the function I shall afterwards discuss becomes paramount.

It has always been the policy of the United States not to maintain a large standing army, in the European sense, with a correspondingly large force of thoroughly trained reservists. Such a large standing army, adequate to cope with the great military forces of the Continental Powers, can only be obtained and maintained by compulsory universal military service. To this, also, the American, like the English temperament has been traditionally opposed. Nor has it been our policy, nor probably will it ever be our policy, to organize on an extensive scale munition factories and factories for the manufacture of the multiform supplies needed for a great army, so that they may be efficiently mobilized in time of war. The experience of this war has shown us that vast masses of ammunition and enormous numbers of rifles, cannon, machine guns, aeroplanes, transport wagons, etc., not to mention uniforms and other necessities for the equipment of the soldier, must be accumulated, factories must be mobilized, and a large army of workmen recruited to keep up the supply.

The disclosures of the war have taught us, along with the rest of the world, a new meaning to preparedness. They have exhibited preparedness carried to a degree of efficiency never before dreamed of or thought possible, excepting by one nation. In this connection I would remark parenthetically that General Crozier, Chief of Ordnance, recently presented to the Senate Military Committee the estimate of what it would cost this country to build a plant adequate to manufacture ammunition and other war materials necessary to equip an army of one million men in the field and an additional million recruits. According to his estimate, as reported in the press, it would cost \$400,000,000 to build such a plant and would require a corps of 700,000 men to keep it going. This gives an idea of what our government would have to do in preparation for the emergency of war, if there were no private munition plants already built, equipped, and mobilized.

In view of the present great movement for preparedness, it is unlikely that we ever shall be in a state of such complete unpreparedness as we have been in the past; but it is also unlikely, in view of our traditional national prejudices and consequent policy, that we ever shall be adequately prepared in time of peace; prepared in the modern sense, in the sense of preparedness as exhibited to us by the military organizations of the Continental Powers, to equip completely within a few days, put in the

field, and maintain an army of at least one million thoroughly trained soldiers, to say nothing of an additional million reservists or recruits.

Consequently, in case of war being forced upon us by a great European Power, and in view of the great hostility of public opinion to universal compulsory service and a huge standing army, it would be necessary for us to carry out our preparations after war had been declared. Preparedness on a large scale—the training and mobilization of recruits, the manufacture and accumulation of an adequate amount of equipment and supplies of all knids—would have to be undertaken after the outbreak of war.

The thesis, therefore, which I would maintain, I will state at the outset. It is this: We require a navy of overwhelming superiority, as compared to the fleets of any alliance of Powers reasonably likely to be combined against us, in order that we may be safe while the nation is engaged in preparation after war is declared. Protected by such a navy of overwhelming strength, we could safely carry on our preparations, and would only require, in time of peace, a moderate army and industrial organization (relatively speaking, of course), both of which could be expanded to adequate proportions after war was declared.

The defense and elaboration of this thesis I would base, not on theoretical grounds, but on actual experience — the experience of one of the nations engaged in the present war, the British nation. It is to facts that we should turn, rather than to theories, for lessons in preparedness. And the facts which England had to face at the outbreak of this war and her experience in dealing with these facts are pertinent to our own situation and problems and furnish us with object-lessons which it would be crass stupidity to disregard.

Everyone knows the assistance which the British fleet has contributed to England's Allies in carrying on the war on land. English and American publicists have often enough pointed out how the British fleet has bottled up and rendered impotent the fleet of Germany and strangled her overseas commerce; how it has enabled England's own commerce to sail the seas unmolested save by submarines; protected the west coast of France from invasion and made the armies of France safe from attack

in the rear. But almost no allusion has been made to another great function which the British fleet has performed, though it has been of equal magnitude and of even greater value to England's own security. The British fleet has been able to fufill this function solely because of its overwhelming superiority to the enemy's fleet. This overwhelming superiority has enabled England, from the outbreak of the war, systematically to prepare for war on land—to create an army and mobilize her industries into an organization adequate for the task at hand. For one year and a half she has been preparing. She was able to do this solely because she was safe behind the steel walls of her fleet. The assurance of this safety has been the paramount, the saving function of her fleet. Here, to my mind, is the great lesson for us in the policy of preparedness.

Let us visualize the situation and see how far the conditions and problems that confronted England in 1914 and 1915 may be paralleled here at home. When war broke out, England, relatively speaking, had no adequate army, no rifles, no munitions, no high explosives, no cannons, no machine guns, no aeroplanes, no transports; that is, none of these in adequate proportions: and she had no factories in which to make them. no machinery to equip the necessary factories, and no army of of munition makers to man the factories. In all these respects she was like the United States. And all these elements of preparedness had to be created. So she set to work to create and and equip an adequate army and to build up an adequate industrial organization under government control - she has now 2700 factories, all under government control. She has been occupied more than one year and a half at the task. But --- and this is the point I wish to emphasize - she was able to undertake and carry on this stupendous task of preparedness after war was declared, solely because she was safe behind her fleet. That, to my mind, as I study the events of this war, is the great function which a fleet can perform for a nation which, like ourselves and like England, is separated from powerful military nations by the seas. If it had not been for the overwhelming superiority of the British fleet, it is quite possible that England would have been invaded and crushed, and it is safe to say there would have been no "Kitchener's Army" of three million men. thoroughly equipped, no great industrial military organization.

— no fighting machine such as she possesses to-day, and such as is required by modern warfare.

The history of England's work in preparedness points to the policy which our nation should adopt and the function which we should plan to have the Navy perform.

As England was on land, so are we to-day, though even less prepared. It is not likely, however, in view of the wide-spread national demand for preparedness and the recent development of the capacity of private corporations to manufacture munitions of war, that we shall ever in the future be so hopelessly unprepared for war as we have been in the past.

The demand for preparedness is insistent. But we are still floundering in the mire of doubt, seeking a national policy on which the country can agree.

What extent and what kind of preparedness against attack will public sentiment agree upon, considering the inherent dread of militarism and the traditional hostility to universal service by democracy? And how efficiently can it be organized, considering the natural inefficiency of a democratic form of government?

If we are willing to accept the lessons of this war and learn from its example, I think we may safely conclude that they teach that we can be safe without a standing army of the magnitude adopted by European nations, provided:

- (1) That we have a reasonably large framework, including reserves, which can be recruited to any required size in time of war:
- (2) That we accumulate a reasonably sufficient supply of rifles, cannon, machine guns, aeroplanes, ammunition, and other munitions of war;
- (3) That we mobilize our factories and munition makers so that in time of war they can turn out the supplies needed;
- (4) That we have a fleet of such superiority, relative to the fleets of any nation likely to attack us, that we shall be absolutely safe from invasion while we are preparing and until we are prepared after war is declared.

Upon this condition "hang all the law and the prophets;" and upon this condition an extraordinarily large military organization could be dispensed with.

In view of our geographical position, it is obvious that the

required strength of the army and the required strength of the navy stand in inverse proportions to each other. To adopt as a fixed national policy any given strength for the army without at the same time determining the strength of the navy, and vice versa, is to exhibit a statesmanship of a puerile order. The requirements for one depend upon the policy adopted for the other.

If the navy is so inadequate, no matter what its strength, that it cannot protect against invasion, it is little better than none at all, for it would be eventually destroyed or bottled up, and the army would be the main means of defense.

We may have an inferior navy and a superior army; or we may have a superior navy and an inferior army, and in either case have placed the country in a condition of rational preparedness. But to have both an inferior navy and an inferior army is not preparedness at all—it is a sham.

What naval strength should it be our policy to maintain, in order to constitute that superiority which would fulfill the conditions here laid down?

The policy I would advocate, and the one required by these conditions, is that same policy which it has been the traditional policy of England to consistently maintain, namely: a so-called "Two-Power Fleet," one equal at least to the combined fleets of any two Continental European Powers, or of one Continental European and one Asiatic Power.

Obviously, our policy must depend upon the view taken of potential attack. But obviously, too, we cannot prepare to fight the whole world. We can, however, look over the international field, and look the facts squarely in the face. When we look to the East, across the Atlantic, I think I correctly express the concensus of opinion in saying that there is only one nation that we have in mind when we try to imagine from what quarter a possible attack may come, whether for purposes of invasion or to test the Monroe Doctrine. And when we look to the West, across the Pacific, there is only one nation with which difficulties may arise that cannot be settled by diplomacy and arbitration. Both are military nations. We do not wish to quarrel with any nation, but in these days ultimatums come as if by wireless out of the clear skies. It is only common prudence to face the facts and possibilities. The ruler of one of

these two nations is reported to have once said, while we were engaged in war with Spain, "If I had a larger fleet, I would have taken Uncle Sam by the scruff of the neck." To the other, a proud and sensitive nation, we have been compelled. by our own interests, perhaps, to give just cause for reasonable offense. Perhaps some time in the future the same or other fingers may itch to feel the scruff of Uncle Sam's neck. The future must be judged by the past until the acts and mental behavior of nations, not words, prove conditions have changed and give us assurances of peaceful security.

In these times, it is the tendency of the nations of the world to form offensive and defensive alliances. And it is within the limits of a reasonable prudence that if we propose to meet an attack upon the one coast, we should prepare to meet a simultaneous attack upon the other. Nothing short, therefore, of a Two-Power Fleet would meet the requirements of naval preparedness and enable us to dispense with universal military service and a huge military establishment on land.

To build such a fleet will, of course, take a good many years, and meanwhile we shall have largely to depend upon land preparedness for defense, combined with what naval force we have. I would not, therefore, minimize the need of developing the military resources of the nation on land.


Let it be clearly understood that in advocating a "Two-Power Fleet" the measurement is that of a Continental Power and that the English fleet is specifically excepted. It would be hopelessly fatuous to enter into a building competition with the British Empire. We could not if we should, and we should not if we could. We must learn, as we have been learning, to live peacefully side by side in friendly relations with the British people — the people of the British Isles, and Canada, and Australia, and all the people of the English colonies. As a great English statesman, Joseph Chamberlain, once wrote: "We English and Americans are one people, not merely because of blood and religion and literature and history, but, above all, because our root ideas are the same, because we approach every question from the same standpoint, because we are alike in all essentials and only differ in minor characteristics." And so the two democracies must learn to settle their quarrels by diplomacy and arbitration, and not attempt to rival each other in the size of their fleets.

44 A Two-Power Fleet As a National Policy

Whatever views be held, I think it must be conceded that what we need, above all things, is a policy,—a very specific, definite policy that can be formulated and understood, and that such a policy, whatever it may be, after having been threshed out in all its aspects until it has become ingrained in the national consciousness, should be adopted, like the Monroe Doctrine, as the traditional policy of the nation and stuck to through all succeeding administrations until times and conditions change.

In advocating a fleet of overwhelming superiority against any forces that might within reason conceivably be brought against us, it may be well to point out that, regarded from a financial point of view, such a superior fleet would be cheaper in the end. It would be cheaper than its alternative, the maintenance of a huge military establishment on land. would be cheaper than a fleet of doubtful superiority, because it would insure not only against defeat and invasion, but against attack at all, just as no Power has dared to attack England on the sea. It has been the fear of the British fleet that has been responsible for the extraordinary spectacle of England's winning on the seas without a battle between capital ships, without a serious attempt to challenge her power. So, with a fleet of unchallenged superiority, we should not only be insured against any great loss of men and ships, but we should have an almost absolute insurance against any nation's attempting to enforce its will upon the United States by war. In any event, like England, safe behind the steel walls of our fleet, we should have ample time to complete our preparations on land for war.





How the water looks as this deadly weapon passes. The modern torpedo carries a charge of 500 pounds of high explosive, and attains a speed of 42 knots with a range of four miles.

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF OUR NAVAL STRENGTH IN ITS RELATION TO THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

J. BERNARD WALKER

Editor-in-chief, Scientific American

By way of preface to my address on the subject of the Rise and Decline of the United States Navy in its Relation to the International Situation, I am going to ask you to exercise your imagination and picture yourselves taking an aerial cruise, by aeroplane or Zeppelin, above the German coastline on the North Sea and the Baltic. I am going to ask you, in the course of that day's outing, to look down upon and take count of the twenty-five dreadnoughts and fifteen pre-dreadnoughts, with their complements of scouts, destroyers and submarines, which constitute the main fighting strength of the second greatest naval power in the world. And I ask you, as you take note of that mighty fleet, to remember that, less than a decade ago, the rank of second naval power was held by the United States; and I ask you, furthermore, to bear in mind that, if it was advisable that the United States should be second in strength ten years ago, it is doubly advisable to-day.

And in proof of my contention, I point to the fact that the German fleet, moored in absolute safety behind the mine fields, nets, torpedo booms, and incomparable sea-coast defenses of her ports and naval bases, is absolutely immune from attack; and I would have you bear in mind that it is the policy of the German Admiralty to preserve that fleet intact until the conclusion of the war—a feat which it is perfectly well able to accomplish.

I would have you remember, furthermore, that the country whose flag that mighty navy flies, considers that it has cause for a deep-seated, bitter, and enduring grievance against the United States—that grievance being that this country has turned itself into an arsenal for the supply of arms and ammunition to the enemies of Germany. I would remind you that, if the war should terminate unfavorably to German arms, Germany will say and will teach it to generations yet unborn, that had it not been for the assistance we furnished to her enemies, she would have emerged triumphant from the great war.

A SIGNIFICANT COMPARISON

And in view of this portentous fact,—this ineradicable canker of bitterness,—I would now most seriously ask you to consider how the United States stands in a comparison of its naval forces with those of the powerful nation in whose heart we have sown such seeds of hostility.

Against Germany's first battle-line of twenty-five dreadnoughts we could oppose to-day but eleven ships completed and in commission; against her division of five 29-knot battlecruisers we could oppose not a single one; against her dozen or so of fast 28-knot scout cruisers we could oppose but three of slow speed and obsolete pattern; and against her fleet of big, able, well-seasoned, seagoing submarines we could oppose a heterogeneous lot of small non-seagoing submarines, which in the recent autumn maneuvers went utterly to pieces and were able to make only four or five knots in the moderate seas which prevailed.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Navy League, in view of this stupendous maelstrom of the European war, the aftermath of which, as it may effect the United States, no one can foretell, I feel that this is no time for the softening of terms, and the hiding of facts we can all plainly see behind honeyed phrases and time-worn platitudes. Congress should at once enlist the whole shipbuilding resources of the country in the task of restoring our navy at the earliest possible moment to its indispensable position of second in strength. The Navy League should impress upon Congress the urgent need for laying down at once dreadnoughts, battle-cruisers, and fast scouts to the full capacity of the public and private shipyards of the country.

And now I am going to ask you to bear with me while I trace the causes which led to the meteoric rise and the rapid decline of our naval strength during the period which has intervened since the Spanish War.

RISE AND DECLINE OF OUR NAVAL STRENGTH

History can afford instances, not a few, of states and nations which have exhibited, from the very day of their birth, a decided spirit of reserve, a purpose sincere and formulated

as a definite principle of action, to work out their destiny in an attitude of international aloofness.

To find a conspicuous example of this spirit it is not necessary to go beyond our own borders. When our fathers "brought forth a new nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal," they warned the country against any "entangling alliances" with foreign powers. The young Republic, guarded and guided by a Constitution into which its noblest men had written its highest ideals, set itself to the task of realizing these ideals in the unhindered development of the territory, vast in extent and rich in its natural resources, of which, by the sword, it had recently won acknowledged possession.

Set midway between the Occident and the Orient, separated by a barrier of three thousand miles of ocean from the one, and by five thousand miles of the little-known Pacific from the other, the new-born state believed that its problems lay, and would forever lie, strictly within its own borders, and that its national policies would always be purely domestic in character—that they would never broaden out into policies of an international scope.

And so for a full century of its existence, the United States worked out its destiny along and within the lines laid down by its founders. In numbers, wealth, industry, and commerce it grew amazingly, and if war came, it was a war of defense; for it is a fact that throughout the first century of our national existence, the armed forces of the country, both naval and military, were regarded and designed purely for the purpose of defense; and it is significant of this spirit and of the purely national as distinguished from the international character of our policies, at least so far as the navy is concerned, that our first three battleships, the Oregon, Massachusetts and Indiana were officially designated as coast-defense battleships—they were not designed, nor were they qualified, for service in far-distant waters.

THE "MAINE"

Then, suddenly, in the midst of our self-engrossed and aloof national life, there burst upon our ears the roar of the *Maine* explosion; and before our President could exhaust

the last resources of diplomacy, the United States was at the death-grip with a European nation. The century-long day of our isolation had ended. From that war we emerged a great world power, to find ourselves standing toe-to-toe with the naval and military giants, young and old, of Asia and Europe.

How many of the eighty millions of us, in 1898, realized that in reaching out a pacifying hand across the few miles of water dividing Key West from Cuba, we were actually commencing to move our frontiers out into the international ocean highways of the world, and that when, at the close of the war, the extension had ceased, those frontiers would have pushed nigh a thousand miles eastward into the Atlantic, and westward some five thousand miles, even to the very doors of Asia?

Not for a moment did the nation regard the Spanish war as one of aggression; it was supposed to have been fought in the interests of humanity and for the abatement of the horrors of the Cuban situation. If we remember rightly, the diplomatic intercourse antecedent to the war deplored the disturbing conditions "on" or "near the borders." It was the propinquity of the trouble that brought it within our concern—had Cuba been off the coast of Spain, the rebellion might have been raging yet, so far as any protest from this country would have been concerned. But in fact, though not with definite intent, this nation in declaring war against Spain abandoned a policy of isolation for one of commanding importance in the great-world politics.

PLAY THE GAME OR QUIT

And it is for us either to play the game with great-world weapons and on a great-world scale, or confess ourselves unequal to the task, let go what destiny thrust upon us, and be subjected by the leading powers to that attitude of interested tolerance which obtained before the Spanish War took place. There is no middle course.

In the Atlantic, the struggle left us in possession of Porto Rico, with oversight of Cuba and the possession, in Guantanamo Bay, of one of the finest strategical bases in the West Indies. In the Pacific, we emerged with full responsibility for the Philippine Islands and holding also Guam, a most valuable

strategic base in the mid-Pacific. Verily, we gave hostages to fortune.

It is extremely significant that the course of our foreign policies, subsequent to the Spanish War, so far from showing any disposition on the part of the Administration to deplore the conditions which had established us in a very strong position in both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, has rather indicated that we were disposed to utilize that position to the fullest advantage. Stimulated by the successes of the Spanish War, we built up our navy, and particularly its first fighting line of battleships, so assiduously that within less than a single decade — within six years, in fact — we had risen to the second place in naval strength. With a natural naval base at Guantanamo, giving us a commanding position in the Caribbean, we took in hand the then seemingly impossible task of cutting a canal from the Atlantic to the Pacific at Panama. We proclaimed the neutrality of the canal, and we prepared to maintain that neutrality by erecting first-class fortifications at each approach. Not content with this, we proceeded to reaffirm the Monroe Doctrine by definite congressional action, forbidding the acquisition by alien powers of harbors or coaling stations which might be located within striking distance of the Panama Canal and which might serve as a base for hostile operations.

COMMERCIAL RIVALRY AND WAR

It is well understood that commercial rivalry is becoming more and more the predisposing cause of modern wars. Our opening of the Panama Canal is destined to cause an upheaval in existing trade conditions and a quickening of commercial rivalries the like of which the world has never seen. Furthermore, its effect upon the balance of naval power, particularly in the Pacific, and in any conflict which may arise over the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, will be most profound. What Gibraltar and the Mediterranean were to the contending navies of the eighteenth century, the Panama Canal and the Caribbean will be in the future naval wars of the New World.

And across this key to the commercial supremacy and the naval control of the Western Atlantic and the Pacific stands the United States — dominant and uncompromising!

If we were slow in taking up our position as a world power, history will never charge that the United States was slow to assert the prerogatives of a world power. Not content with our reaffirmation of the Monroe Doctrine, which someone has described as "the most magnificent bluff in all history, and, so far, the most successful," we have taken the vast problem of China into our benevolent keeping and have spoken out boldly for the "Open Door of Trade" as against Europe's pet theory of separate spheres of influence - thereby setting our face firmly against any attempt to destroy the integrity of that greatly-coveted country. Lastly, we have looked squarely in the eye of the most intelligent, refined, proud, and successful of the Oriental races, and told it that we do not want and will not have its people in our midst. And this we have done to a race who, by defeating on land and sea the then supposedly most powerful nation in the world, had but recently graduated, by universal consent, to the rank of a first-class naval and military power.

Such are the international policies of the United States in this year of our Lord 1916.

When a nation thus formulates its policies, it should definitely determine both the manner of their presentation to the rival nations whose interests may be affected and its own subsequent attitude, in case they should be attacked. It may offer them as a request, to be granted or refused or ignored as the case may be, or it may boldly proclaim them as being so necessary to the national well-being and honor that they will be supported, if occasion should require, by all the armed forces of the state.

Now, it is evident that to present such ambitious policies as have been adopted by the United States in the form of a request, would be as futile as it would be ridiculous—their very magnitude and daring are taken by the world at large as an intimation that we are prepared to defend them with all available forces at our command.

And this brings us face to face with the question:

WHAT IS OUR STRENGTH ?

Do we possess, or are we likely to possess in the near future, sufficient power to defend those principles and policies which are dear to the heart of every American citizen? To this answer must be made that, because of the geographical situation, a war for the maintenance of our policies must of necessity be a naval war, and that the Navy of the United States is utterly inadequate to the magnitude of the task. The struggle for the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, the neutrality of the Panama Canal, Asiatic Exclusion, or the Integrity of China, will take place upon the high seas, and the situation is such that, in the event of war to-day or to-morrow, we should find ourselves in the precarious position of having to defend first-class policies with a third-class navy.

I do not hesitate to say that the work of bringing the American Navy up to the standard of strength called for by our national policies is by far the most pressing question now before the American people, its Congress, and its President.

It may be said of the people of the United States, as a whole, and to a great extent of Congress itself, that until the European war broke out we were so deeply engrossed with internal economic questions that we followed with a languid interest the course of international politics. It was only to a few in our Foreign Affairs Committees and in our diplomatic and naval and military services, that the portentous significance of the events which have led us to the present condition were known, and by them only has the alternative of either a disgraceful abandonment of our policies or a humiliating defeat in our attempted defense by inadequate naval and military forces been foreseen.

Universal arbitration, to which so many of us look forward with eager eyes, would present a way of escape from the existing dilemma, but the horrible tragedy which to-day is convulsing all Europe has shown that this remedy is as yet a dream of the far future.

And since arbitration is for the present at least but a Utopian dream, it behooves this nation to take careful count of things as they are and to make at once a drastic re-adjustment between our policies and our sea power. Either we must modify our policies by retrenchment, or we must at once take all needful steps to bring the navy up to the full measure of its heavy responsibilities.

A DESTINY AGAINST WHICH THERE IS NO APPEAL

The nation is confronted with two alternatives, and two only. Either we must give up Guantanamo, Porto Rico, Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippines; leave China to the rapacity of the Great Powers; dismantle our forts at Panama, placing the canal under joint international control; rename our first fighting line "coast-line battleships," and withdraw entirely within our own frontiers; or we must accept the burdens of a great world power, not with hesitation, but rather with a glad courage, remembering that these burdens are not of our own seeking but have been laid upon us by a destiny against which there is no appeal.

THE MEANING OF SEA POWER

Better than any learned treatise could have done, the events of the Spanish War taught the American people the value of a preponderance of sea power. When Dewey crumpled up the Spanish fleet at Manila, and Sampson strewed the southern coast of Cuba with the burning wreckage of Cervera's squadron, the decisive influence of sea power, always recognized by the naval expert, became self-evident, even to the man in the street.

The effect of this object lesson upon the country at large and its representatives in Congress was immediate. of its navy and the international prestige which followed upon its victories, and realizing that what the navy had won, a strong navy alone could keep, Congress lent a willing ear to its naval advisers, and systematically and most liberally set itself to the task of building up a navy that should be equal to the heavy responsibilities entailed upon the country by its acquisition of such widely separated possessions as Porto Rico and the Philippine Islands, and by its occupation of the Island of Cuba. Our navy grew literally by leaps and bounds. and within half-a-dozen years of the conclusion of peace it stood second in strength, with a commanding lead over that of Germany, having as its first fighting line not less than twenty-three first-class battleships built or under construction, to say nothing of eleven armored cruisers, the latter a type which Japan, not many months before, had not hesitated to place in the first line at the great battle of Tsushima.

But it so happened in the very year, 1905, which found our navy in such a commanding position, there was built in England a new type of battleship, the *Dreadnought*, which was destined to work a revolution in the relative standing of the world, by relegating all existing battleships to the second line.

So vastly superior in size, speed, gun power, and defensive qualities was the new ship, that it was recognized as the only type that could be used effectively in the first line of battle; and it was realized that the nation which could most quickly build and equip a fleet of these ships would hold the balance of sea power with all that this implies. The leading powers recognized that the *Dreadnought* had entirely upset existing conditions, and all but ourselves accepted the burden thus laid upon them, enlarged their naval appropriations accordingly, and made haste to build up a new battleship fleet along dreadnought lines.

Unfortunately, Congress failed to appreciate the serious nature of the crisis; and at the very time when appropriations should have been increased to meet the new conditions, they were reduced — with the result that our first line of battleships (and that means the navy, so far as the winning of decisive engagements is concerned) has sunk to the third position, with France pushing us very closely for pre-eminence. The story of the rise and decline of our navy since the war with Spain is told by the statistical figures of the following table:

APPROPRIATIONS FOR	ARMORED S	SHIPS SINCE	THE	SPANISH	WAR
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Date	Battleships	Armored Cruisers
1898	Three	• • • •
1899		Two
1900		Three
1902		Three
1903		• • • • •
1904	One	Two
1905		• • • •
1906	One	• • • • •
1907	One	••••
1908		• • • • •
1909		• • • •
1910	Tw o	• • • •
1911		••••
1912	One	• • • • •
1918	One	
1914	Tw o*	
1915		

^{*} Three ships were authorized, but one of these replaced the Idaho and Mississippi, sold to Greece.

54 The Navy and the International Situation

An analysis of the above table shows that in the seven years intervening between the Spanish War and the opening of the dreadnought era, Congress authorized the construction of new battleships at the average rate of two and one half ships per year, and of battleships and armored cruisers combined at the rate of four ships per year; whereas, during the ten years covering the dreadnought era, when a far seeing government would have accelerated construction, we have authorized new battleships at the low average rate of only one and one-half vessels per year. And let it never be forgotten that during these years of decline in relative strength, our international policies have grown in scope and have been proclaimed with greater emphasis than ever before.

ACTIVITY OF THE NAVY LEAGUE

Twelve months ago the present Administration was bitterly opposed to making any exceptional addition to our naval and military forces. To-day, thanks to the activity of the Navy League in its great work of education during the past dozen years, and thanks to the work this year of such patriotic associations as the National Security League, the American League, and others, the Administration has seen a great light, and has suddenly made the most drastic change of front that has ever occured in the history of official Washington. Fifteen months ago the mildest suggestion that the defenses of this country were not what they should be was denounced as an effort to lead the country into militarism, whatever that may mean. To-day, the Administration is on record to the effect that it favors making large additions to our naval and military forces.

It would be ungenerous to take these assertions of the government at anything less than their face value. The great work which the Navy League and other patriotic associations have been doing is bearing fruit; the politicians, with their hands upon the public pulse, realize that the vast majority of the American people wish to have the defense of this country immeasurably strengthened and are going to see that it is done and that it is done at once.

Admitting, then, that the present Congress will make considerable additions to our naval strength, the question arises:

How large should be the increase of our navy, and how soon should it be accomplished? Those are highly technical questions; for they involve the consideration of the broad question as to how strong the navy of the United States should be in comparison with the other navies of the world.

The question was determined several years ago by the General Board of the Navy, which was formed to draw up a program of construction that would maintain our navy in a condition of strength and preparedness sufficient to enable it to take care of the vast and ever-growing interests of the United States. The Board laid out a program of construction which, had it been followed, would have maintained this country as the second naval power, and by the year 1920 it would have seen our navy in possession of forty-eight battleships.

And what became of this program? It was never adopted. In the give-and-take of politics, this, the most vital question affecting the welfare of the nation, was thrown into the political bag in common with such relatively minor matters as rivers and harbors, pensions, good roads, and a hundred measures of purely local interest, and it came out of the shuffle cut down to a yearly quota of two battleships per annum. And in four out of the past ten years even that modest program has been cut in half.

WHAT CONGRESS SHOULD DO

Now, if the present Administration is desirous of executing the will of the country as freely expressed, it should lay out a program of construction which shall not merely make such yearly additions to our navy as are contained in the original program of the Naval Board, but it should increase the addition by an amount equal to the omissions of the past ten years. The program of construction as recently set forth by the Secretary of the Navy makes no attempt to repair the neglect of the past. In other words, the Administration's program will fail to bring our navy up to the standard of the German Navy, and by the year 1920 we shall be some eight or ten dreadnoughts short of the required strength.

So far as the material of the navy is concerned, its most pressing need to-day is a division of four battle-cruisers, (not two, as suggested by Mr. Daniels. The foreign nations build their ships in groups or divisions of four; Japan has her four Kongos; Great Britain built her four Inflexibles and then her four Princess Royals. Germany has her four battle-cruisers of the Seidlitz type. Now, as the present program suggests, if we build two battle-cruisers only, these ships, in the event of hostilities, would be certain to encounter never less than a division of four of the enemy.

The present Congress, then, should authorize the construction of the two dreadnoughts asked by the Administration, and in addition it should authorize the construction of a division of four battle-cruisers, making six dreadnoughts in The governmental and private shipbuilding resources of this country would enable us to lay down six such ships at once. This program should be followed by the authorization of four dreadnoughts, preferably battle-cruisers, in 1916, and four dreadnoughts in 1917, and by three dreadnoughts in the year 1918, in 1919, and in 1920. This addition to the seventeen dreadnoughts we now have built, building, or authorized, would give us forty dreadnoughts by the year 1920. Adding the eight pre-dreadnoughts of the Michigan, New Hampshire and Connecticut classes, which would still be within the 20-year age limit, and the country would have by 1920 the full quota of forty-eight battleships regarded by the Naval Board as the minimum necessary for the safety of the United States.

I have spoken in terms of the battleship — for the battleship, not the fast scout, nor the torpedo boat, and certainly not the submarine, is to-day, and ever will be, the bulwark of a nation's naval defense.

A MISLEADING REPORT

"Secretary Daniel's report and his subsequent examination before Committee," says a discerning critic, "are disappointing to the few who had reason to believe that within the past year the Secretary had become aware of the insufficiency of our navy to defend his country against invasion and to protect our policies."

"Throughout the report, Mr. Daniels lays down no policy. He makes no indication as to whither he is leading us. He makes few recommendations that are fundamentally sound. The five-year program is attractive and alluring, and if adopted

and carried out will unquestionably increase the material strength of our navy. But to what end are we increasing the material strength! Why not build half the ships, or double the number? When the five-year program is completed, where will our navy stand? We know that at present the United States is about third in material strength and about fifth in personnel strength, so that at present we can not be considered as better than in fourth place. Where will we stand when the five-year program is completed? The program is proposed without any definite relation to our policies or our needs. It is formulated wholly in response to the growing demand for a navy that will defend this country against invasion, and the public jumps to the conclusion that this five-year program will do the trick. If so, the public is mistaken; for our navy will still be a bad third when this program is finished. The layman is certain to overlook the fact that the personnel for this fiveyear program has not been asked for, but on a moment's thought it is quite evident that ships must have officers and men. The five-year program as proposed by Mr. Daniels will require 1,700 officers and 30,000 men. Without considering the proposed five-year program, the navy to-day to go on a war basis would need 2,000 additional officers and more than 30,000 additional men. The ships at present in commission in the Atlantic fleet are operating in almost all cases below the allowed complements of officers and men. The personnel shortage of both officers and men is so serious that our 21-battleship fleet was recently reduced to sixteen battleships, and the complements of destroyers was reduced 25 per cent. destroyers have been operating at sea with 50 per cent of crews and 50 per cent of officers. Admiral Fletcher reported, over a year ago, that the shortage in the battleships alone exceeded 5,000 men, and despite vigorous requests from officers in the fleet, it is impossible for the shortages in officers and men of our present fleet to be filled."

"Note how ingeniously Mr. Daniels passes over the personnel situation, on page 20 of his report, and shows that there are a total of more than 109,000 on the Navy rolls. This total he arrives at by adding in the marines, navy yard establishments, and certain specialized electricians, engineers, etc., all of whom would be needed on shore and none of whom would


available for the country's defense at sea. The Secretary might with equal propriety have added thousands of men at the Bethlehem Steel Works, the DuPont Powder Works, the General Electric and Westinghouse Companies, not overlooking the Edison Works, and prove with equal sincerity that there are a half million men ready to respond to the Navy's call. The truth of the matter is, that we have some 52,000 men authorized by law, a Naval Reserve consisting of about 250 men, and a Naval Militia (partly trained only) of some 7,000 men. Against these resources of say, 60,000 men, the Navy needs to-day on a war basis more than 100,000 men. These are the facts that Mr. Daniels should honestly present to the American public, and his ingeniously contrived summation of 109,000 men on the Navy rolls is unworthy of the leader of our first line of defense.

"Turning now to the question of officers, which is an even more important one than that of the men, we find again that our present navy on a war basis requires about 2,000 additional officers and the five-year program will require 1,700 additional officers."

THE NAVAL POLITICAL SITUATION

Let me, in conclusion, remind this gathering that it may be said of the United States that its international policies, in the very nature of things, are founded upon its navy; that our policies and our navy are builded, or should be builded, as one structure, pyramidal in form, with the navy as the sure and unassailable foundation. We have constructed the pyramid, all right, but we have inverted it, with a vast accumulation of policies imposed upon a navy all too small to take care of them. The joint structure is in unstable equilibrium. It has grown at the top and shrunk at the base. No great power in the world has promulgated a line of international policies so fraught with possibilities of conflict as our own.

The General Board of the Navy realized this, and has recently asked for the greatest navy in the world. The President himself has asked in a public speech for the same thing. We may reach that standard in the dim future. Personally, I do not believe such a fleet will ever be necessary, but we can reach and we ought to regain at once our rightful position of second in strength among the great navies of the world.



THE HYDRO-PLANE

Up to 1916 the appropriations for this service had been just enough to furnish the lame ducks necessary for killing and crippling the splendid young officers who devotedly volunteered for this service. Congress has now appropriated \$3,000,000 for this service.

THE BANEFUL INFLUENCE OF POLITICS UPON OUR FOREIGN RELATIONS

HENRY WHITE

Ex-Embassador to Italy and France

In venturing to address this distinguished company on a subject of such delicacy as anything pertaining to our relations with foreign countries must necessarily be at this period of world upheaval, I am deviating from a course to which I have rigidly adhered since I left the Diplomatic Service nearly seven years ago. I have always been of the opinion that a retired diplomatist, especially one who has been for more than a quarter of a century in the service of the nation, and has been honored with the confidence of statesmen both at home and abroad, should rarely, if ever, give utterance to his view on matters of public policy, particularly to any such having reference to the relations between his own and other countries.

But there must be exceptions to every rule, and I am making this one because I cannot but feel that a crisis is rapidly approaching in our history, if it has not already arrived, when the course pursued by this country will settle, for a very long period to come, whether we are to be a potent factor as a nation in the world's affairs or not; whether we shall even be able to maintain ourselves as a Great Power; that is to say, to inspire a conviction in other countries that we have the capacity and the power behind it which is indispensable, to do so.

It is not sufficient for us to feel, as I have heard said by thousands of our countrymen from the days of my youth,—though less frequently of late, I am happy to say,—that "we are the greatest nation on earth;" that we are "Americans" and therefore it is not necessary for us to adopt a line of conduct such as other benighted nations, not blessed with American nationality, are obliged to adopt in order to maintain their position in the world; or even, as an eminent citizen publicly stated recently, that a million men would spring to arms in a night in the event of any aggression by another country against our own.

The point is not whether we, as a nation, in our ignorance of — or indifference to — what the rest of the world is thinking

about us, or our unwillingness to face facts as they are, believe these things to be true; but whether other nations - and particularly what we are known as the Great Powers of the world - are of that opinion. It is because my long connection with the diplomacy of this and other countries has placed me in a better position than the majority of my countrymen to appreciate the feeling of the leading nations of the world with regard to ourselves, and particularly as to our ability not only to defend ourselves successfully against any attack made upon us by one Power or a combination of Powers, but to make our influence felt as a Great Power should be able to do, that I have felt it my duty to say a few words here to-day and have chosen the subject of my address. I am glad to have the opportunity of doing so in the congenial atmosphere of the Navy League of the United States, which is especially sympathetic to me from the fact that it is interested solely in the welfare of the nation irrespective of that of any political party. My sole public interest during the best years of my life was - and indeed still is — the nation, which I served with equal fidelity and zeal, whether its government happened to be under the control of the Democratic or the Republican party.

Until we reach the point at which nearly all other civilized countries have arrived, in respect to those branches of their public service by means of which they may be brought into contact with other countries, namely, the Diplomatic, Military and Naval Services, from which considerations of party politics have been practically eliminated, those services being in the hands of trained experts, we shall never assume the position to which we are enitled in the family of nations.

If there is one conviction more deeply rooted in my mind than any other as a result of long experience, it is that the respect in which a nation is held by others, is in exact ratio to the fleets and armies which are known, or at least believed, to be looming in the distance and prepared to back up, if necessary, its diplomatic representations or other actions of international import. Other countries have adopted the course I have mentioned, not because in many of them the pressure of political parties and interests do not make themselves felt just as strongly as in the United States, but because they have come to realize, after centuries of experience, that the world-wide

interests of the nation are of vastly more importance than those of any political party at home.

Human nature has not changed, neither have the rules of cause and effect; nor can they be changed by ignoring them or attempting to persuade people that they act differently in our case than in that of any other nation. I do not hesitate to assert that we have not succeeded in impressing other nations of the world with the feeling that we consider our national interests above those of every other sort and kind and particularly of domestic politics at home. On the contrary, they know that, if this country were administered on what we call business principles, it would long since have been the foremost Power in the world from every point of view and that such is not the case. They know that political considerations or the length of purse-strings usually outweigh any known fitness in the selection of the chiefs of our foreign Embassies and Legations; they know that our army and our navy are for the first of those reasons not in the highest state of efficiency, but very much the reverse; and that what is known as "preparedness" has become a domestic political issue.

In saying this, I do not wish to single out any particular individual or political party for criticism or condemnation. I do not claim for myself any monopoly of partriotism. I have no doubt that the majority in the House of Representatives who passed what is known as the Hay Bill have as earnest a desire as I have that our country should occupy a great place in the world—a desire which of course is not shared, human nature being what it is, by the citizens of any other country—but I can not believe that those legislators realize the effect which their action is having upon the prestige of this nation nor how they are playing into the hands of those who do not wish our country to be strong or to wield a potent influence in the world's affairs.

I am necessarily much restricted by international — and even domestic — considerations in respect to the specific instances which I am able to bring forward in support of the subject of this address. I am of course precluded from allusion to, and particularly from criticism of, any of our diplomatic negotiations now pending or of recent date with foreign countries. I shall have, therefore, to confine myself to generali-

ties in dealing with the unfortunate effect which domestic politics have had upon the first of the three branches of our public service to which I have referred: the Diplomatic.

The Diplomatic Service is the outer bulwark — the fore-front — of a country's national security and defense. The leading nations of the world have long since arrived at the conclusion that that outer bulwark of theirs is most efficiently maintained by employing as their chief diplomatic representatives, men who have been trained as such from their youth, either in subordinate positions at their foreign Embassies and Legations, or in their foreign offices at home, or who have specially qualified themselves for diplomacy in some other branch of the public service. Particularly is it their habit to retain in office as long as they can, up to a certain well advanced age limit, those ambassadors and ministers who have shown themselves capable and efficient.

And the reason is obvious to anyone familiar with diplomacy. An ambassador or minister, if he does his duty and can speak the language of the people among whom he is representing his country—or the French language.—should be constantly obtaining in private conversations and transmitting to his own government in private letters, as well as in official dispatches, confidental information as to the personal characteristics of the public men whom he is dealing with; the trend of public opinion on matters of importance; the influence wielded behind the scenes by certain individuals; the stability of the Cabinet or of certain Ministers; the condition of the army and navy; and a thousand other details which one government ought to know about another, and which all European Governments do know about each other.

In order to obtain such information, the Ambassador's impartiality and also his discretion — the certainty that he will never pass it on except to his government in absolute confidence — must be above suspicion; otherwise he will not get those among whom he is living — particularly those in a position of power and responsibility — to talk with him confidentially. And of course the longer he remains at the same post, the better is he able to attain such a position.

Our history abounds in cases, since General Jackson's presidency, of the appointment, for reasons which were solely

political, of men who were entirely unfit to represent us abroad and were unable to maintain relations of that friendly and confidential nature which should subsist between foreign representatives and the statesmen of the country to which they are accredited.

Save from the foundation of our government until about the end of the first quarter of the last century, during which period our foreign representatives were usually appointed for fitness only and were not always changed as the result of a change of Presidents, we have followed a system which is the reverse of that adopted by most of the civilized Powers of the world.

How different our system is from that of other countries having diplomatic forms of government more or less resembling our own, may be gathered from the following comparison between the number of Ambassadors and Ministers we have sent to certain countries and they have sent to us, or to each other, during the last half century.

Since our Civil War came to an end, there have been eight Ministers or Ambassadors from Great Britain to the United States. Two of them died at their post. Two others were each here for thirteen years, and in no case had the return home of the six who were living at the time of their recall any connection whatever with the domestic politics of Great Britain.

During the same period, we have had at London fifteen Ministers and Ambassadors, or within one of twice as many as the British Government has sent to us.

During the fifty years in question, Great Britain has had but six Ambassadors at Paris — one of them, for twenty years — and since the present Ambassador assumed the duties of that post in 1905 — eleven years only — we have had no less than five Ambassadors there. We have had six at Paris since M. Jusserand, the present distinguished Ambassador to this country from the French Republic, presented his credentials to the President in February, 1903 — that is to say, six in twelve years.

For many years past the French Government has maintained at Berlin and London, respectively, as Ambassadors two brothers, the Messrs. Cambon, one of whom was formerly

French Ambassador at Washington. The London brother is still at his post, but, of course, the mission of the Berlin brother came to an end when the war broke out. His long experience is, however, being utilized at home, as he is now Secretary-General of the French Foreign Office, which is practically Minister of Foreign Affairs. So far as I am aware, these brothers have never been supporters of any party or group in the French Parliament, nor subscribed a franc to the fund of any such party or group. Numerous Ministers have come into office and fallen in France, several Presidents of the French Republic have succeeded each other during the tenure, by the brothers Cambon, of the French Embassies at London and But they were retained at those posts—the most important in the Diplomatic Service of France — as M. Jusserand has been for so many years at Washington, for the sole reason that the interests of the French Republic are believed by the French Government and people to be safer in the hands of men such as they, who having passed many years of their lives either at the French Foreign Office or in the Diplomatic Service, are known to be personally acquainted with those in charge of the administration and diplomacy of the countries to which they are accredited. They are considered consequently more likely to be able to further generally the interests of the French nation than men who have passed most of their lives in politics or in business at home; or who, whether with or without any previous experience in diplomacy or politics,

Since the Kingdom of Italy came into existence in 1860, we have sent six Ministers and ten Ambassadors—in all sixteen representatives—to that country, from which only nine have been accredited to us, and the ninth has been here but a short time. So that until quite recently the number was sixteen to eight, or twice as many from the United States to Italy as from the latter country to the United States.

have contributed liberally to the funds of the political party.

But the case of that venerable and sturdy Republic, Switzerland, is still more striking, not only as regards this country, but others. Since 1882 there have been but six Ministers from Switzerland at Washington, and we have sent fifteen to Berne; but since the year 1857, four years before our Civil War began, Switzerland has accredited but two Ministers to France and the

second is not only still there, having been accredited in 1882, but is likely to remain, if in good health, until his death, as was the case with his predecessor.

I could, if time permitted, give many instances in recent years of unpleasantness caused in other countries, and of consequent injury to our interests in those countries, by the appointment of unsuitable men as representatives of the United States; or by recall, for reasons of domestic politics and still more, perhaps, for purely personal reasons, of Ambassadors and Ministers of ours who were particularly acceptable to the government and people of those countries; and I am certain that no man living can be found who is able in a period ranging from thirty to sixty days—and t'at, too, upon coming into the great office of President, with the administration of which he is unfamiliar—and with thousands of other important questions claiming his attention, to find men all of whom are suitable to be placed at the head of all of our Embassies and Legations.

With regard to the other two branches of our public service through which we may be brought into contact with foreign nations, the army and the navy, I am not an expert in respect to the details of military or naval matters. But I can speak with some knowledge as to the effect which our policy, as revealed by what has been taking place of late in Congress, in regard to the army and the navy, is likely t produce upon foreign nations.

The most important of those nations all have General Staffs or Boards composed of military and naval experts, whose duty it is not only to watch carefully the conditions and to control the policies of their own respective armies and navies, but to keep themselves accurately posted as to what is going on in one another's armies and navies or in those of other Powers having any claim to a postion of importance in the world. They fulfill those duties admirably, and of course it has been their particular duty of late to look carefully into what this country is doing in the way of our much talked of "preparedness."

I have no hesitation in saying that those foreign military and naval experts must be—and I am sure are—feeling exceedingly comfortable of late with regard to any possible damage which our army or navy is likely to be able to cause any other nation within any period in the near future, in the event

of conflict with the United States. I am of course not alluding to any one nation rather than another. But, as I have already said, none of the Great Powers of the world desire that this country shall be stronger, from a military, and still less perhaps from a commercial, point of view, than they are themselves.

With regard to the navy, when those foreign general staffs turn their attention to the evidence of experts which has recently been given before the Congressional Naval Committes, to say nothing of the information they must be securing from their own private sources in this country, their feelings of satisfaction must be great; for they find that we have a navy, which if not actually disorganized, at least they know could not send sixteen battleships nor probably half that number around the world without accident or brekdown, as President Roosevelt did in 1908-1909.

They know, if our own naval experts are to be believed,—and the experts of foreign general staffs accept their opinion rather than that of Members of Congress or of anyone else not trained in Naval Science,—that our navy is short of men, battle-cruisers, airships, submarines, and much else besides whereby its efficiency as a fighting machine is greatly impaired. They know that for reasons of domestic politics, which I need not go into as they are understood by everyone here, we are keeping up at large expense a number of navy-yards which are of no use whatever to the national defense of this country; some of which our largest or even moderate sized war-ships can not even approach much less enter, through lack of water deep enough to float them.

Those foreign experts also know that such is our limited capacity for building war-ships that those authorized by Congress to be built more than a year ago, have not yet been begun and are not likely to be completed and in commission for several years to come.

Is it to be wondered at, with the knowledge of all this, and probably of much more than you or I know as to the effect, from their point of view eminently satisfactory, of domestic politics upon the development of our navy on purely scientific lines and with a sole view to the advantage of the nation, that its present condition, or its prospects of any marked increase at all commensurate with that of the greatest navies of the world, should

not be a source of any anxiety to the general staffs of boards of any Foreign Power.

And the situation with regard to our army, made public by recent proceedings in Congress, is even more reassuring and comforting to the military experts of countries likely by any possibility to be brought into conflict with us. For they know that a bill has been passed by the House of Representatives and is now pending in the Senate, in which, first of all, the regular army has not been increased to the extent that in the opinion of experts it should be, by many thousands of men, and the keystone whereof is the proposed source of our future reserves, namely, the militia of the several States, or of as many of those States as may see fit to come into the scheme provided by the Bill.

They know furthermore that instead of availing ourselves of every opportunity to extend the sources from which a trained national reserve for our army can be drawn, a provision inserted in the Army Bill with a view to materially enlarging those sources, empowering the President to raise and train United States Volunteers in time of peace (he already has that power in time of war), was defeated in the House of Representatives, has been sustained in the Senate by a bare majority of two, and is not unlikely to be defeated in the end, not in the nation's interest, but in that of some sinister It is likely certainly to be domestic political influence. defeated unless every kind of pressure which can possibly be brought to bear upon Congress by those interested in the nation's welfare utilized with a view to its retention in the Army Bill when passed.

The officers of those foreign army and navy general staffs know perfectly well also that the Constitution of the United States, whereof they have copies, forbids the appointment by the President of the United States of a single officer of the militia regiments of the States; that in time of peace he can not legally give an order to a State militiaman. They know that Congress can not order the militia out of this country. They know furthermore—for it is their business to be exceedingly well informed on such matters—that the union labor of this country will not enlist in any militia regiment because it might in that event have to take part in certain of its local

duties such, for instance, as the suppression of strikes. They also know that it is practically impossible for farm laborers to enlist in the militia because they can not get away from their duties to take part in its weekly drills, which usually take place in towns or cities. They know furthermore, as George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and military experts from their day to this have said, that the only military policy of which they need be at all afraid, in the event of future trouble between their countries and ours, is one based upon armies having reserves, raised, organized, equipped, and trained under the sole control and jurisdiction of the Federal Government. Those foreign experts have also read, I do not doubt, Mr. Frederic Huidekoper's book in which, amid a great deal of exceedingly valuable information as to this country's weakness, past and present, from a military point of view, particularly as to the incalculable sums of money spent upon its military policy with little or no adequate return, there is a certain amount of interesting information concerning the militia in the course of our history.

It is not therefore difficult for this audience to see how reassuring the policy we are pursuing must be to any foreign power likely to be brought into conflict with us at any future time.

I have referred to these foreign general staffs because our whole idea of preparedness should be based upon possible aggression on the part of one, or other, or several jointly, of the Great Powers of the world; and not upon the furtherance of the views of our own National Guard or of any other domestic organization or political party in this country. And what seems to be of real importance is the effect which will be produced upon foreign countries, and upon our own people, by what we are doing in the way of preparedness.

We have not gained in popularity abroad during this war, to put the situation very mildly, and there is more than one reason why, at its close, we may find ourselves in conflict with one or more foreign nations. But if I were to go into these reasons, I should be entering upon subjects which I think for public reasons had better not be touched upon at this critical time.

I may say, however, that the path of a neutral is always a

hard and an unpopular one to tread, and when this great war is over, Mexico alone, against which unfortunate country all nations will have claims of vast magnitude for damages to their respective nationals or to their property—not a dollar of which she will be able to pay—will furnish abundant opportunity, without undue effort on the part of any nation, for us to get into serious international difficulties. Nothing is so likely to keep the peace under those circumstances as the conviction on the part of other powers that we are well-nigh invincible, not only in defense of ourselves, but also in that of any other republic of this hemisphere. Such is certainly not the conviction of any foreign power at present.

I would therefore urge very earnestly every member of the Navy League to impress upon everyone with whom they have any influence, and particularly upon their representatives in Congress, the importance of thinking nationally, and not merely locally; the importance of carefully considering what effect every action which we take as a nation, having any bearing whatever upon our contact with other nations, is likely to have upon them.

The world has emerged from an era of haphazard, hand to mouth, management of public affairs. This is an era of efficiency in which scientific methods and trained men are as important for the successful conduct of governments, as for that of business; and unless we are prepared to sacrifice local political interests whenever they clash with the nation's welfare, we shall, as certainly as the globe revolves upon its axis, find ourselves before long in the position of a second-rate Power, unable to maintain the peace of a strong nation on terms more or less our own, but obliged to submit to a peace dictated by others, in which our interests are certainly not likely to be considered.

In conclusion, I can not say how strongly I am in sympathy with the objects of the Navy League nor how earnestly I wish it all possible success in its efforts to obtain for this country a Navy General Staff as well as a Commission of National Defense. And I entirely concur in the view expressed by the President of the United States during his recent visit to the West, that we must have "incomparably the finest navy in the world."

PREPAREDNESS FOR AERIAL DEFENSE


ALEXANDER GRAHAM BELL, Ph.D., LL.D.

I do not know much about navies, but this I do know,—that fleets are not confined to the ocean, but now sail over the land. This I do know,—that all the power of the British Navy has not been able to prevent Zeppelins from reaching England and attacking London, the very heart of the British Empire. Navies do not protect against aerial attack. This also we know,—that heavier-than-air flying machines of the aeroplane type have crossed right over the heads of armies, of million of men, armed with the most modern weapons of destruction, and have raided places in the rear. Armies do not protect against aerial war.

The curious thing is that the development of aerial machines for offensive war is just in its infancy. We may say that the destruction or damage known to be due to Zeppelins and heavier-than-air machines has been very slight compared with the damage inflicted by armies and navies, but we are only beginning. Why, there are men in the room who can remember the first flight of heavier-than-air machines. It was America that gave aviation to the world. I myself was a witness, and the only witness excepting the workmen employed, of that celebrated experiment of the late Samuel Pierpont Langley, Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, when his aerodrome model, on May 6, 1896, made a magnificent flight over the Potomac. It was that experiment that demonstrated to the world the practicability of mechanical flight. It was as a result of these experiments that Professor Langley predicted—

"The world indeed will be supine if it do not realize that a new possibility has come to it and that the great universal highway overhead is now soon to be opened."

That was America's first contribution. That was the origination of the modern art of aviation. America was not behind in those days, for America gave the first practical flying machines to the world. Langley himself gave us, in 1903, a machine that did not fly—simply because it caught in the launching ways. And the world looked down on the result, and he was laughed to scorn, and the ridicule attached to this failure to get into the air broke his heart. And yet that machine was a per-



A dirigible balloon just after leaving the ground. The pilot's car contains the motor and, with its long tapering tail and its skids, resembles the body of an aeroplane.

fectly good flying machine, and has since been flown. There was nothing the matter with it. It stuck in the launching ways, and the public were no more justified in supposing that it could not fly, than they would be were they to suppose that because a ship stuck in the launching ways it would not float. The machine is a perfectly good flying machine, and is the first flying machine ever constructed capable of carrying a man.

He did not succeed in getting it into the air, but only a few days after his last experiment, on December 3, 1903, another man, stimulated by Langley's researches - two other men. Americans both, the Wright brothers - put a motor upon their gliding machine at Kitty Hawk, and flew. They were the first men to get into the air with heavier-than-air flying machine. and they were Americans. And that was at the end of the year 1903. We lost sight of them during 1904 and 1905. However, they were constantly flying at or near Dayton, Ohio. They were successful in keeping these flights secret, and the world, though it heard that remarkable flights were being made, treated the news - especially in the light of Langley's failure to get into the air, for he was well-known, and the Wright brothers were unknown — as a newspaper story. Very few believed that they really had got into the air. But others, stimulated by Langley and by the reported success of the Wright brothers, were led to make developments, and there again we have America in the front.

The Aerial Experiment Association was organized at the end of 1907; and in 1908, on the 12th of March, one of the members, Mr. F. W. Baldwin, succeeded in getting into the air on a heavier-than-air flying machine at Hammondsport, on Lake Keuka, on the ice. That was the first public flight of a heavier-than-air flying machine in America. The machine was Selfridge's "Red Wing." Among the members of the Association gathered at Hammondsport was the late Lieutenant Selfridge, the first victim of modern aviation. Many of us can remember when he met his death at Fort Myer, in a flight with Orville Wright, only a few years ago. There were Lieutentant Selfridge, F. W. Baldwin, J. A. D. McCurdy, and a man who has since become represensative of America in this respect — Glenn H. Curtis. He was introduced to aviation by the Aerial Experiment Association. On July 4, 1908, he made the celebrated flight for the Scientific

American trophy for the first measured kilometer under test conditions.

So the Aerial Experiment Association went on and made one experimental machine after another. There was the "Red Wing," the "White Wing," the "June Bug,"—that was Curtis' machine,—and the "Silver Dart." All this was done before the Wrights appeared in public. But in September, 1908, the Wright brothers for the first time appeared in public. Orville Wright flew in America at Fort Myer, and Wilbur flew in Europe, and the world then found that the Wright brothers were ahead of everyone.

We know the history of aviation from that time. We can recognize that it is a purely American art. But where are we to-day in that art? The exigencies of the European war have developed the offensive powers of both dirigible balloons and heavier-than-air flying machines. The belligerent powers have thousands of machines of the aeroplane type. How many have we? I do not know, but I think that the army and navy together may be able to account for twenty-five, maybe a few more.

We are the only great power that has not hundreds of these machines. As for dirigible balloons,—well, we haven't any. It it is true the navy possessed a small dirigible balloon, about 160 feet long, which could not be armored, and could not get out of reach of anti-aircraft guns. But I see by the newspapers that that has escaped from its moorings, and gone off into the unknown.

That represents America's preparedness for aerial warfare of the Zeppelin kind. Now, this is a matter of the very gravest consideration, especially when we remember that the art of aerial locomotion is only in its infancy. Whatever the offensive powers of these machines may be to-day, is it conceivable that we are going to rest there? Are there no improvements to be made? If so, it is the part of preparedness to look forward into the future and prepare for that which we foresee must come.

We must foresee that our great cities are liable to be raided by dirigible balloons of great size, raining down bombs upon the inhabitants. And what have we got to protect us? Nothing. The army and navy can't protect us. The only thing we have is this little handful of heavier-than-air flying machines. It is obvious that an aerial fleet cannot be overcome excepting by an aerial fleet of superior force, and we have not got it.

In relation to the heavier-than-air flying machine, we had the possibilities of its use demonstrated here only a few days ago. A large proportion of the inhabitants of the city of Washington saw a heavier-than-air flying machine hovering over Washing-It made a circle over the city and went away. machine had come from Newport News right up to Washington, and returned without landing, in five hours. Why, it takes twelve hours to go down to Newport News by boat; it takes from five to seven hours by train; and here this machine had come up from Newport News to Washington in two and a half hours and returned in the same time. Suppose that had been a hostile machine. We have every proof that if any hostile fleet should come anywhere near our shores, it could have flying machines hovering over Washington in about two or three hours. There is our Capitol, and there are our beautiful public buildings that we have here, all at their mercy, and nothing to defend them. Fortunately, such a war has not come here, and I trust it may not come for a long, long time; but it is surely our duty to prepare, and we cannot meet an aerial attack except by an aerial defense. We must multiply our dirigible balloons - we have not got any yet. We must multiply our heavier-than-air machines - and they are really the most important, as the indications are that the heavier-than-air machines has the dirigible at its mercy if it can get at it. The heavier-thanair machine can go higher than the dirigible, it has a greater range of altitude, it has a greater speed; and once a heavierthan-air machine can get over a dirigible, there is not much hope for the latter. So that really that art which we originated, the art of aviation, the art of flying heavier-than-air machines, will be our greatest protection. It does not cost much to make a heavier-than-air flying machine. It costs enormously to make dirigible balloons comparable to the Zeppelins of Germany. But we can make flying machines. The difficulty of making flying machines need not bother us at all. We are turning them out now in large numbers, but not for use in America. They do not cost much: they do not take long to construct.

But there is one element in relation to the flying machine that we are not producing, that we cannot produce in an emergency, and that is the men. We can produce machines, but not the aviators. That takes time. We have one hundred million population in the United States, but how many aviators have we? Only about three hundred, all told, licensed aviators in the United States; but when the emergency comes for aerial defense, we will want them by the thousands. Where are we to get the men, and where are we to train them? That is a serious problem in aerial defense. There seems to be only one possible way by which we can supply the multitude of trained aviators before the time comes when the necessity for their use in war arises, and that is to find uses for the flying machine in time of peace, uses that will support a multitude of aviators.

Flying machines have not yet made much headway in commercial use, but a very promising line has been suggested by which America can gain an aerial reserve for use in time of emergency, and that is to use the flying machine for carrying mail. If we had numerous aerial postal routes established in the United States, we would have aviators flying over a particular route day after day, week after week, getting familiar with the conditions in the air, and the look of the ground underneath them. We could in that way obtain a large number of trained aviators, who would offer a sort of aerial reserve for the army and navy when the time of emergency should arise.

It seems to me that, in relation to the heavier-than-air flying machine, the most practical thing we could do is to urge upon the Post Office Department the use of these machines in carrying the mail, to establish as many aerial postal routes as we can. We had an illustration the other day in the case of this flying machine hovering over Washington, coming up from Newport News in two and a half hours. If it had carried the mail, there would have been a great gain over the railroads. you could get mail matter from New York to Washington in a couple of hours. We could get the high-powered machines, like those used by the belligerents in Europe — those are the machines we want to get - that make a hundred miles an hour. This machine that came up here made only fifty miles an hour. It came up in two hours and a half from Newport News; but if it had had one of these high-powered European motors that give a speed of about a hundred miles an hour, it would have come up in about an hour and a half. Think of that: a hostile machine could come from the sea in an hour and a half, and hover over Washington; and in times of peace we could send mail matter from Washington to Newport News, or from Washington to New York and other places, equally distant, in an hour and a half.

In considering the possibility of mail service, we must know, of course, that a machine is able to fly under any conditions. When we look back to the early days here, although they are only eight years ago, we remember how aviators were afraid of the wind. They went up in a calm, and if there was any wind blowing they postponed their flights for another occasion. But the necessities of war have gotten rid of that, and aviators are no longer afraid of the wind. They fly in all sorts of weather in Europe. We had the exhibition a few days ago in Newport News of a machine there maneuvering in a fifty-mile breeze — a regular storm-wind. Wind does not count as much as it did before: and the heavier the machine is and the faster it is, the more it can make its way against the wind. We have machines now — I should not say "we," they in Europe have machines now - that can be relied upon to go day after day over the same course in any sort of weather, except, indeed, a regular hurricane. So it is perfectly practicable to establish aerial postal routes.

This body should consider, I think, the establishment of plans for aerial defense as among the most important questions that can be considered, and Congress should be generous in its appropriations for flying machines and dirigible balloons.

It is a little more difficult to see how we can use the dirigible balloon in time of peace; but it is important that we should have these machines, and many of them. Their great function is to carry weight. The heavier-than-air flying machine is for speed, but not of much use in carrying weight until we have learned to build larger and more efficient machines. Their use is for scouting purposes, for rapid work from place to place. They are admirably adapted for carrying mails. The dirigible balloon is useful for the weight it carries. The most recent Zeppelins are said to support a weight of thirty tons in the air. Allowing fifteen tons for the weight of the machine, its crew, etc., they are said to be able to carry a useful load of fifteen tons. Think of it! Thirty thousand pounds of useful load! If our army only had one of those machines now, they could carry rations for 10,000 men in a single trip over any sort of country, even where there are no roads; and I rather think that the cost of the transportation would be less than by mule wagon or motor car. But we haven't one, so it is no use considering that.

If we can only find use for them in peace, we can get a supply that can be used in war. It is a little difficult to see how that can be done. It seems to me it can only be done by the stimulation of companies by subsidies from the government. may have an aerial route from New York to Washington. could not carry heavy freight, it could carry parcels; it could carry first-class mail matter. The newspapers could use it to send the issues they want to distribute in another city. There would be an advantage there, coming from New York to Washington in about two hours, instead of the five hours now required by our fastest express. And I have no doubt that business men and many other peple would be glad to pay many times the cost of the railroad fare to enjoy a ride through the air from New York to Washington. Then the Post Office could assist, in the case of the parcel post. It would be useless to expect it to take heavy Anything that the government can do to establish these large dirigible balloons in actual use will be of assistance to it when the time for war comes.

There is another consideration in this matter. Neither the army nor the navy is of any protection, or of very slight protection, against aerial raids. We may therefore look forward with certainty to the time that is coming, and indeed is almost now at hand, when sea power and land power will be secondary to air power, and that nation which gains control of the air will practically control the world.

That is a very serious thought; but that time is coming and is almost now here. What protection has Great Britain's Navy been against aerial attacks? What protection have the armies of Europe been against attacks in the rear by heavier-than-air machines? We must realize that we are only in the infancy of aerial locomotion; that this is only the beginning of things. These are not matured machines that have developed their full offensive power; there is going to be further improvement, and if you will allow your mind to look ahead you can see that land power and sea power will ultimately be secondary in importance to air power.

Now, the United States has a great advantage, so far as future progress is concerned. We are an inventive people. In

fact, the chief weapons of modern warfare used in Europe are American inventions, nearly all of them. We are an inventive people, and if we prepare in time we can develop these machines to greater and greater usefulness, and we will have a good chance of becoming the nation that will ultimately have the control of the air.


WHY CONGRESS IS RELUCTANT TO DEVELOP THE NAVY

AUGUSTUS P. GARDNER

If no such thing as a congressional pork barrel had ever existed, the attitude of Congress towards the navy would have been pretty much the same. The reason why pork barrelism is so constantly harped on is because a censorious world delights in attributing unworthy motives to us Congressmen. Furthermore, it is simple to explain to the public that the opposition to large appropriations for the army and navy arises from Congressmen's desire to use the money for magnificent post-office buildings at Squedunk Cross Roads and for the dredging of unnavigable brooks in districts of doubtful political complexion. The cynical cavillers who sneer at an honest "Little Navy" Congressman as a pork barreler, have no right to quarrel with the ghoulish traducers who attribute to corrupt motives the patriotic activities of the Navy League.

THE REAL MOTIVES.

Denunciation is always easier and makes better reading than analysis; but it is not much of a guide for men whose object is to accomplish results. The fact is, that a mixture of motives, some of them extremely subtle and difficult to explain to outsiders, have hitherto restrained Congress from voting for a real modern navy. In the first place, every Congressman who is worth his salt is more or less a watch dog of the Treasury. This does not mean, of course, that when political necessity overpowers us, we refrain from joining in a treasury raid. It merely means that most of us join in a treasury raid with reluctance and usually decline to join at all in other people's treasury raids unless those raids are allied with our own. The result of all which is that a heavy burden of proof rests on army and navy officers to show the necessity of their recommendations. Hence, also, the natural inclination for Congressmen to believe that military men, like all other government officials, overestimate the urgency of their demands. Singularly enough, by the way, I believe it to be the



U.S.S. MASSACHUSETTS

case that army and navy officers even to-day are asking for far less than they at heart believe that our national safety Germany and admirals, unlike us mudlark politicians. have not learned to grow two thicknesses of hide where one grew before. Consequently they hate to be accused of seeking increases to our armed forces in order to secure their own promotion. Furthermore, every officer knows full well that any suggestion of his which calls for large expenditure is bound to be an embarrassment to his chief.

"Never do to-day that which can be put off till to-morrow" is a legislative maxim of hoary antiquity. To tell the truth. there is generally a surprising degree of soundness to that dogma. Prior to the European war, those of us who entertained some suspicion that we were not keeping our navy up to the mark, thought it a circumstance which scarcely necessitated our immediate attention. Most of us never start to get anything ready until the last possible minute any way. But the fact is, after all, that until eighteen months ago not one man in a hundred realized that our navy had lost its international standing and had drifted down stream from a good second to a bad third, if not lower still. I, myself, at first could not believe the facts, and yet all the time staring me in the face were our own official bulletins showing us far behind Germany and neck and neck with France in war-ship tonnage. Unless we are to assume that foreign admiralties are ignorant of their business, we can not overlook the significance of war-ship tonnage as a measure of relative naval strength.

I suppose, after all, that we Congressmen didn't see the truth because it was more comfortable not to see the truth. Naturally enough we didn't want to be howled down as militarists and tools of the armor plate trust if we told the people the facts. Furthermore, I doubt whether the people cared for the facts. One of the most amazing spectacles in the world is the American public when it dons its rose-colored blinders, twines a bandage around its eyes, and then proceeds to inspect that which it does not wish to see.

PRESIDENT WILSON RESTRAINS US.

This brings the story of Congressional inertness down to the assembling of Congress after the fall elections in 1914. Desire to defend the Treasury, procrastination, ignorance of of the facts, reluctance to incur abuse, and the indifference of the public — all these factors had played their parts in causing our neglect of the navy. But here was a war raging in Europe, here were sparks falling all round us, as a very distinguished citizen has since said, here was the press questioning the adequacy if our navy, here were definite charges being made about obsolete torpedoes, worthless submarines, miserable target practice, insufficient crews, battleships decaying in reserve. and grave differences between the civilian head of the navy and his professional advisers. All eyes were watching for the Secretary of the Navy's report. All breaths were held to listen to President Wilson's determination. Congress assembled, Secretary Daniels reported the navy in a superb state of effectiveness, adequately manned and thoroughly prepared. President announced to Congress that the country had been misinformed, that our defense had not been neglected, and that there was no new need to discuss the question of the nation's armament. I ask you in all fairness: In the face of those assurances from the men to whom the people had intrusted the duty of informing us of the state of the nation, can you blame Congress for the passage of the pitiful Navy bill of 1915?

A DELECTABLE PICTURE.

Secretary Daniels is not the first Secretary who has failed to enlighten the American people as to the true condition of the navy. Secretary Daniels is having a very unpleasant experience, while other Secretaries escaped scot free, and the reason is clear enough. Former Secretaries hoodwinked the people when the people were in the mood to be hoodwinked. The present Secretary has first hoodwinked himself and then painted for us a delectable picture at the very time when what we wanted was the unvarnished facts. That is why Daniels exasperates us, while his predecessors only tickled our national vanity.

President Taft once declared in a speech that the navy was ready to fight at the drop of a hat. That is what they told him to say. It was not true; but President Taft did not know it. Nobody cared very much whether it was true or not. It was easier and pleasanter to think it was true. But the situation is different now.

Why Congress is Reluctant to Develop the Navy 81

Congress and the public have not been getting the whole story. I do not mean to say that we have been getting many absolute misstatetments of fact, although we have had some. What we have suffered from is suppressions and reticences and exaggerations and boastfulness.

TARGET PRACTICE AND MOBILIZATION

Our target practice is a case in point. Captain Sims, who for many years was our inspector of target practice, recently testified before the Committee on Naval Affairs that, in days gone by, the Navy Department used to encourage the publication of good gunnery scores, while suppressing results that were mortifying. I know, from my own experience with the present Secretary, that I had no difficulty in finding out the number of hits made by a certain efficient gunner, while all requests for our wretched spring battle practice records of 1914 and 1915 were denied me. Fancy a situation which permits a prominent magazine writer in 1914 to publish without contradiction the statement that our battle practice score was 95 per cent of hits, when as a matter of fact the Atlantic battle-ship fleet had averaged less than 9 per cent of hits in the spring individual battle practice of that very year.

The evidence of Captain Sims and Admiral Winslow has shown us this year that the past mobilization of our fleets in the North River have been jokes on the public. Hitherto we have never known the facts. So long as the brass looked bright on board ship, so long as the crew was shaved and the paint was spick and span, could we be blamed if we were ignorant of the fact that not one of the reserve ships was ready to go out and steam at full speed and use her guns effectively? How were we to know that the reserve ships could not be manned without depleting the active ships of their full complement of men?

"CONFIDENTIAL."

Even now, after all this winter's hearings, we do not know the full truth about ammunition or target practice or torpedces or mines. It passes my comprehension why the War Department should publish full figures as to ammunition and mines and the target practice of our big coast defense guns, while the Navy Department should refuse all those figures on the ground that they are "confidential." "I would cut out the word "confidential" all the way through," was the testimony of Captain Sims, commander of the superdreadnought *Nevada*; "it, is one of the greatest blocks we have to progress." Speaking of our "confidential" target practice, Captain Sims testified: "You can verify it by calling any foreign naval attaché before your committee and he will tell you all about it, because those things are well known."


The hearings this year before the Committee on Naval Affairs are really enlightening, because the committee has consented to call as witnesses many an officer who disagrees with the present administration of the Navy Department. Last year that was scarcely the case. Had it not been for the boldness of Assistant Secretary Roosevelt, Admiral Fiske, and Commander Stirling, the public would not have begun to suspect the true situation.

ADMIRAL FISKE.

All hail to Admiral Fiske! His evidence last year before the Committee on Naval Affairs reminded me of Admiral Nelson's conduct at the battle of Copenhagen. The battle of Trafalgar may have been his greatest victory; but give me the battle of Copenhagen, where Nelson clapped his telescope to his blind eye and could not see his superior officer's signals. That was what Admiral Fiske would not see last year,—his superior's signals.

History tells me that at the battle of Sempach the day was going against the Swiss troops and the Austrian overlords were gaining the upper hand. Suddenly the scene changed. Out from the Swiss ranks stepped a mighty man at arms, Arnold von Winkelreid. He hurled himself on the enemy, and catching hold of as many spears as his arms could encompass he bore them to the ground with the whole weight of his body. His comrades rushed over his corpse, burst through the gap made in the Austrian ranks, and the day was won. Bradley Fiske, I salute you as the Arnold von Winkelreid of the American Navy!





YALE ARTILLERY FIELD GUN

Paul Thompson

Yale University raised an excellent battery of field artillery in 1898 for the war with Spain and has recently formed another battalion of artillery as a part of the Connecticut National Guard.

YALE BATTALION OF FIELD ARTILLERY

GEORGE PARMLY DAY

It has been amusingly and truthfully said that there is no greater pleasure than generalizing from a single instance unless it be generalizing from none at all! The remark is worth quoting and remembering at this time, when all over our country newspaper writers and public speakers are engaged in uttering generalizations as to the effect of the great war in Europe on the ideas and ideals of the American people in regard to military service, preparedness, etc. Almost every day one can read in one paper the mature conclusions of some pacifist that the country is actively against any plan for increasing our naval or military strength; and in some other journal the conviction of some gentleman of the opposite point of view that, as a result of the war abroad, our people are actively interested in promptly and materially increasing the strength of both our army and navy. To be fair we should admit that these contradictory assertions are each made in good faith. To be fair in their turn the majority of those who assume to voice the feeling of the country at this time should confess that they are apt to base their statements on their own personal beliefs, fortified by discussion with a number of people who share their beliefs. It would probably be impossible even by a referendum to ascertain the real opinion of the majority of our people at this time on this very important matter, because — if I may be allowed, in my turn, to generalize - it would seem as if most of our citizens were trying to "make up their minds," to prepare themselves mentally to discuss how far their country should prepare itself physically and financially to meet some great, though unforeseen emergency which shall test its right to continued existence. If I may be allowed to generalize still further I would add that I believe, the wish being father to the thought, that the greatest good which can come to the United States from the Eureopean war is that our people may "think this question through." There are signs that we are planning to do this, instead of allowing it in accordance with tradition to become a topic which shall be endlessly discussed but never settled. And the advocates of preparedness and peace-at-any-price should alike welcome any

opportunity to draw inferences, if not positive conclusions from the definite action of some representative community, instead of continuing to rely on the more or less indefinite and constantly changing talk of this or that locality, the geographical situation, business interests, etc., which inevitably affect its so-called "fundamental convictions."

But can we find any such "representative communities" whose answer to the question before the country may be fairly taken as indicative of a national response rather than a decision influenced very largely by local conditions? It has seemed · to me that we can, and that in one of our national universities such as Harvard or Yale we can get the equivalent of a very fair test vote, since such a university is composed of men drawn not just from one city or State, but from every State and Territory in the Union and from many foreign countries. Furthermore, the members of such a university are, in a very real sense, representative of the best citizenship in the localities from which they come, are very truly "picked men" in the best sense of the word, and are as yet uninfluenced by being identified with business interests in their home communities which may later, unless they become really educated men, tend to make them look at national questions from a local rather than a national standpoint. Because I know more of Yale than of other universities, and because the Yale graduates and undergraduates have, without pressure from either the faculty or corporation, responded in no uncertain tones to the question of the hour, I have thought I would speak to you today on the organization of the Yale Battalion of Field Artillery.

Military training at Yale is in one sense no new development, but rather a return to former practice, as set forth by President Hadley in his report for last year (published in August, 1915). There has never been compulsory military drill for Yale students, and enlistment in the proposed Yale battery last autumn was entirely voluntary. It is, of course, for this very reason that the response of the student body is the more interesting and the more significant. The movement for the organization of a battery of field artillery in the university was originated by a number of the alumni and undergraduates who attended the summer encampment at Platisburg

in 1915, their plans being based on a suggestion made by Major General Leonard Wood and receiving the prompt and hearty endorsement of President Hadley. It was the idea of the originators of the project to establish one battery, which would require the services of 133 men. The official announcement of the plans in the "Yale Daily News" and the statement that applications for enrollment would be received, resulted in 437 men volunteering the first day, the number being increased to over 900 within the week. Because of the fact that the organization had to form a part of the Connecticut National Guard in order to ensure for its members the best training and proper equipment, and because of the fact that the strength of the Connecticut National Guard is limited by statute, but 486 men could be enlisted. This is 46 men under the number authorised by law as comprising the minimum strength of four batteries, but it was deemed best to make the organization the Yale Battalion of Field Artillery comprising four batteries, instead of the one modestly counted upon by the originators of the plan. These four Yale batteries, together with one at Branford and another at Stamford, compose one complete regiment of field artillery for the State of Connecticut, to be officially designated as the Tenth Militia Field Artillery.

Enlistments for the Yale batteries were completed and the first muster held on November 22, 1915, the batteries being accepted for the State by Assistant Adjutant General Cowles. and for the United States by Captain Marlborough Churchill, Field Artillery, United States Army. At the request of President Hadley the War Department approved the detail of an officer to take charge of the training and designated First Lientenant Robert M. Danford, Fifth Field Artillery, for this duty. Lieutenant Danford was commissioned as major in the Connecticut National Guard and assigned to the command of the Yale batteries, entering upon his duty December 10, 1915. The enthusiasm with which he has inspired the undergraduate members of the Yale Battalion shows that those who are interested in military drill at our universities cannot aid it more effectively than by impressing upon the Government the necessity of detailing its best officers for this important work of education and training.

Considerable delay was experienced in obtaining the field

artillery material, and it was not until March 1, 1916, that all the guns, caissons, sights, fuse-setters and other necessary equipment was received. It will be seen then that it would not be within the province of this paper to discuss what the Yale batteries have already accomplished, but rather what is hoped they will do in developing trained men for the service of the nation. For in this development, as in other directions, Yale men are merely seeking to make sure that their university shall remain true to the ideal expressed in its charter; that it shall train men for "public service in Church and Civil State,"

There is no doubt that we are a peace-loving nation and that such service does not often take the form of requiring that our college graduates should be able to assume leadership in a physical struggle to maintain our independence or our national unity or to rescue, or help rescue, some country incapable of resisting undeserved aggression. But the fact that the necessity of our acting instead of talking may arise only once in fifty or a hundred years does not absolve us as a nation or as individuals from giving our coming citizens the opportunity to fit themselves to be capable leaders in both thought and action if the need arises in their lifetime. We can all applaud the optimism of those who assert that in the event of trouble coming to our country a million men would spring to arms between sunrise and sunset. But none of us should deceive ourselves by imagining that such a body of untrained men would be an immediate asset of any great value. Rather it would be a potential asset of very real value, but an immediate liability of large proportions until a sufficient number of officers could be found or developed to train such a patriotically inclined but chaotically unorganized mob. The chief value of organizations such as the Yale batteries does not lie in the fact that they will increase materially the number of well-trained and properly disciplined citizen soldiers in our republic. Rather does it consist in their developing men capable later on of training other men who may be willing to serve the nation, but unable because of lack of experience to render efficient service. General Wood during his term as Chief of Staff of the United States Army repeatedly called attention in his reports to the utter inadequacy of our field artillery in personnel, material and ammunition. Our regular field artillery comprises but six

regiments, only three and one-half of these being within the continental limits of the United States. A war which demanded the mobilization of 450,000 men would require, I am told, fiftyfour regiments of field artillery. We have, I understand, at the present time in the United States, in addition to the field artillery of the regular service, sixty-five batteries, or, roughly speaking, twelve regiments, of militia field artillery. The majority of these batteries are said to be at a low standard of efficiency. Even if we counted them as dependable units it would be necessary in time of war to organize thirty-six regiments of volunteer field artillery. This would require approximately 1.500 officers. With the present high educational and technical requirements for a field artillery officer it would be fatal to the efficiency of a most important arm of our defense to give these commissions to untrained men or to hurriedly prepared candidates. With the experience of the present European war in our minds it would be the height of folly to neglect any opportunity to assure for our country abundance of at least partly trained material from which to make officers. In determining, somewhat tardily but better late than never, to pursue a policy of conservation of our natural resources, we have decided not to wait until our forests are attacked by disease, or assailed by other enemies, before we start to train men capable to lead in the fight for the preservation of these resources of ours. In considering the conservation of our country as a nation we must realize that in the last analysis we must rely on men trained in advance to direct successfully the mental and manual efforts of others in whatever dangers may arise, on men trained by an early appreciation of the value to a nation and all its citizens of the self-sacrifice which constitutes real patriotism to set the best example to others. It is a comparatively easy matter for most of us to take part in observance of a "safe and sane" celebration of the Fourth of July, or even to live through "an old-fashioned Fourth," or to rise and uncover when the national anthem is played. Such ceremonies have their value in making us feel for our country. But in order to feel himself really a part of his country a man must make some sacrifice for it, and be willing to give to it and to its service some of the time and thought that all Americans like to think they give to their families and unquestionably do

give to their business. It has been well said that the measure of generosity is not what we give, but what we have left, and in much the same way it may be stated that the measure of patriotism, of love of country, is not what we think we will do in an emergency, but the amount of time and effort we are willing to take out of our personal life and devote to the life of the state day by day. It is surely most fitting for our universities to instill in the minds of their students that real patriotism means self-sacrifice. It is the more important that this lesson should be learned early, since, as Stevenson has said, it is generally true that after a man marries and has a family, he is very apt to come to believe that his first duty to the state is to preserve the life of an invaluable parent!

The two most significant features of the development of the Yale batteries have been: first, that the service of the undergraduate members is entirely voluntary and that their work in and for the organization represents such time as they have themselves been willing to give from their spare hours after completing their regular university studies each day. It is noteworthy that there is "a maximum of hard work and a minimum of fuss and feathers" in the exercises of the field artillery, so that there is little or none of the glamour popularly associated with military companies to attract candidates for enrollment. Yet in spite of these possible obstacles the number of undergraduates who endeavored to enlist were seven times as many as had been thought probable, and was practically double the number which could be enrolled under the Connecticut State Law. And in the second place it is significant that, while the undergraduates of Yale are thus giving freely of their time, the graduates have given land on the new athletic field as a site for an armory for the Yale Battalion of Field Artillery and are now pledging the money needed to erect the armory without expense to the State. The project is one then which deserves to command national interest and which promises to justify the continued and hearty cooperation of the War Department in furnishing officers of instruction, as well as equipment. It is, of course, the hope of all that the resulting benefits to the nation will be large, not only by reason of the training afforded the men taking part in the work of the batteries, but also the development of a greater interest in our military problems

and an ability to discuss and criticize these more intelligently. In this connection it is of interest to note that Yale College will offer this coming year a new elective course on the military history of the United States.

No one who is interested in studying the educational results of work in organisations such as the Yale Batallion or in the student camps of instruction conducted by the War Department can do better than to read President Hadley's annual report issued last summer. It is his deliberate opinion, based on personal observation, that "wholly aside from their military value in preparing a reserve of partly trained officers for possible service in the event of war, the camps have an educational value that much more than justifies their organization and their maintenance. * * For the education received at summer camps is not a training in the showy side of military service, as some suppose; nor is it a matter of routine drille, as others think. It is a training in the exercise of the intelligence on problems of interest and importance. And, wholly apart from its physical and intellectual value, it gives a training in the sense of public obligation. One of the worst evils of the present day is the tendency to exaggerate our claims against society and to underrate our duties and obligations toward society. We think of the government as something of which we can make use, rather than as something which has the right to make use of us. If we pay our taxes, and perhaps render occasional service on juries or in public administrative offices, we think that we have done all that can be asked. It is an advantage of military training that it brings home to each individual the paramount importance of public duty. emphasizes the fact that patriotism means not enjoyment. but sacrifice. It teaches us that the community can claim not only a part of the property or a part of the time of its citizens, but their very life itself. This lesson is important in every age; it is particularly important to-day, when combinations of various classes in the community stand in organized antagonism to each other, and do not hesitate to ignore national interests in their conflict.

"But besides the direct mental and physical training and the indirect effect in creating a sense of public obligation, the effect of these camps is to give men a moderation in utterance regarding the affairs of the nation which is desirable at all times, and imperatively necessary to-day. In talking with Yale men who have attended the summer camps at Gettysburg and at Burlington I have been struck by the quiet and grave spirit in which they discuss international affairs. They know that if there is war it will probably be their duty to take part. They know what war means, and they are intelligently anxious to avoid it. They become practical as well as theoretical friends of peace. They will help us instead of hinder us in dealing with our international problems, because they know of the dangers involved in loose talk."

Farther on in the same report President Hadley has written some paragraphs which should be treasured by all who are more concerned in the welfare of the nation than in having their personal point of view as to its duty and destiny prevail. In speaking of the objections which are urged against the possibility even of counting the work in these camps as part of the fulfillment of the requirements for a degree, the president states that:

"The first, and probably the strongest, objection is that of the extreme peace men. Such men believe that training in military affairs leads to militarism; that a student who has learned how to fight will want to fight; that a boy who has become attracted by the glamour of military life will be anxious to plunge the country into war. cannot help thinking that the men who hold these views hold them on theoretical grounds; that they have not talked with boys that have been at the camp, and do not understand what is the moral effect of its lessons. Play soldiering may be attractive; real soldiering is not. And the boys who have attended summer camps of the United States Army have seen something of what real soldiering is and does. They know that it means grave discomfort during the time of preparation and much physical suffering during the actual fight. They learn that the glamour is little as compared with the risk. If the service of their country attracts them - and it does attract many, - it is because they learn to regard it as a duty, not as a pleasure. Actual knowledge of military affairs, instead of increasing the danger that we shall go to war, tends to diminish it.

"There is one error, and a very grave one, which the extreme militarists and extreme pacifists hold in common. They believe our country to be stronger than it is. The

militarist thinks that our neighbors have reason to be afraid of us. The pacifist thinks that we have no reason to be afraid of our neighbors. Both errors spring from the same source: an underestimate of the forces arrayed against us and an overestimate of our own powers of resistance. The militarist who wishes to pursue a 'spirited' foreign policy, and the pacifist who wishes to 'overawe the nations of Europe by a display of moral force,' are suffering from nearly the same mistakes and are likely to lead us to nearly the same destination.

"Now a boy who has had the training of the military camp is protected against both of these errors. He knows what war means, and how little we are prepared for it. He knows that if we talk without being prepared, we are likely to promote war. He knows that if we keep our utterance within the bounds set by our measure of preparation we are likely to have peace. It is not readiness for war that creates a probability of war, so much as overestimate of

our readiness and underestimate of our neighbors'.

"Taking all these considerations together, I regard the student military camp as one of the most valuable means of safeguarding the peace of the country which we have at our command; and I believe that official recognition of these camps by our colleges, instead of leading to militarism, will lay the basis for a foreign policy, to which, in Webster's words, we may owe 'safety at home, dignity and consideration abroad.'"

THE DEFENSE OF THE NATION AS THE BUSINESS OF THE CITIZEN

CHARLES MARTINDALE

I come to you from the State of Indiana, which gave to our country John Hay and John W. Foster, in diplomacy; Oliver P. Morton and Benjamin Harrison, in statesmanship, and General Lew Wallace and James Whitcomb Riley, in literature; and, although all unworthy to represent that great State, I esteem it an honor to be accorded the privilege of this platform for the purpose of giving an impression of public opinion in the State of Indiana upon the subject of National Defense.


The defense of the nation is inherently a political question and necessarily the ways and means of national defense will soon become a party question, but in what I shall have to say, I shall endeavor to avoid any transgression of the propriety of this occasion.

However men may differ about measures, we must accord to all, in the last resort, a loyal devotion to our country, however much it may appear at times that personal interest and party success seem, for the moment, to be dominating motives.

In a democracy, the difficulty of ascertaining the popular will is increased by the timidity of its politicians. Those who are in administration desire to remain, and those who are out desire to get in. Both would be glad to anticipate the will of the majority. Both are afraid to take a bold stand and trust the people. Politicians as a rule do not trust the people, but fear the people. Hence action is tentative and timorous.

In the last eighteen months the object lesson of the great war has effectually disposed of pacificism. To all but a negligible number of dreamers, the only question to be considered now is how to organize the forces of this Republic for its defense.

The winter of 1914-15 was a period of keen distress among the wage workers of the Central States. Commerce raiders were at large in the Atlantic and exports found tardy and irregular transport. Factories were either shut down or running on half time. Wage earners were in the bread line. Cities were running municipal shelters and soup-houses. They were having





"bundle days" and charity performances. There were demands for the valorization of government loans on cotton and copper. The project of government-owned ships to transport our products was suggested, to supply the need of a merchant marine. Had the embargo on ocean shipments long continued, wage earners would have been starving in the midst of plenty.

Nothing has happened in this country since the embargo acts of 1812 which so sharply brought home to our people the necessity for foreign markets and uninterrupted ocean transportation.

Millions are employed in industrial labor. Many of these depend upon next week's pay roll to pay last week's grocery bill. Wages have been the highest in the history of the world. Wages and food for these millions of workers depend upon continuous employment. A high wage-rate and continuous employment require a maximum output to cover the high wage rate and the overhead expense. Maximum output means a surplus over domestic absorption, and this requires exportation.

Foreign trade and constant ocean transport demand a merchant marine and its complement — a powerful navy.

Here is an inexorable sequence which the masses of the Middle West understand as thoroughly as those who live at the seaboard. The industrial worker of the Central States favors a greater navy, not alone for the defense of the national honor and national safety, but because he believes that, protecting an adequate merchant marine, the navy is protecting the workman's dinner pail.

We begin to understand that when nations go to war for foreign markets, they are fighting either because their workers are hungry or to keep them from being hungry.

Twenty years ago, Benjamin Harrison uttered these words, which are as true now as they were then:

"I can not help but feel that in a country like ours where our social security and the good order of our communities depend upon a well-conditioned and well-disposed laboring people and where the defense of our flag and our institutions depend upon the strong arm and patriotic hearts of our workingmen — I can not help but feel that it would be a disaster to bring in a condition of wages in the country so low that hope would go out of the heart of the man who toils in the mill. Unless there is hope in the heart, some

promise of better things, some margin of comfort, some ladder for the feet of his children to climb to heights that he had not attained; unless these things are in the heart, you may expect anarchy to increase, and social disorder."

The people are beginning to understand that in the competition between nations for foreign markets, we may reasonably expect in the future to be obliged to choose between external war to hold our foreign commerce, and internal distress with domestic anarchy.

By some such process of reasoning the people are coming to believe that they must have an adequate merchant marine, growing step by step with the marketable surplus of agricultural and industrial products of this country and that the constant operation of such a merchant marine must be guaranteed by a navy sufficiently formidable to deter an attack from any source.

Another outgrowth of the great war is the popular realization of the lack of sufficient naval and military force to protect the international rights, either on sea or land, of American citizens. It is beginning to dawn on us that international policy depends upon armaments and armaments on policy.

Much of the expressed dissatisfaction with executive action is really irritation because we have not the naval and military force to justify a bolder diplomatic tone.

Popular opinion on the question of means and methods of military defense, is rapidly taking concrete form. Military organization is a question that, in this generation, has had little interest for the masses. For a hundred years, most of our national revenue has been derived from indirect taxation. Whatever the masses have contributed to the national revenues by means of indirect taxation, they have not realized they have paid. So far as our revenue has been derived from direct taxation, it has touched only the well-to-do and the wealthy. The masses have not felt taxation. Wage earners have come to feel that the wealthy have furnished the money and hired a soldiery. They have had no partnership in the transaction.

The militia of the country has seemed to the industrial masses to have but one field of activity, viz.: to suppress disorder in case of strikes.

The business of enforcing domestic law and order is the business of the State by means of a police force. It is not the

business of the National Government to contribute funds to any extent to aid States to keep the peace within their borders. To the extent that the National Government has contributed money to maintain a militia chiefly used for police duty, the question of national defense has been prejudiced in the minds of the industrial masses. Any program of army reorganization which includes a State militia used as a local police force, will meet the strong opposition of the industrial workers.

It was largely because of this feeling that the issue raised between the late Secretary of War and the Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs of the House,—that national military forces should be exclusively under the control of the Federal Government and should not include a militia subject to State interference,—evoked an expression of opinion strongly favorable to the Secretary of War.

Any plan of army reorganization which includes State militia will not be satisfactory to the people of my State.

In confirmation of my opinion, I call attention to a recent editorial in the "Indianapolis News." This newspaper has a circulation of 150,000 copies. It is independent in politics. It has been a consistent supporter of President Wilson, and until four four months ago was strongly pacifist.

After upbraiding the Indiana Senators for voting against the provision in the Chamberlin Bill for a volunteer reserve, it says:

"The people do not demand a great army, but they do demand one larger than they have now, and — what is even more important — one organized on scientific lines. Especially do they ask that the first reserve shall be indisputably Federal, and under the sole and undivided control of the President and the War Department.

The question is not one of meeting the wishes of the representatives of the National Guard who are now in Washington, but of giving to the people of the United States the best army organization that can be had. The Indiana Senators, for some reason, failed to appreciate the nature of the issue. They voted to eliminate the best feature of the Chamberlin Bill. Whether it can be saved in conference is now the question. The chance would have been much better had that provision had the support of the Indiana Senators. The people should rouse themselves, and do what they can to make their representatives at Washington understand that nothing but the best attainable will satisfy them."

The officers of the National Guard in Indiana assure me that if an opportunity were given the National Guard to resign from the State Militia and re-enlist in a Federal Reserve, nintey per cent of the Guard would do so.

The feeling of the National Guard is that the police duty of the State should be performed by State police and constabulary, and that the National Guard should be converted into a Federal Reserve wholly separated from State control.

In Indiana it is a tradition, the outgrowth of issues involved in the Civil War, that national unity must rise supreme over State sovereignty. The feeling exists that the proposal to permit any interference by State authorities with the personnel and organization of national military forces, is a survival of the principle of States rights, as opposed to national supremacy.

There is a marked growth of opinion favorable to universal service. This is a recognition that equality of rights implies equality of obligations; that manhood service is the correlative of manhood suffrage.

Those who hold these opinions believe that there should be an equality of participation in national defense. They do not believe that the so-called voluntary service is voluntary at all. They do appreciate the patriotic and unselfish devotion of both officers and men in the service after they have become a part of the organization.

They believe that the larger number of men who enlist in the regular army do so because the conditions of the service and the pay are attractive as compared with whatever employment they may have had in civil life.

The failure of the so-called volunteer plan in the Civil War, and in Great Britain in the present war, has made a very deep impression.

Those who believe in Equality of Service are of the opinion that if the young men of this country arriving at the age of eighteen years are required to spend either one year or two years in the service, and then pass into a military reserve, the education acquired by the men and the effect upon our body politic in inculcating discipline, respect for law and order, obedience to authority, will more than overbalance any economic loss by reason of their temporary absence from industrial life.

These opinions are not confined to any particular class of society. You will find such expression as common among the wage earners as in professional circles.

It has been said quite frequently in congressional debate, that compulsory service is the ideal plain, but that the people are not ready for compulsory service. Whether this be true or not, is a matter of personal opinion. No one can know when, or how soon, the majority of the people will vote for compulsory service, until the issue has been put before them.

The chief difficulty is that the politicians have not been willing to stake their political fortunes on the issue. They are afraid to trust the people to do what they believe to be right, or to make the attempt to lead public opinion into what they know to be the right course.

The same political situation existed in Great Britain prior to the outbreak of war. Upon his return from South Africa in 1905, Lord Roberts began a propaganda for national service. He made many speeches and wrote constantly on the subject, exerting all the influence at his command. Not only the Liberal ministry, but the opposition, treated his efforts with polite tolerance. He was regarded as an amiable old gentleman pursuing a hobby.

After the Agadir incident in 1911, there was the gravest concern among the British politicians over the strained relations brought about by that occurrence. While this apprehension still existed, Lord Roberts, in the fall of 1912, made a speech in Manchester in favor of immediate preparation, in which he used these prophetic words:

"In the year 1912, our German friends, I am well aware, do not—at least in sensible circles—assert dogmatically that a war with Great Britain will take place this year or next; but in their heart of hearts they know, every man of them, that—just as in 1866 and just as in 1870—war will take place the instant the German forces by land and sea are by their superiority at every point, as certain of victory as anything in human calculation can be made certain. Germany strikes when Germany's hour has struck. That is the time-honored policy of her Foreign Office. That was the policy relentlessly pursued by Bismark and Moltke in 1866 and 1870. It has been her policy decade by decade since that date. It is her policy at the present hour.

"Such, gentlemen," he continued, "is the origin and such the considerations which have fostered in me the growth of this conviction—the conviction that in some form of national service is the only salvation of this nation and this empire. The territorial force is now an acknowledged failure—a failure in discipline, a failure in numbers, a failure in equipment, a failure in energy."

Not only the British Ministery, but the Unionists and the leading newspapers of the United Kingdom, fell upon him, tooth and nail, with the severest condemnation, charging him with provoking Germany to an attack.

History has justified Lord Roberts, and Great Britain has been reluctantly compelled, as we were compelled during the Civil War, to resort to compulsory service.

Would it not have been much better, had English statesmen given heed to an old and tried soldier who had devoted his life to his country, and made a sincere effort to lead public opinion to the point of rational military organization.


Had Lord Roberts been successful in his efforts, the western line of battle in Europe might have been along the Rhine and Moselle instead of in Northern France.

We demand of our politicians that they make a sincere effort to *lead* public opinion and not to *follow* it; that they set an example of confidence in our great national destiny; that they make a sincere attempt to create in this country a great national will and unity of purpose.

Above all the gracious gifts of God, what we should pray for is a leader—a man with the wisdom and courage of Washington, with the patience and steadfastness of Lincoln, with the eloquence of a Demosthenes—who can stand forth and say to us, as he said to the Athenians in their hour of peril:

"Yet, oh Athenians, yet is there time. There is one way in which you can yet win a victory. And the manner of it is this. Cease to hire your soldiers and go yourselves—every man of you—and stand in the ranks. Thus if you win a victory it will be a victory in glory beyond all victories, and if you fall you will perish worthy of your heroic past."





The battleship Wyoming, a ship of the first fighting line, mounts twelve 12-inch guns and twenty-one 5-inch. Here she is seen steaming up the East River, just above the Brooklyn Bridge, with the towers of downtown New York in the distance. The Arkansas is a sister ship.

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SAFEGUARDING OUR INHERITANCE

CHARLES ALEXANDER RICHMOND, D.D.,LL,D. President of Union College, Schenectady, N. Y.

There are times in the life of every thoughtful man when he sits down alone and tries to get at the truth about himself, and more especially about his own weakness. It is a sobering exercise, but of great — often of saving — value. To the nation it is altogether indispensable, yet how often has it happened that nations have first been made aware of the weak places in their armor by the thrust of the enemy's sword. It seems rather to have been the rule than the exception. The history of most of the great nations of the past has been a story of narrow escapes and of final catastrophe. But, however foolhardy other nations have been, in the present or in other times, I suppose there has never existed at any time a nation so joyously foolhardy and so blandly oblivious of its own defects and weaknesses as this American democracy of ours.

Fifty years, or more, ago we sat amid the ashes of our desolation with loins girded about with sackcloth. We betook ourselves to prayer, and there was a great searching of heart in those days. But since the time of the putting off of our mourning we have gone on our way jauntily enough and the thoughtful mood has not returned. We are as a man who beholdeth his natural face in the glass and goeth his way and straightway forgetteth what manner of man he was. Say what you will, you can not shake the average American out of the conviction that this nation is indestructible. It is not merely the fixed idea of the common and unobservant mind: it is a kind of national obsession. Even Mr. Andrew Carnegie, a man not altogether uninstructed in the ins and outs of life and not wanting in the common prudence essential to self-preservation, professes to believe it. Not long since he said to me, in a conversation on the subject: "No matter what she may do, America is safe. You can't sink her."

But the unsinkable Ship of State has not yet been designed. A triumphant democracy it is not, and perhaps never will be. It is a democracy on trial, and the supreme trial may still be before us. Who knows but the waters may be even deeper and the fires

more fierce than those our fathers had to pass in the days of'61? Well may Mr. Bryce say of us: "Pessimism is the luxury of a handful; optimism is the private delight, as well as the public profession, of nine hundred and ninety-nine out of every thousand." No doubt there is good ground for it. Certainly we have succeeded amazingly, and we like to think of it as the result of our own unequalled genius; but may it not rather be due, as De Toqueville, three quarters of a century ago said it would be, to the unique advantage of our position and the unparalleled conditions of our life? The laws of the universe are not suspended for the benefit even of the United States. but if ever the grace of God operated efficaciously - not to say miraculously — it has done so in the prospering of this nation. The sins and the follies of our youth have been many, and we have paid but lightly for them, as is the common good fortune of youth. To be sure, there is reason for this. The mistakes of the small and weak among the nations are more easily forgiven. The results are not so disasterous. But the venial fault of the boy becomes a crime in the grown man, and is not forgiven. The fool in "Twelfth Night" sings:

"When that I was and a tiny little boy
With a hey-ho the wind and the rain,
A foolish thing was but a toy,
For the rain it raineth every day.
But when I came to man's estate
'Gainst knaves and theives, men shut their gate.
But when I came, alas! to wive,
By swaggering could I never thrive,
For the rain it raineth every day."

And this is no foolish song. When America was a chaotic little people of three or four millions, so weak that even the Barbary States were not afraid to flout her, and so insignificant that the nations of Europe hardly took her into account at all, the world cared very little what we did. Our follies could not work much injury to them, or even to ourselves; our disasters were, at worst, the diseases of childhood — inconvenient, but rarely fatal.

It is very different with a nation of a hundred millions, a world power with national wealth greater than that of Germany and Great Britain combined, and a foremost position of responsibility and influence among the people of the earth. The

political and social and industrial forces of America are to the forces of that day what the artillery of the present war is to the little brass cannon of the breastworks at Bunker Hill. Their capacity for benefit to the race is unbounded, but at the same time they contain in themslves high explosives which could send the whole fabric of our government into pieces and destroy society itself. This we must not forget. Upon our care in handling these hazardous goods and upon our skill in developing and using their potential benefit will depend the ultimate success of the experiment in democracy. For after all our menace is not from without. Lincoln was right when he said: "This nation will live forever, unless it commits suicide." Our defects as well as our dangers are inherent. They are a part of our very character and composition. We are hearing much to-day of the weakness of our national defenses, of our unpreparedness, and the insufficiency of the army and navy, and it is well to give good heed to these voices. In such a menagerie as this we live in, teeth and claws are a beneficent reinforcement to a peaceful disposition. God knows this world is no Utopia and the doctrine of sin - original, hereditary, and self-acquired - is still a sound article of faith! We have been the ostrich in the world's zoological garden, an imposing but rather lightheaded bird; an ornithological pacifist whose noble plumes, intended by nature as an ornament to his own person, have rarely been spared him, but are commonly plucked and worn by others. Certainly it is time for us to take our heads out of the sand and look danger in the face. If we have enemies, we must be ready to meet them at the gate, as strong men have already done, and not within the walls of the city.

"Every good political institution," says Burke, "must have a preventive operation as well as a remedial."

It is, of course, a truism to say that the real defense of any nation is in the character of its people. But in an entirely different sense must this be said of a republic, and especially of this republic, for indeed we are not like any other nation. The origin of this nation, its traditions, its ideals, the structure of its life, are all different. Switzerland, a real republic, is too minute for a comparison. In France the first great expression of democracy was a revolt accompanied by hideous excesses, the dethronement of religion and a practical denial of moral sanc-

tions. Its philosophy was rationalism, and, let me say in passing, France never truly found herself until the day of tribulation turned her back to God.

The democracy of England has a background of an hereditary aristocracy. In autocratic Germany and Austria, democracy represents only an opposition to the Government. In Russia and Italy, it is feeling its way slowly but surely to ultimate realization. The so-called republic of Mexico and certain other pseudo-republics, are to a free republic what the ape is to the man—a mock or a sore shame. And China, republic also in name,—waking from her long sleep and feeling vaguely the stirring of power and aspiration,—is still like a giant groping in the dark.

But in this republic nearly everything is in direct contrast. Our first settlers were not adventurers nor revolutionists. They had no ancient grudges to pay off; they were men of intelligence and education; men of faith and of great moral earnestness; lovers of peace and of law and order. The most typical of the germinal idea of this republic — and I spell germinal with an "i" and not with an "a"—is to be found in the Pilgrim Father. He came to this land to find freedom. It was not wealth he sought, nor any material advantage whatsoever, but a spiritual ideal. The founding of this republic has been called the triumph of an idea — the idea of human liberty — not a new idea, of course, but reasserted and reestablished upon a scale and with a sanction not seen before in this world. The republic has continued and grown year by year in essential strength. It is indeed the triumph of an idea.

The most astonishing achievement of this American democracy is the success we have had in developing a distinct nationality. We have taken materials from every nation under the sun—some of it the waste of other nations, the cast-off refuse of the human scrap heap—and some how we have found a way to use it and to transform it into something of value. It is a miracle in alchemy. We have not been wholly successful; but upon the whole our success has been wonderful, and, speaking broadly, we must regard it as the success of democracy and individualism. Few indeed are the men who have come to this land who have not improved, not only in outward condition, but in essential character. In general, we may say, when a

man becomes an American citizen he becomes more of a man. "The consequences of democracy are by no means to be comprehended in one summary verdict of approval or condemnation. So complicated and endless are their ramifications that he who sees furthest into them will longest hesitate before finally pronouncing whether the good or the evil of its influence on the whole preponderates." So says John Stuart Mill. But whether we like it or not, we shall have to put up with it. A certain New England lady, well known to our grandmothers,— I mean Margaret Fuller,— once said, with an air of patronizing sweetness: "I accept the universe." When Carlyle heard of it he smiled grimly and remarked: "By God, she'd better!"

We shall have to accept democracy. We can no more stop it or diminish it than King Canute could stop the sea. The more he beat it with his chains, the more turbulent it became. Nothing is so constant, so elemental, so historically progressive, so irresistible as the movement of democracy. As for ourselves, we not only accept it, we believe in it. We believe in democracy because we believe in individualism and in self-direction, and in the intrinsic worth of manhood. This, in short, is the creed of the American democracy.

And this has become our heritage, a heritage of liberty, a tradition of equality and of human brotherhood; a principle which our forefathers fought to establish and which our fathers had to fight to maintain.

To-day this principle has been challenged with a rudeness, and with greater force than it has been for a hundred years. Whether the issue will be thrust sharply upon this nation and put to the arbitrament of war we cannot tell. We all know that at least it is possible. This country has stood for a century and a quarter as the concrete expression of the principle of human liberty and of self-government. If by any fatality it should be destroyed, it would seem that "government of the people, by the people, for the people," had indeed perished from the earth. It is therefore an issue of more than national importance. It is our heritage, but a heritage we hold in trust for whole world, and the question as to how we shall safeguard it, or whether we mean to safeguard it at all, is one in which the whole world is interested.

Whatever other differences of opinion there may be. I

suppose it will be agreed that the ultimate desire of every man whose opinion is worth listening to is peace. There is only one place for a man who wants to fight for the sake of fighting, and that is Ireland. The Irishman fights cheerfully, just for the fun of the thing. His attitude toward the present conflict is that of the poor fellow who has lost a leg or an eye: "It's a terrible fight, but it's better than no fight at all." As for the man who stirs up strife to make business for munition factories, he is simply a wild beast and should be hunted out of society.

When we come to the method by which a permanent peace may be secured, there is the widest differences of opinion among honest and patriotic men, and honest differences of opinion are not to be treated with ridicule. At the one extreme is the pacifist — or pacificist, as you please; neither of these outlandish words is to be found in the Century Dictionary. He believes that we should have no army and no navy. A few weeks ago I asked one of the prominent leaders of the movement what his program would be. He answered, "We should disarm at once." Perhaps Villa had heard of this when he proposed to ride into Washington and take possession of the United States Government.

At the other extreme is the fire-eater who would have every schoolboy come to school with a knapsack on his shoulder and a gun in his hand, and who proposes a program that would turn this country into an arsenal and a barracks.

But the great body of thoughtful people does not sympathize with either of these extremists. A very serious situation is confronting us. Perhaps it is not exactly a crisis, but it may easily become one. A year and a half ago very few of us believed in the possibility of a world war. To-day there are many who fear, and not a few who believe, that this war will become literally a world war and that we can not escape. And fervently as we may hope and pray that these last may be mistaken, it seems to me that it is madness for us to face such a possibility, however remote, without taking adequate precautions. It would be a horrible thing to contemplate an uninterrupted race in armament, such as bids fair to exhaust the nations of Europe; but we must see things clearly as they are, and not as they ought to be or as we should like to have them. If this war should end without our becoming implicated, we should find ourselves the

richest nation in the world, with all the other nations armed and equipped and practiced in every device of destruction. If we think of them as weak and exhausted beyond the possibility of action, we shall make a very great mistake. There is no limit to the exertions and sacrifices which nations are willing to make to satisfy their national ambitions. We do not want to think of any nation as hostile. But we have evidence enough to show that some nations, at least, are not very much influenced by considerations of friendship when it stands in the way of conquest. To such a nation there is only one question — not "Have I a right to it?" but "Am I strong enough to take it?"

We must be strong in time of peace as well as in war, and if our voice is to count it must have behind it the authority of strength. A weak man or a weak nation is a man or a nation whose voice carries no weight. Grape juice is a bland and pleasant beverage, but there are times when nothing will do but three fingers of Scotch. The only safe refuge for the dove of peace is under the shadow of a strong, protecting power. The counsels of peace which come to us from God himself receive their sanctions from His omnipotence. The pleadings of divine mercy would have small effect upon the stubborn hearts of men if they did not have behind them the austere authority of the divine commands.

When it comes to detailed plans, I do not feel qualified to speak. Two principles, however, should be always kept in mind:

First: Whatever preparation we make should be national, and whatever service is required should be universal. A volunteer service may do for an emergency, but for a permanent policy it is inefficient and undemocratic. Its tendency is to kill off the best men first and sacrifice them to the costly experiments which are made at the beginning of every war.

Second: The officers should be men thoroughly trained. It is little short of murder to entrust the lives of our young men to incompetent leaders. Let us double or treble West Point, if necessary, or establish other war colleges for the training of officers, but do not let us delude ourselves with the idea that a dilettante training and a little marching up and down in parade will qualify men to become competent officers in actual service. I am sure we do not appreciate the horrible sacrifices of life made in this country to official incompetence. An officer in a

company which served in the last Spanish War has told me recently that they marched out one hundred strong. They were moved from one camp to another, each one more unhealthy than Not even the commonest sanitary precautions were the last. The drinking water was polluted, and an epidemic of typhoid went through the company. A pest of flies aggravated the disorder. They never left the country. At the end of a few months they were brought back to the North with hardly a healthy man in the entire company. Eight out of the one hundred had died, and not a few of the others had become invalids for life. At the end of that time this same man enlisted in another company. They went to Cuba and saw some hard service, but the officers of the regiment knew their business, and out of that company only one man was lost and when they were mustered out, every man was fit.

I present this as an exhibit which is at least worth notice. A movement has been started to provide reserve officers by the establishment of summer camps, and special effort has been made to secure college men. The movement is a good one and should be encouraged. There is nothing the American boy needs so much as training in discipline and a sense of duty. I have heard of a father who said he never raised his hand against his son excepting in self-defense. To have such sons taken in hand at least once a year and made to understand that there is such a thing as obedience is a most wholesome exercise. But we must not deceive ourselves. This will not make officers, and the danger is that these youngsters may get the idea that they know something of military science when they know only enough to make them dangerous. A training in physical fitness is a great deal more important for these young men than a training in military science. I am told that Funston's men, in the first two days of their march into Mexico, covered ninety miles. They had no water excepting what they could carry with them. Lately they have covered fifty-five miles in seventeen hours. I asked an old army officer what would happen if we should send our young college men on such an expedition. He answered, "Of course they would all die."

If we are going into this business of preparedness we should go into it with our eyes open and do it thoroughly, whatever it may cost. So far we have been playing with it, and it is pretty safe to prophesy that the cost in the end, both in money and in lives, will be vastly greater than it would have been if we had taken it up in earnest from the beginning. And to do this we must have a strong central government. No adequate program for defense can be carried out without a sufficient federal authority; we have found that out at least, and in that respect we have traveled far away from the doctrine of Thomas Jefferson. "Societies exist," he says, "under three forms: First, without governing, as among our Indians; second, under governments wherein the will of everyone has a just influence; third, under governments of force. It is a problem not clear in my mind that the first condition is not the best."

An example of the practical efficiency of these ideas of government is to be found in his preparations for naval defense. He did not like war, therefore war was ruled out of his universe. But, pushed by the intolerable insults of England and France to some action, the best he could think of and the farthest to which he could be urged was a kind of amphibious gunboat. These could be built for \$10,000 each, or \$100,000 per dozen. They were to be kept in the barn when not needed, and in case of emergency to be dragged to the water in wagons, manned by the farmers of the neighborhood, and eaten alive by the victors of Trafalgar and the Nile. This is not an extract from a Gilbert and Sullivan opera, but an executive order issued by the President of the United States and actually carried out. In a special message to Congress, dated February 10th, 1807, recommending these gunboats, he says: "They would be manned in ordinary with only their complement for navigation, relying on the seamen and militia of the port if called into action. At all times those unemployed would be withdrawn into places not exposed to sudden enterprises, hauled up under sheds from the sun and weather." Gallatin criticized gently the naive proposition, in his own writing, on the draft of this message, but in December the bill was passed by a large majority and the sweet little gunboats were built.

His general ideas on the subject may be gathered from a letter written to Thomas Paine, dated September, 1807: "Believing myself that gunboats are the only water defense which can be useful to us and protect us from the ruinous folly of a navy, I am pleased with everything that promises to improve them."

Some hundreds of these gunboats, carrying one gun apiece, were launched. Some of them never even fired their solitary gun; some were overturned by the recoil, and all of them soon found their way to the scrap heap. But we must not forget those gunboats. They serve as a humorous but grim reminder of the dangers of a doctrine.

We rejoice in our democracy. It is our pride — our inheritance, as I have tried to show. We should guard it with alertness and diligence unceasing. But there are times when this heritage which belongs to us all can only be safe-guarded by entrusting it to one central control to whom we give authority and whose hands we uphold and strengthen. And this also we have found to be true, as the conduct of our two great wars and the names of Washington and Lincoln will recall. It is justly said that war is a one-man business. Napoleon wrote at St. Helena, "One bad general is better than two good ones." And our own Hamilton, in "The Federalist," has shown how well this government of ours is devised for adjustment on the one hand to the conduct of the regular business of peace by representatives of the people, and on the other to the emergencies of war by practically centralizing power in the hands of one man.

It might seem that some things we are saving here are too much like an echo, in broken English, of certain academic apologists for war. If anyone should so interpret this, I should be gravely misjudged. We hate war. We are ready at any time to fight to end it, and this is no contradiction. There are wicked men and wicked rulers of the nations in this world who believe in war and love bloodshed and brutal lust; and if there is to be peace, we must destroy these wild beasts or cut their claws and draw their teeth. And we can not do this if we are weak and unarmed. If we arm, we arm not only for our own defense, we arm for the defense of liberty and humanity. We are no hypocrites - no one has a right to suspect America of lust of power or desire for conquest or oppression. We have not been as forward as we ought to have been to stand up for the weak and the defenseless. For this we are and ought to be ashamed. As we grow stronger, we must make it clear to the whole world that we mean to use the strength as really strong men have always used it - not to rob and bully, but to champion the cause

of human freedom and to interpose a mailed arm between helpless nations and those who would outrage and oppress them. That is our mission, and for this cause God has raised us up.

And as we make ourselves strong, we must see to it that we do not grow also in the pride of strength. Our greatest danger to-day is in our riches. We must see to it that munitions do not become a worse menace to ourselves than they are to our enemies. We must find some way to prevent inordinate profits and so remove a motive and a temptation which have often proved too strong for weak men. The speculation in war stocks has already done incalculable harm to this nation. It is bad money. If war is hell, I know that a large share of these profits has gone where war came from, and too often the money is dragging the men and women down with them. The whole agitation for preparedness is full of such dangers, and thoughtful men everywhere should raise their voices and sound this note of warning. We must purge our hearts of selfishness, of base thoughts of gain, and set ourselves to our work as to a high and sacred task which calls for effort and for sacrifice; and for pity and chivalry, too; because to us national defense means no contemptible application of "Safety first!" but a strong assertion of a humane and altruistic purpose.

The very idea of militarism is abhorrent to me, as it is to every right-minded American. It may be necessary to have a strong army to destroy militarism. If so, let us face this task and carry it through. My own feeling is that we should use whatever force we can bring to bear to unite in a world crusade to crush militarism wherever it is found, and then to join with the other nations who really love peace and desire it in establishing an international force sufficiently strong to prevent this noisome dragon from ever raising its head again to menace the peace of the world.

THE STRONGEST NAVY IN THE WORLD

W. H. STAYTON


When I was a youngster on duty in the Navy Department, I had a very logical old chief, who, in entering upon any new subject, always began by asking himself three questions. He started off by saying: "Why should we do this? What should we do? And When?" It seems to me that we might to-day approach the subject of preparedness by asking "Why should we prepare? What we should do in the way of preparedness? And When should we do it?"

First, then, "Why should we prepare?"—especially since we have gotten along fairly well without it heretofore. Several answers occur to me. It seems that the times are rather out of joint; queer things are happening, and we cannot go along on the ordinary road. I say things are queer, because we have such problems as the case of the Sussex: Who blew her up? The answer is, "Nobody." It seems that she committed suicide Perhaps the same thing occurred to some of the other vessels that have been wantonly destroyed lately. When things of that sort are happenning, it is time that people should think and do something different from what they have been accustomed to do.

There is another reason for preparing,—a reason which applies with special force just now, and that is, that the people of the world are not what we thought them. No man will say, I think, that the nations of Europe to-day are what he believed they were two years ago. We hardly realized then that some of them were organized on the principles of the Jesse James gang.

Some of my friends say to me, "True, some European nations have proven themselves organized brigands, but this war is going to exhaust these people so that they will be unable to continuue the war, and neither we nor anyone else will be in danger."

I do not think history justifies that view. There have been some short wars, as, for instance, our Spanish War, that have ended so quickly that the people have not been much disturbed or turned aside from the previous courses of their lives. But whenever a war has gone on long enough to exhaust the people, then, merely because they were exhausted and upset, they could



O N. L. Stebbins

U.S.S. DELAWARE

She mounts ten 12-inch and fourteen 5-inch guns and has two submerged tubes for 21-inch torpedoes. Her turbines develop $31,300~\mathrm{H.-P.}$ and drive her $20,000~\mathrm{tons}$ through the water at a speed of 21 knots.



not settle back to the old order of things; and those are the very wars that have continued. The Seven Years' War, the Thirty Years' War, and the Hundred Years' War were fought so long merely because the nations were exhausted; and the gravest danger now is that this war is exhausting the people financially and physically. And the longer it lasts and the more exhausted become the nations, — the greater is our danger and our necessity for preparedness.

Take the Napoleonic wars. France went into the revolution because she was poor, because her people did not have even bread. Yet for thirty years she made war,—robber war—simply because she was exhausted. On no other theory did Napoleon make war. And when this present world war is over, some of the people in Europe are going to be in the situation in which Napoleon found France at the end of his first short war—people out of a job, poverty-stricken, tax-ridden, hardly able to pay interest charges, and they will have absolutely no assets except a well organized bunch of burglars, and a set of burglar's tools. And they are going to use them.

So far as I am concerned, I confess if I were running a European nation, regarding myself (as European rulers now regard themselves) as the head of a great family, and if I saw my family was suffering because it had sacrificed its all, and if I saw a people over here as rich and as unprepared as these Americans are, I think I should turn my back so that I might not look upon the temptation. And then I should probably walk backward toward it.

But there is still another reason why we should prepare now as we have not prepared before. Please do not think I am merely criticising. I happened to be in Europe six months before the war broke out, and I have only just returned. I tried to ascertain what was going on there. I mean to try to state facts; I do not mean to criticise the President. I am not fool enough to suggest or to think that I could have done better. I do not say it is his fault or that it is our fault. It may be that it is the fault of the people over there — a people perhaps unjust under the stress of their affliction. But whatever the cause is, there is abroad in the world to-day a new state of mind which vitally affects our attitude toward preparedness. We are utterly despised in Europe now. They do not do us the courtesy to

hate us; they despise us. The feeling has grown until an American can not stand it any longer in Europe, even though he is inclined to sympathize with the country in which he happens to They never thought much of us; at least, they have always had the idea that we were a money-grabbing, money-chasing people without ideals, and they connected us with the "Almighty dollar," with a certain superiority and contempt. But now they have gone farther than that. You have probably noticed that whenever our government raises a protest, there is always some insulting offer of money, with never a recognition of the wrong that has been done. They seem to think of us as a people who go around with tags on our backs: "Marked down to It will cost you \$2.37 to kill this man. They regard our administration as a mere collection agency. They believe that, instead of that good old flag we used to have, with a rattlesnake and the motto, "Don't tread on me," we now fly some emblem showing a typewriting machine, and the motto, "If you step on us it will cost you something, provided we can collect by bluster and bluff." That means that there has been an antagonism growing between us and the rest of the world. I hope we do not deserve it. But it exists and it affects our duty toward preparedness. The contempt is not only on the other continent; it has spread to this. Fifteen or twenty years ago — even ten years ago — we were less strong than we are now: but our neighbors did not invade us then. They at least respected us. Mexicans did not come across the border. But the contempt which is felt for us over in Europe has come here and we are not safe even from a Mexican foray now. Nobody is too contemptible or too weak to kick us.

My reason for dwelling on this is that wars do not come from any single or specific act. Wars come because a people have a feeling of antagonism towards some other people. This feeling that has grown up towards us is going to be reflected within us, and it may lead to antagonism and war unless we take some steps to prevent it.

When Ambassador White spoke here this morning,— a man of vast experience in the diplomatic world, — he told you about the European nations and how they estimated each other by the size of their armies and navies. He said, in a little less objectionable language than I shall use, that we were despised because

we had no army and no navy, and that that feeling would continue until we armed. Some people believe, honestly no doubt, that to get an army and havy means trouble and not peace. my mind, and I am glad to say to Mr. White's mind, the one way of preventing war is to get an army and a navy. The one way to make other nations respect us and to respect peace is to be prepared for something else. They do not respect any halfway peace. What they know, what they understand, and the only thing they do understand and will respect, is the peace that comes with sword girt on thigh. If we arm, if we prepare and make them respect us, then for a generation we will have no war; but unless we do, this country will be exploited just as it was three hundred or four hundred years ago, by a people who believe their civilization is superior to ours, that we are a decadent people, and that for the benefit of their higher civilization they can come here again, fill their war coffers, and wipe us out.

Another answer to the question, "Why prepare!" - and a deeper answer,-is, "it is our duty." To whom does this country belong? What is the duty of you and of me - of Americans of this generation? Who made this country? Why, our forefathers made it with their blood. And did they give it to us? No. They gave it to their descendents, of whom we are only one generation. They passed it on to us in trust, to hold it for our lives and to pass it down to our children and to their children and their grandchildren. Are we doing it? They who made the nation gave us the right to the fruits that ripen during our time. But we are using the heritage as if it were ours in fee. We are spending all of the income and thinking nothing of those who are to come after. When the time comes that your children and mine have to settle for the negligence of the generation of to-day, let us beware that our children do not rise up and curse us.

So I should answer the question, "Why do we need preparedness?" in some such way as I have indicated.

Then comes my old chief's next question, "What do we need?"

Well, if I had a preconceived idea in favor of an army, I should come to the conclusion that we needed an army, or universal service. But it seems to me it would be much safer to

discard preconceived opinions and to look for the teachings of history,—to see what history tells us we ought to do.

Now, from a military point of view, this country is an island. It is quite true we have border lines to the South,—Mexico,—but until a month ago we did not suppose that Mexico could whip us. And it is also quite true that we have border lines to the North, but I for one prefer to believe that from Canada we need never expect trouble. But even if we do have trouble there, that trouble must come from across the ocean. So that, practically speaking, we are an island when it comes to an attack from abroad.

What, then, in the light of history's lessons, should an insular nation do to defend itself? Instinctively we turn first to Great Britain. For a thousand years she has defended herself and lived in peace within her own island, because she has had a navy. When you go to Great Britain now, you find that the people, compared with those of the continent, are infinitely happy. They do not every day expect that something will happen to cause their houses to be attacked and burned. There are a few Zeppelin raids to worry them, but generally speaking they live in peace and comfort, because they are protected by a navy and by a little body of water over which a modern gun can throw a projectile.

Japan is another example. She is protected by a navy; and it was because of the existence of that navy and the straits between her and the continent of Asia that she was able to humble the mighty Russia.

So the lesson seems to me to be clear. In answer to the question, "What do we need," I should say that history tells us we need a navy.

Then comes the question, "What sort of a navy," what sort both in size and kind? As to size, we seem to need one thing; we need a navy big enough to meet any probable enemy. We need a navy big enough to get back for us that wonderful asset that we seem to have lost, the respect of the world,— and some of our self-respect, for much of that has been sacrificed.

When one speaks of the biggest navy, or the strongest navy in the world, the terms seem at first vaguely forbidding. But let us look the situation in the face. If we must have the strong-

est navy in the world, if reason and common sense lead us that way, why be afraid of it?

Let us see then what we must have. We need a navy on both coasts. It is conceivable that we may have to face an enemy from Europe at the same time that we face one from Asia. We are gradually learning that we cannot rely too much on the Panama Canal. The time has not yet been when we could have passed a fleet through it, and the time may not come when we can do so. It is vulnerable to the extent that a few men with a few pounds of dynamite, with the belief that their lives amount to nothing, that the cause for which they fight is everything—can put that Canal out of commission, so that, so far as war is concerned, we cannot pass our fleet through it. So I think we must dismiss that suggestion as a dream. If we have to defend ourselves on both oceans, we have to have fleets on both oceans.

I have said that to my mind preparedness is not a question of expediency but a matter of sacred duty to our progenitors and our posterity. Viewed in this light, the question, "What navy do we need?" permits of only one answer, namely, "A navy sufficient to protect the trust committed to our keeping." That trust demands that we protect both our coasts simultaneously,—not merely protect them after they have been invaded, but, in the language of our Constitution, protect them "against invasion." If we are not the world's richest country now, we will be when the war is over. We will be charged with the duty of defending the hoarded treasures of the globe. We will have to face the greatest task in the world.

Then, if that leads us to the strongest navy in the world,—and I think it does,—what does that mean in figures? The strongest navy in the world, of course, when the war broke out, was that of Great Britain. Let us use that as our standard of measure. After all, it would mean only 250,000 men, with the necessary ships to go with them. That is the easiest way to express it—in terms of men. We are talking freely now-adays of having an army of 250,000 or more men, and of having a million or more men in training. And what are the objections to having a great army?

I think it would be a very fine thing to have an army of a million men. I think every man who has that service comes out a better man. But if we cannot get it, what about a navy of 250,000 men? Some people have a great fear of a standing army; they say first, it will endanger our civic institutions. Nobody thinks that of the navy. Second, they say that so great a number of men from the army will come back and corrupt,—militarize—the whole stream of our national life. Certainly 250,000 men will not do any such thing. Thirdly, they tell us it takes too many men away from productive enterprises. Fourth, they say it is too expensive.

Let us see what 250,000 men in a navy would mean. shall not go into the details of the figures, but, taking the navy as we have it to-day, we will multiply that by so many in order to get it up to 250,000, and we will increase the cost pro rata. And, if we raise the navy to 250,000 men, in other words, if we bring it up to the point that makes it the strongest navy in the world, then we shall find that the annual cost to us will be just what it is costing Great Britain to carry on this war for sixteen That is all it would cost us per year. And, unless we make that appropriation, generations from now our children may look back and say,"Those forefathers of ours were not willing to take from their own luxuries the cost of sixteen days' war and spend it to prepare for defense, and here we are unprepared, and we must fight it out." So, as I have said, we must guard against doing this thing and being cursed by our own children. It is not too much to ask that this nation spend once a year what Great Britain is now spending every sixteen days. It is not as much as the interest she is going to have to pay on her national debt which has accrued since this war began. An annual expenditure of less than that interest charge would give us the strongest navy in the world — and I say we ought to have I hope we will get it.

And if we are going to have the strongest navy, let us ask ourselves, what we shall need in the way of ships. To answer that question, let us again turn to history and ask: How have the existing types behaved in this war? What have the best types shown as to their effectiveness or uneffectiveness? Having been lucky enough to be in the service, and knowing some of our attachés, I have talked with them and their friends in the European navies, and I have, I think, a fair idea of what the naval opinion is both here and abroad.

I found practically nobody who is willing to change from

the dreadnought. They all agree that whenever called upon, she has done her duty. As to the battle-cruisers, I think there is a general opinion that they have done better than was expected of them, and there is a great tendency to increase the proportion of battle-cruisers in the fleet. I noticed that our Department sometime ago — I believe the recommendation has been changed now—recommended a very ambitious program for battle-cruisers; they recommended that by 1926 we should lay down as many as Japan now has. Eleven years' handicap. Everybody with whom I talked, who has seen the battle-cruisers in action, had much to say of their efficiency.

I think we hardly realize over here how much the beligerents depend on their aeroplane service in the navy, and certainly we do not all realize how much they depend on it in the army. In one compartively small factory in France, I saw in one day 300 machines that had been made in that factory, backed under the shed awaiting tests. There were six officers in the air testing them, but there were 300 machines awaiting tests.

As to submarines, the general feeling I found there was that while we need submarines, and many of them, yet the service over there was rather extraordinary, and, perhaps, not a fair guide for our coast conditions. The North Sea is shallow and has a sandy bottom. The submarine there can go out and run awash during the night, and by day submerge and sleep an the bottom; but that sort of thing would not obtain off our entire coast. Consequently, submarine action could not be quite as effective over here, perhaps, as over there, and yet everybody is agreed that we do need the submarines.

That reminds me of one thing our attaché in London told me—which seems to me to be the most remarkable incident of the war. A submarine in Riga was recalled to Great Britain, and passed under the ice of the Baltic 200 miles. That sort of thing shows us we have got to have something more than submarines; namely, men, crews. After all, when we talk about having the strongest navy in the world, we cannot get it by merely building ships. However many submarines we may build, it takes a year to train a submarine crew properly, and one of the practical things Congress could do is to give us enough submarines to put officers and crews in training, so that we may have reserves if trouble does come to us, as I fear it may.

That leads me to the last subject I wish to talk about in connection with the strongest navy in the world — the subject of the personnel. The personnel of the navy may be roughly divided into three classes. The first is the Secretary, the civilian head. For that post I would have somebody who is capable, not merely of handling the 60,000 or 70,000 enlisted force of the navy and marine corps, but a man who is capable of looking out for the squadrons where the people have several hundred millions of dollars invested, a man capable of looking out for the great navy yards and manufacturing establishments, a man who is sufficiently big industrially and in an executive way to be able to manage the United States Steel Corporation, at least. I do not know that we can do very much to see that we always get that sort of a Secretary. It seems to be up to the President himself as to what kind of a Secretary he is going to give us. Some Presidents do give us that sort of a Secretary, and some do not.

The second class in the personnel is the enlisted men; I leave the officers intentionally till the last. Concerning the enlisted men, I think there is little to say. We are getting these men from the cities and from the great central west—boys going into the service with an earnest desire to learn, who are taking it very, very seriously. I could not express the opinion of the navy in any better way, I think, than to say, given proper material for training and proper opportunities to train, the world has never known any such enlisted force as the United States Navy has to-day.

Now, as to the officers I am not going to say much. Some of you are going down to the Naval Academy in the next few days. You have probably noticed of late articles in the papers criticising the management at the Academy. Let me ask your attention to one or two differences between the Naval Academy and other institutions of learning.

Suppose that from Yale or Harvard, or even from a theological seminary, some boy is graduated who ought not to hold a diploma. No particular harm is done. He goes out into civil life, where he either succeeds or fails, and his success or failure is not of great importance outside of his own circle. But suppose such a young man graduates from the Naval Academy, if only one such man in a class. That man in the course of time

may command your fleet, which means that he may be entrusted with the safety of your lives and the honor of your country. The Naval Academy simply cannot take a chance on turning out a man who is unfit, and there is no other institution in the United States, save the Military Academy, that must be governed by that standard.

Captain Eberle is the Superintendent of the Academy. I hope you may meet him. I have served with him, and I know of no man better fitted to deal with the responsibilities of that position.

But it requires more than a good superintendent to make the Naval Academy all that it should be. Remember, we have there several hundred boys. It requires a mother, a woman who knows boys. And the Superintendent's house at Annapolis is dignified and blessed by the presence of Mrs. Eberle, a mother who has suffered. No better combination could possibly be had, and I do not think the navy could possibly be better satisfied.

When you go down to the Naval Academy you will see buildings, and very different buildings than those that I saw when I was a student there. When you see them I will ask you to think of one or two things. I hope you will all remember that we owe those buildings to a man to whom the Navy League and the Navy of the United States owe much — Colonel Thompson. He is absolutely the embodiment of the spirit of the navy. He is the Naval Academy's best beloved son. I hope he goes down with you. You will see how they love him there.

One thing I wish you would think of when you see the Academy, is a little speech I heard an old graduate make years ago. He went back after several years and found all the old buildings gone, and he made a speech at the dinner that evening about the Naval Academy. He said, "I find everything gone that I once knew. I find not one instructor here who was here in my time, and not one single building. I find the grounds completely changed, and yet the Naval Academy is not in the least changed. Because the Naval Academy does not consist of instructors, it does not consist of a corps of cadets, or of grounds, or buildings, or all of these. The Naval Academy is that spirit of love of country, that devotion to duty, that loyalty to one's fellow man, that intangible thing that makes up the spirit of the navy."

That is what the Naval Academy is there for. It is there to make officers. It is there to cultivate a spirit in its young men that will enable them to take charge of such a navy as you choose to give them, be it little, as it is now, or be it "The Strongest Navy in the World."





THE CHURCH FLAG

When divine service is being held on board ship the church pennant is hoisted above the national ensign, and is the only flag that floats above Old Glory.

PRAYER FOR OUR NAVY

O Eternal God, Creator of the Universe and Governor of Nations: Most heartily we beseech thee with thy favor to behold and bless thy servant, the President of the United States, and all the officers of our Government, and so replenish them with the grace of thy Holy Spirit that they may always incline to thy will and walk in thy way. Bless the Governors of the several States, and all who are in authority over us; give them Grace to execute justice and maintain truth that peace and happiness, religion and piety, may be established among us for all generations.

May the vessels of our navy be guarded by they gracious Providence and care. May they not bear the sword in vain, but as the minister of God, be a terror to those who do evil and a defense to those who do well.

Graciously bless the officers and men of our navy. May love of country be engraven on their hearts and may their adventurous spirits and severe toils be duly appreciated by a grateful nation; may their lives be precious in thy sight, and if ever our ships of war should be engaged in battle, grant that their struggles may be only under an enforced necessity for the defense of what is right.

Bless all nations and kindreds on the face of the earth and hasten the time when the principles of holy religion shall so prevail that none shall wage war any more for the purpose of aggression, and none shall need it as a means of defense.

Amen.

Note:—This prayer is to be used in opening meetings. (All standing.) It is an adaption of a prayer offered by the Reverend Doctor Suddards, at the launching of a navy ship at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, in 1843, and is the only instance of prayer at a U. S. Navy launching discovered in examined records, 1798-1914. The full text of the original prayer was sent to Washington by Mrs. Reynold T. Hall, president of the Society of Sponsors of the United States Navy, in 1914, with the suggestion that prayer be offered at future Navy launchings. The suggestion was favorably received by Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, and was adopted at the launching of the battleship Oklahoma, at Philadelphia, March 21, 1914, and thereafter.

A CLERGYMAN'S VIEW OF PREPAREDNESS

THE RT. REV. JOHN N. McCORMICK, D.D. Bishop of Michigan

Most of our convention programs are something like the alleged veteran of the Civil War, who sat by the street corner with a sign hanging around his neck, which read: "Battles and wounds, seven. Wife and children, four. Total, eleven." However, this program seems to be a happy exception. Its units, like those of a well-organized fleet or army, move well together, and there is one central objective, the motto of the Navy League, "Peace through Preparedness."

Being a clergyman, this might be called, so far as I am concerned, a text; but it must be understood that, in speaking of it, I am not speaking from a pulpit, or ex cathedra as a bishop, and that I do not claim to represent the Episcopal Church or my own diocese of the State of Michigan or anyone else than myself. As a background, however, and to show that I speak as one of many like-minded clergymen, I may refer to a declaration on preparedness recently communicated to the New York Times. This declaration is intended to offset the propaganda of the Church Peace Union as being likely to confuse minds and to befog issues. In the declaration, the signers state that they themselves stand for, and they believe that many Christian ministers stand for, real military efficiency and reasonable military preparedness. They make their own the sentiments of Mr. Darwin P. Kingsley, in his remarkable address last November before the New York Chamber of Commerce, as to arming adequately at the present time, and all the more urgently, because the ultimate goal is that of an international state, in which all nations shall agree to disarm, and in which war will be impossible.

The main question at the present time they hold to be: "Military Preparedness adequate to secure respect for our nation's counsels and protests, whether against infringement of its own rights or trespass upon the liberty of the weak in the wider world." Preparedness is to them, "the first visible and practicable step towards averting war hereafter." To this statement about one hundred clergymen, representing many denominations and many influential congregations in New York and

vicinity, have affixed their signatures,— over fifty of them, as it happens, being clergymen of the Episcopal Church. I think that signatures in about the same numerical proportion could be secured among Christian ministers almost anywhere in the United States.

It is not, therefore, altogether as the voice of one crying in the wilderness that any individual clergyman should speak on this subject. Though I can but feel, if one might venture to continue the illustration, that like John the Baptist, who cried, "Prepare!" we are seeking to prepare the way of the Lord: in so far, that is to say, as it relates to that final and universal peace which must be in accordance with the will of God, for which we pray when we say, "Thy kingdom come, Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." This all-desirable peace for which we hope and pray, may perhaps be best anticipated and hastened, so far as we can do our part, by safeguarding this nation, as a people willing to take its share of the world's burden of storm and stress, and willing to do what it can on equal terms. in connection with the other peoples of the earth, to promote international justice, righteousness, and good-will, and so to make its effective contribution to the ultimate pacification of the world.

In other words, I do not feel any inconsistency between setting forth, as I have done, a prayer for peace, to be daily used by the people of my diocese, and making a public address in behalf of preparedness for national defense. The two things seem, so far as this country at the present time is concerned, to come together in the motto of the League, "Peace through Preparedness."

I take it that this campaign must be largely a campaign of education, such as that which the Navy League is conducting. You may remember to have heard of the little girl who was asked by her teacher, "If you were not living at the present time, in what age of the world's history would you like to have lived?" To which she replied, "In the days of Charles II." "Why?" said the teacher. "Because," said the little girl, "I have read that in the days of Charles II education was much neglected."

Certainly the education of the nation at large has been much neglected on this vital matter. But now this neglect is being remedied. The newspapers and the magazines are doing valuant work, and societies and organizations such as the Navy League. are making themselves influentially heard throughout the country. As a result, the people are waking up. In Grand Rapids, for example,— to speak only of the town best known to myself, we have a Businessmen's Battalion, a part of the nation-wide Military Training Organization. This battalion, consisting of business and professional men, is two hundred strong, and I am proud to be its chaplain. This organization, which has no officers and does not go in for dress parades, is being drilled and instructed by the officers of the Regular Army and of the National Guard, and within a few months has made remarkable progress. It will probably have a camp of instruction this summer, similar to the one at Plattsburg, New York,—where, by the way, I understand more than three thousand men have applied for entrance. In one of our parishes the young men who used to belong to our cadet corps as boys, have now come back and reorganized as young men, and we are hoping for at least optional military training, similar to the Wyoming plan, in our public schools.

These conditions, of course, are significant, not in describing one community alone, but as representing conditions which exist generally throughout the country. I do not believe that all this is going to transform us into a blood-thirsty nation of fire-eaters. There is no more danger of sane Americans becoming militarists than there is of their becoming pirates or cannibals. But the recent disclosure, by land and by sea, of our present alarming and humiliating conditions,- the pathetic facts of unpreparedness and inadequacy, which may easily at any moment become tragic facts, - really seem to me to settle the main question; and I think that the vast majority of our citizens so believe and that they are ready to act in accordance with their belief. We are not to rest satisfied with our condition, like the lazy man to whom his wife said, "John, I should think you would be ashamed to lie in bed so late"; to which John replied, "Well, Mary, I am, but I'd rather be ashamed than get up." The country is tired of being ashamed. We now propose to get up.

The details of Military Preparedness, as to quality and quantity, we civilians must leave to those who are competent to

speak with authority, but we must all unite to bring pressure for action upon the present Congress. And it seems to me that the proposition of this convention for a National Defense Commission is most statesmanlike and practical and that it should be strongly endorsed and recommended. The establishment of this commission, already proposed in political platforms and introduced into Congress, should be urged as a non-partisan matter of first importance, to be introduced as an administrative measure and to be supported by a coalition of political parties. In other words, preparedness for national defense has now passed beyond the stage of talk and of personal and official declarations, and takes the right of way as a matter of definite and immediate action.

This preparedness, we are beginning to see, means not only the increase, the equipment, and the technical preparation of the army and the navy, but it means the coordination of all the forces of the nation, diplomatic, industrial, social, agricultural, educational and religious, as well as military.

We must not isolate nor over-emphasize preparedness as if that, in itself, superimposed upon an otherwise disorganized, uncoordinated, and undisciplined national life could work a miracle. As a matter of sober fact, it is the whole nation that needs to be disciplined and prepared. Industrial organization is equally important with military organization. Surrounding and suffusing the whole movement must be the life of the nation itself, the spirit of the people. This means a national ideal and a worthy cause,—something worth organizing for and preparing for, living for and dying for.

Mr. George W. Alger, of New York, has written a thought-compelling article in the April Atlantic, "Preparedness and Democratic Discipline," which it would be well for us all to read and to ponder. He says:

"The notion that preparedness is a mere military thing, to be had by superimposing upon the most wasteful, extravagant, and inefficient army and navy establishment iv the world a new mass of similar expenditures, is a delusion. If we are so insistent upon preparation for war, and if we are, as we say, still unprepared after spending on such preparations over three billion dollars in the last twenty years, exclusive of pensions, let us at least in our preparation recognize an essential part of its true basis. The power behind

military Germany is industrial Germany. The organization of German life is doubtless extreme, but the current preparedness doctrines, however much they may differ on military or naval estimates, agree at least in this: they ignore absolutely every necessity for improving the industrial organization, the economic basis for national unity. Sweatshops, child-labor, industrial anarchy held in check by martial law, the exploitation of the worker, lack of of an intelligent policy in handling the immigrant, industrial accidents crippling and burdening the worker, industrial diseases unregulated and unprevented, the almost total absence of effective labor legislation on the side of inspection and regulation, the exploited tenant farmer, the stupid chaos of liquor legislation, the whole mass of haphazard, slipshod laws which seems to defy all attempts at co-ordination and economy of administration — all these and a hundred others are true problems of preparedness which are to-day ignored.

"It is diciplined democracy which America needs, a democracy diciplined to a capacity for true leadership such as will effectuate a Pan-American Federation, as a new world-contribution of democracy toward the foundations of peace. The strident patriots who are expounding crude preparedness propagandas, in principles and purposes identical with all the armed peace propogandas which have proved wrong in a hundred years, ignore all such considerations. If they have their way, there may be an additional reason for ignoring the economic basis of national unity, the plea of poverty: that we can't afford it. The propagandists of preparation seem ready to do anything but improve the quality and character of our democracy. To them it is all a matter of guns, soldiers, submarines, and huzzas for the flag; not the establishment of a democracy supremely worth fighting for." *

"How can a sane program for the perfection of a democracy of peace be even thought of in the mist of such a clamor of military preparedness—and appropriations? Yet that program must be considered. The danger to America to-day is the ascendancy at this time of short-sighted men, unduly excited over preparation for war, who cannot visualize the America whose great need is preparation for peace, for the evolution by patient labor and infinite pains, by the love anl loyalty and wisdom of her freemen, of that difficult and ideal democracy, which harmonizes and blends political and industrial freedom—the only liberty which can enlighten the world."

So far as the immediate and proximate question of military and naval preparedness is concerned, in attending the instructions and witnessing the drills of the Military Training Organizations I have seen demonstrated, beyond any question, the insane folly of those who believe that an army can be created over night and that you can make a man a soldier by dressing him in uniform and putting a gun in his hand. And if this necessity for discipline and for instruction applies to the army, it must apply even more emphatically, under existing conditions, to the navy.

The only logical inference seems to me to be some such form of universal military and naval service as shall be best suited to our conditions, our form of government, and the spirit of our people. Every man in the country should be prepared to relate himself in some practical way to the national defense. Meanwhile, of course, the regular forces of the army and the navy must be strengthened and developed to the point of highest efficiency.


The needs of the navy, such as battle-cruisers, naval aeroplanes, submarines, docks and yards, its full complement of officers and men, and other particulars, are known to you even better than to me. We must remember that the English Navy has saved England from invasion, and, remembering that, we must see to it that the American Navy should be adequate to defend our coasts in both oceans and so to defend them on short notice and against any foe.

I believe that the Navy League has an honorable mission and a noble task, and thus it has set itself to do a great work for the nation. It is because of this belief that I have for some years been a member of the League, and it is because of this belief that I am now adding my small mite to the cause espoused and proclaimed by this convention. I do this as a Christian and as a clergyman, as well as as a citizen, because I believe in and hope for peace; and it is because I long for the just and honorable peace of the world that I believe in preparation to secure, to maintain, and, if necessary, to enforce that peace. Therefore, I believe in preparedness—not for war, but against war and for peace.

Personally, like most Americans, I am a great admirer of the navy and am strongly attached to the naval service. In regard to the increase and betterment of the navy, I feel like a boyhood friend of mine with whom I used to row in a crew, to whom someone said, when the boat was in very

rough and dangerous water, "How would you feel if we were on terra firma?" to which he replied, "I think I would feel a little less terror and a little more firmer." My own attachment to the naval service is very strong. Several of my kinsmen have belonged to it, and, for myself, if I had not felt a vecation for the Christian Ministry, I should probably have sought entrance to Annapolis. One of my classmates and chums in college is now an admiral in the navy, and one of my most cherished possessions is a letter from my friend, the late Admiral Mahan, a man no less distinguished as a Christian and a Churchman than he was distinguished as a naval authority and historian, in which, referring to a letter I had written to him about his beautiful and wonderfully helpful religious book, "The Harvest Within," he speaks of his thankfulness that in any way he could be of use "in the service of Christ." I am glad to believe that there are thousands of like-minded men in the service — whether it be that of the administrative, legislative, or judicial branches of the government; whether it be the diplomatic service, the army service, or the navy service; or whether it be that service of the common good in which all the citizenship of the nation is enlisted — thousands and hundreds of thousands of men who honestly believe that the service of their country and of their fellowmen, even though it be military service, is really to them the service of God, and that, like Admiral Mahan, in the service of the people, they have not ceased to be the cervants of Christ.





One of our latest battleships. She was commissioned in the summer of 1916. She mounts ten 14-inch and twenty-two 5-inch guns and has four submerged torpedo tubes. Her 25,000 H.-P. engines drive her at a speed of 21 knots.

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AN ADEQUATE NAVAL POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

HENRY A. WISE WOOD

Having masters at sea, we may neither command others nor disobey them.

In discussing naval policy I conceive it to be necessary at the beginning to lay down the following principles:

In order that a nation shall be able to devise intelligently its naval and military organisms it must

- (a) Determine and formulate the policies which these organisms shall be used to maintain;
- (b) Ascertain by comparison with the like organisms of other nations, particularly of those nations with which its policies are likely to bring it into conflict, the nature and extent of the forces it must create and maintain in order that its policies shall prevail if they be challenged;
- (c) Determine the extent of the naval and military or ganisms it can afford in men and money;
 - (d) Determine by what method it shall obtain the men;
- (e) Determine where and how it shall obtain the material, and
- (f) How the creation and maintenance of these organisms shall be financed.

Before a nation's policies may be formulated there must be considered the extent and geographic disposition of its territory; of adjacent territory which may become a source of danger to it, and of the territory not its own in which nevertheless it has assumed obligations analogous to those of sovereignty.

Also, the extent and disposition, and naval and military strength, of every other nation must be borne in mind, whether or not there be with it a conflict of policies, because accidental causes of friction sometimes occur between nations which for long periods of time have lived in seemingly unshakable amity.

As a nation's policies are modified by the nature and extent of its commerce, by its foreign investments, by the rights abroad it demands for its citizens, and the rights at home it grants to the citizens of other nations, as well as many other things, these also must be taken into consideration.

In a paper so brief as this all may not be dealt with. Nevertheless, those which are controlling may be treated with such breadth that the result will be the same in substance as if each had been discussed.

In this treatise I shall speak of the United States in the singular; it is time we had begun to think of our country as a Nation, instead of as a federation of States.

The United States has an Atlantic coast line of 2,435 nautical miles, a Gulf coast of 740 miles, a Pacific coast line of 1,125 miles — in all, 4,300 sea miles of coast line. Alaska has a coast line of 6,500 miles. Thus we have bounding our continental territory a coast line to be defended of 10,800 miles.

Mexico has an eastern coast line of 1,345 miles, a western coast line of 1,815 miles, while Central America's eastern coast is 1,200 miles, and its western coast 1,500 miles, long.

If the territory described be taken as a whole, and its eastern and western coasts be considered separately, it will be found that the United States, Alaska, Mexico, and Central America have an eastern coast line of 5,720 miles, and a western coast line of 10,940 miles.

If we intend to defend our position in the Northern Continent against invasion directly by way of the Atlantic, we have 5,720 miles of coast to be considered; if against invasion directly by way of the Pacific, we have 10,940 miles to be dealt with.

The north and east coasts of South America measure 8,500 miles, and its west coast 5,300 miles. If it be our intention to continue to support the Monroe Doctrine we shall have to defend in this hemisphere 14,220 miles of coast upon the Atlantic side, and 16,240 miles upon the Pacific side, or upon both sides 30,460 miles, which is considerably more than the circumference of the earth.

The foregoing makes it plain that these coasts cannot be defended from within, but must be defended from without, if they be defended at all. For this purpose a navy is needed. It becomes necessary therefore to determine what is a navy sufficient for the purpose, in size and kind.

Turning now to the subject of our policies, it may be said with accuracy that we have no foreign policies at the moment. With the destruction of our citizens while upon foreign merchant ships or upon our own merchant ships we offer no armed interference, nor do we offer armed interference when our citizens while upon foreign soil are destroyed, their wives and children outraged, their property confiscated. Furthermore. it is to be doubted whether at the moment we are willing to enforce by armed intervention such of our domestic policies as are inimical to the interests of foreign nations. If, for instance, the Japanese fleet, convoying troop transports, should appear off the coast of California, or of adjacent Mexico, with the command that we abandon our Asiatic exclusion policy or fight, and the Canal were blocked, I doubt not we should instantly abandon our exclusion policy. Therefore, to discuss a naval policy for the United States at this time would seem a mere academic occupation were it not for certain indications which are present that we are about to experience a nation-wide reaction of opinion which cannot fail to crystallize into a national spirit, a national spirit finding expression in a definite code of policies dealing with foreign affairs in order to sustain which the United States, if need be, will declare war.

What these policies are likely to be I venture now to suggest. They will declare for the United States:

First, that it shall be treated in all respects as becomes the equal of every other nation.

Second, that it shall deal with all other nations, and by them be dealt with, in that spirit of exact justice which is born of scrupulous regard for the rights of others, unselfishly interpreted, be those others great or small.

Third, that it wishes those peoples to be free who wish to be free, and shall offer to all such its sympathy and moral support.

Fourth, that its first duty is to its own citizens, be they at home, abroad, or upon the high seas, and to the strangers within its gates; its second duty, to those peoples, however remote, for whose welfare it is responsible; its third duty, to its neighbors, whose proximity has made of them its intimates; and its fourth, and no less, duty, to the other peoples of the earth.

Fifth, that it has witnessed with surprise and horror the recrudescence of the use of armaments to settle the disputes of nations, which it had fervently trusted would never again be resorted to by the more enlightened among them.

Sixth, that this reassertion of the principle that the use of

force is permissible where negotiation fails, has aroused not only its deep concern for the progress which it believed was being made towards an international life of unshakeable amity, but its profound anxiety for its own position in the world, no less than for the safety of its citizens and dependents, and of those sacred institutions which it has reared slowly at such great cost in labor and suffering.

Seventh, that in view of the dangers which are inseparable from such an altered conception of international obligation as it is apparent the world has undergone, and of the grave responsibility devolving upon the living generations of Americans to maintain its equal dignity and prestige among nations, to insure the survival of its institutions, and to safeguard, wherever situated, the lives and property of its citizens and dependents, it is imperative that the United States shall notify its intention.

- (a) To protect its coasts from invasion;
- (b) To insure respect for the inalienable rights, upon the high seas and in foreign lands, of its people and dependents;
- (c) To preserve such domestic policies as it deems to be necessary for the welfare of its people;
- (d) To protect the Panama Canal, and to insure its control thereof;
 - (e) To enforce the Monroe Doctrine, and
 - (f) To protect its oversea possessions.

Eighth, that the United States shall acquire naval and military strength sufficient to enable it to make these, its declared policies, effective as against any other nation or nations.

The principal sea powers are Great Britain, Germany, France, Japan, Russia, Italy, and Austria, ourselves excluded. These nations may be separated into active and passive groups, in so far as the existence of possible causes of conflict of our policies with theirs in normal times is concerned.

For the purposes of this paper I shall omit to consider the frictional questions which, as incidents of the present war, have involved us in controversies with nearly all of its belligerents. I believe it to be controlling that we should predicate our naval policy upon considerations of a more permanent character, and therefore shall concern myself with fixed rather than with such fleeting conflicts of policy.

In the passive group I place Great Britain, France, Italy, and Austria; in the active group, Germany, Japan, and Russia.

Great Britain I place in the passive group, because in normal times there is no conflict between its policies and our own. All of our disputes with its colonies in this hemisphere have been settled, and elsewhere there are no questions open between us. Nevertheless, we must bear it in mind that if Canada earries out its intention of sending half a million men to the front we shall have upon our northern border after the war upwards of three hundred thousand well-trained, war-taught British troops. Our general staff has told us that before the war Great Britain in fourteen days could have landed upon our shores 170,000 men, a number which repesents but a small portion of the army it will be able to send in future. With such a force as will be adready ashore to the north of us, and that other force which its command of the sea will enable Great Britain to deliver here at will, it is a correct induction that in the final analysis we shall have to conduct our affairs in conformity with the wishes of the British people.

France is placed in the passive group, because nowhere do its policies conflict with ours, or are there questions open between us. Of Italy and Austria the same may be said.

Germany belongs in the active group. It is an expanding nation with imperial ambitions as yet unrealized, and a thirst for sea power wherewith to create for itself a colonial empire second to that of no other nation. Finding itself beset in Africa and Asia by powerful rivals already in possession, it is not unnatural that Germany should have turned to the only remaining continent which is occupied by little powers and free of great ones, therein to set up the dependencies upon which its growth oversea depends. Nor is it surprising that the prosecution of this, its colonial policy in South America, which has been so carefully outlined by its economists, should have been held in abeyance thus far. Germany, as events have proven, forsaw the necessity of affecting in Europe a state of equilibrium whereby it should be made secure from attack by neighboring enemies before undertaking extensive operations so far afield. Its decisive victory, or a peace by the terms of which it shall have secured for itself freedom of action in the southern half of the Western Hemisphere, must inevitably be followed by a knock at the gates of one or more of the Spanish-American republics. This, unless the United States is able to interpose the only obstacle that is effective, superior sea power. Germany, as our general staff advises us, can land upon our shores 827,000 men in forty-six days. If Germany be permitted to retain its present superiority to us in sea power, then, in the last analysis, we, having in her a second master in the Atlantic, shall have to conduct our affairs in conformity with the wishes of Germany also.

Japan is placed in the active group, because it, like Germany, is an expanding nation having a definite mission, conscious of its possibilities and fully aware that these may be realized only by the exercise of naval and military prowess. Ambitious to dominate the Pacific, desirous of a base near the Canal, determined to secure for its people in foreign lands the same rights that are enjoyed by those of other first-class powers, and wishing to command China, Japan is a rapidly growing sea power to be reckoned with by us. Japan, our general staff tells us, can deliver upon our Pacific coast 238,000 men in sixty-three days. As in the case of Great Britain and Germany, we have in Japan still a third master, in so far as our western coast is concerned, who may dictate our policies for a time at least unless we possess in the Pacific superior sea power.

Russia is placed among the active powers, because of the discrimination against our Jewish citizens which it practices, in which there lie the seeds of controversy.

Thus, with four sea powers we have no conflict of policy, while with a fifth its colonial policy conflicts with our Monroe Doctrine, with a sixth its demand for equality of treatment conflicts with our Asiatic exclusion policy, and with a seventh its Jewish exclusion policy conflicts with our own demand for equality of treatment. In the latter case we complain of that which we ourselves accord to another.

Other nations fight in packs, and we singly. Whether we shall be able to hold to our traditional policy of isolation amid nations which avail themselves of the advantages of organized co-operation, our next wars probably will determine. Meanwhile, it is upon the assumption that we shall have to bear in full the brunt of our defense against a coaliton of powers making common cause against us that we shall have to formulate

our naval policy. It is not that we should assume vaguely that we shall have to meet any two or more powers, but that we should accept as a military axiom the liklihood of our having to face any two of the powers with which our policies conflict already, whose interests and aims would be served by their conducting operations in common against us.

I shall now lay down three propositions which are fundamental to the maintenance of independent nationality:

- (1) It is the first duty of government to secure its people against attack by alien peoples.
- (2) As independent nationality is possible only when and so long as security against alien attack is effective physically, the defenses of a nation must take precedence over public works and social betterments if the nation is to be secure in the enjoyment of its internal life.
- (3) When and so soon as public works and social betterments absorb the attention and resources of a people at the cost of its defenses, the nation is in danger of subjugation to the extent that its defenses are insufficient for its protection, and its independence is in jeopardy. In this case stands the United States.

We are surrounded by *possible* enemies, in the sense that friction leading to war may arise conceivably between ourselves and any most friendly neighbor. Of this the past is full of appropriate examples. We are not free of *probable* enemies, in the sense that friction which may lead to war already is present, conceivably in the form of an enduring conflict between our own policies and those of the nations which I have placed in the active group.

In determining a naval policy suitable for the United States our first and imperative duty is to secure ourselves against successful attack by those whose policies conflict with our own. To do less would be to lay ourselves open to charges of malfeasance, we who are trustees holding for the benefit of those to come that which our progenitors created for them at the cost treasure and blood. And our second duty is to conceive and create and administer our defenses in such fashion that they shall afford us the maximum of protection should we have to meet those with whom we have no enduring conflict of policy, should an unforeseeable controversy arise with them.

Further than this we need not consider going for the moment, although a broad survey of affairs in the world and of our exceptionally favorable location therein, of our vast wealth and the rapidity with which we are increasing it and our population, all point to the need of our becoming ultimately the first naval power. Therefore our defenses should be designed with this in view and our plans laid accordingly, for a well thought-out, continuing development of our navy and its adjuncts, towards a definite aim which has been predetermined, will insure economy of time, of labor, and of resources.

Such a policy must be predicated upon the acceptance of the law, which human history has firmly established, that war is a recurring phenomenon and must be classed as such with fire, internal outbreaks of violence, and other fortuitous calamities which are unforseeable but occur inevitably nevertheless. Being a recurring phenomenon, war must be provided for in advance in order that its liklihood may be lessened, and its operations excluded from one's own soil.

In view of the foregoing and of the first duty imposed upon us thereby, a fit naval policy for the United States requires that we shall:

- (a) Maintain at all times in the Atlantic a force superior to that of Germany, and
- (b) Maintain at all times in the Pacific a force superior to that of Japan, and
- (c) Endeavor to protect the Canal so thoroughly against capture or destruction by land or sea, or injury by air, or stoppage by the accidental or intentional sinking or explosion therein of appropriately laden merchant vessels, that this passage shall constitute a means as nearly dependable as may be, whereby either fleet may be supplemented from the other, or both combined in case of need. In formulating our naval policy, however, it is inadmissible that the Canal be treated as a link which is dependable, because the utmost vigilence of those in charge cannot assure its freedom from closure by artificial means or by natural forces. And upon so unstable a means of communication no nation so great as ours should stake the success of its defense.

In performing our first duty we shall have performed our second, in that we shall have created and disposed adequate

forces appropriately, and provided as well as may be for their coalition and use in the event of a major operation in the Atlantic, where, it is safe to assume, any European enemy will have to be met and dealt with.

How such a navy shall be built and financed and administered are interesting questions, the discussion of which is not permitted by the limitations of this paper. These questions, however, are wholly aside from and secondary to the needs of the navy, and the requirements of national self-preservation which demand imperatively that a sufficient navy shall exist. However, I think it necessary to refer herein to a condition which must be preserved scrupulously if effective sea power is to be achieved and maintained. A navy to be effective must be modelled exclusively by naval men of the highest technical attainments, and never may be modelled in any respect by civilians, whether they chance to sit for the moment in the Secretary's chair or in the legislative committee room, or in the halls of Congress itself. A navy is a highly complex and delicate instrument of precision understandable by those only who have spent long years in its study and use, and is as subject to injury through the tampering of those who are ignorant of its parts and their subtle relationships as is the telephone system.

Therefore, secretaries and legislators who are wise will content themselves with determining the policies a navy shall execute and the size it shall be given as a whole, while rigorously refraining from attempting to determine the nature of its units, its proportions, or the disposition of its divisions. With respect to a navy, that great outer wall of a nation's defenses, upon which depend the safeguarding of its commerce affoat, of its wealth ashore, of the lives and honor of its men and women, of its free and independent national life, these searching words of Christ should be big with meaning for all who are charged with the awful responsibilities of government: "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's."

HOW PREPAREDNESS SHOULD BE FINANCED

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
ISAAC N. SELIGMAN

As a citizen and a banker of New York, my interests and associations have been centered more on civic, altruistic, and peace-loving pursuits, than in any expert knowledge of military and naval subjects. In fact, I am closely identified with a number of state and national peace societies, and some of my friends may think it curious that I should be connected with any naval or military organization. However, I wish to state emphatically that, in my opinion, there should be no serious conflict of views or action in assuming and maintaining such an attitude. I am a consistent and strong advocate of peace, and am anxious to promote world peace and world welfare, but, at the same time, I feel that, under conditions prevailing throughout the globe, if we wish to be secure against aggression, we must have a more efficient army and navy as a relief from the present condition of insecurity.

The Hon. Joseph H. Choate, President of the National Security League, perhaps our most notable and beloved citizen, a strong advocate of peace, with whom I am associated in a number of peace societies, and whose valuable services at the Hague are still fresh in our minds, is a strong convert to the policy of preparedness and has delivered some forceful addresses on the subject. A large number of my friends who are members of various peace societies pursue the same policy.

The question of preparedness should not be one of politics. It is a matter of vital importance, upon a satisfactory settlement of which perhaps the future welfare of our country may depend. The American people demand a reasonable enlargement of the army and navy, adequate coast defenses, and a more efficient system of co-operation between the departments. As an advocate of peace, I realize that a more thorough and enlarged organization of our fighting and defensive force is required at this critical period, to protect our lives and homes and to safeguard the rights and welfare of humanity.

It is all very well for some of my friends to say that we do not need to advocate any policy looking to military or naval preparedness, but, alas! we have lately been awakened from our



ISAAO N. SELIGMAN

dreams of reliance on honest intercourse between nations, and we have seen in the frightful cataclysm abroad crimes committed on all sides against humanity, and treaties disregarded; and we realize that we have only the voice, without the power to act.

There had been a growing belief that throughout the world the spirit of democracy and human fellowship was growing, but, alas! we were suddenly undeceived, and we are witnessing the spectacle of the flower of manhood being killed and maimed; and to some it may look as if the civilization of the world was really doomed.

Failure to do our duty as a nation in providing for reasonable preparedness places upon us a responsibility which we should not assume. We would not be true to ourselves or to our children if we calmly sat by and refused to do what our conscience and common-sense dictate — if we refrained from an effort to protect ourselves and the future against possible danger from without. Nearly the entire nation is united on the policy for an adequate national defense. Every impulse of humanity and patriotism tells us that there can be no shirking.

We have been fortunate in never having been brought face to face with the armed strength of any of the great world-powers and I hope that we never shall be. I do not apprehend (as some of my friends fear) that we will be invaded by any of the belligerent armies and navies. After this world conflict I think that it is more probable that we may have to fear an invasion of goods (i. e., an economic invasion) from those financially and industrially stricken countries, which must at any price dispose of their products to replenish their coffers.

I think that there is no danger of our country ever becoming a purely military nation, and I hope our children will never see this specter rise in our country. Our people desire to live up to the high ideals imposed on them as citizens of a world-power. They are a law-abiding people, desirous of living at peace with all nations and safeguarding the rights of all nations.

Militarism spells ruin. By militarism I mean the belief that war is and must continue to be an inevitable incident in the life of all nations, that wars between highly civilized nations (whether on the Malthusian principle of weeding-out population or whether as an ennobling stimulus) must continue. Thus a militarist believes in the certainty, in the necessity, of wars, while the pacifist believes in the possibility and desirability of permanent peace. If these definitions are correct, I think that we may all well lean rather to the pacifist than to the military definition. However, definitions do not always clearly define one's views.

I can not give my own views more clearly or more cogently than by referring to the resolution passed lately by the Executive Committee of our New York Chamber of Commerce (whereof I am a member), which believes that the organization of military and naval forces and equipment and the methods of their maintenance and use under modern conditions are questions involving the highest mechanical and scientific knowledge and technical skill and experience; and it expresses the opinion that, in formulating legislation and adopting plans for adequate protection of this country, the views and opinions of the trained staff of the army and navy should prevail as to the personnel and equipment needed to assure the purpose in view.

Recent hearings by the Naval Committee of the House have quite clearly shown that our navy, neither in efficiency, organization, nor personnel, is adequately prepared for war. Any one reading Admiral Fletcher's testimony before the Committee will be convinced that our navy is seriously lacking in many requirements.

Admiral Winslow made some alarming statements as to the shortage of men and insufficient auxiliaries, etc.

Whether Congress, the Secretary of the Navy, or the Naval Board is responsible, I do not know, but I presume that before long the responsibility will be placed and a wholesome change will be decided upon.

It has been suggested by the experts that a Council of National Defense and a Naval General Staff should at once be formed to intelligently deal with all the important proposals that may be presented. This appears to me to be a step in the right direction.

Failure to adopt a sane policy of preparedness in our navy may, in case of war, subject our country to humiliation and misery, and the American public will rise in indignation against those responsible for these shocking conditions. There are two important and underlying national policies whereto our people are wedded and as to which I think they will not change — at least in our generation:

- 1. The policy of avoiding entangling alliances, as enunciated by Washington and Jefferson and by subsequent Presidents;
 - 2. The Monroe Doctrine.

Both these policies largely affect all our international relations.

You will pardon me for digressing from the exact subject assigned me, but I desire to make clear my position and views on this subject.

The subject assigned to me is, how to finance preparedness. I wrote to Colonel Thompson, the honored and strenuous President of your society, that the subject was at the present time too broad and uncertain in its scope to allow of adequate treatment. Its discussion opens the door to a great diversity of views. What will be the expenditures for the naval, military, and coast defenses, and what will the budget amount to this year and what will be the commitments for the future?

Moreover, even assuming that Congress will shortly determine the total budget for this year and for the following years, what degree of certainty is there that all estimates may not have to be revised by reason of increased Mexican requirements and possible enormous appropriations in case of any rupture with belligerents abroad, etc.?

There appear to me to be several methods of financing the Nation's Deficit:

- 1. Additional Federal Income Tax;
- 2. New Stamp Tax (as in Spanish War);
- 3. Additional Excise Taxes;
- 4. Additional Importation Tax;
- 5. Federal Inheritance Tax;
- 6. Sale of Bonds.

In considering the problem of financing the preparedness program, we are confronted by the obvious difficulty that until the program is itself definitely adopted, no one can tell how much money will be needed. The original estimate contained in the last report of the Secretary of the Treasury was \$93,800,000.

But that estimate was prepared before the movement had received its present momentum and there is every likelihood that far greater sums than that will be needed. According to the various plans that have been suggested, it is probable that the annual outlay for the largely increased army and navy will vary from 100 to 500 millions; it is quite clear, however, that a fiscal program involving the possible raising of \$500,000,000 is a vastly more complicated matter than that of raising only \$100,000,000 additional. The latter program might conceivably be accomplished by comparatively slight changes in the existing system of federal revenues; the former program would rquire what amounts to a revolution in our fiscal system.

In considering this problem, we shall therefore assume that the needed annual additional revenue will vary from \$200,000,000,000 to \$300,000,000, and we shall attempt to make some suggestions for a system which can be modified either up or down according to the needs of the treasury.

The first question to be disposed of is as to whether the needed additional revenues should be raised by loans or by taxes. This question can be easily answered if we adhere to what is a fundamental proposition in sound finance; namely, that in times of peace, and apart from extraordinary emergencies of a temporary character, loans should be utilized primarily for capital expenditure only and that current expenditures should be defrayed from current income. According to this principle, it would be necessary to separate carefully the projected expenditures for new and permanent fortifications from the ordinary expenditures of the army and of the navy and even from the guns and ammunition required for the new fortifications. Warships have a comparatively short life, and they, like the cannon and the ammunition and the recurrent expenses of the army and navy, ought to be paid for out of the taxes, because each year's program will call for new ships, as well as replacement of guns and ammunition. But the construction of a numerous and costly chain of forts along our entire border, for instance, can profitably be defrayed out of loans, because the fortifications once completed will probably not have to be entirely replaced for a generation or two, or at all events, not within the period during which the loan has to run. The only exception to this principle that capital expenditure on fortifications ought to be defrayed by loans, and all other expenses by taxes, is that if the policy of a great and sudden increase of the navy is decided upon, say the construction of five or ten warships a year, each costing from \$15,000,000 to \$20,000,000, it may be desirable to finance the construction of these warships by comparatively short time bonds, say ten- or fifteen-year bonds of a serial character, so that the bonds will all be repaid by the time the warships are obsolete. This is the plan, as I understand it, which was suggested by your worthy and able President, Colonel Robert M. Thompson, in an address lately delivered, recommending a \$500,000,000 bond issue. In general however, it would be better frankly to put the recurrent annual expenses upon the tax list.

Assuming, then that the national revenues must be increased by \$200,000,000 or \$300,000,000, the question is what can be done? Secretary McAdoo, in his last report, in giving the estimates for the fiscal year 1917, stated that if we were to spend about \$94,000,000 for preparedness, we should need about \$113,000,000 more revenue. But in this calculation, he assumed that the duty on sugar, amounting to \$45,000,000, would be continued, and he also assumed that the emergency revenue law of 1914, with an estimated revenue of \$82,000,000, would likewise be continued. The continuance of the sugar duty has been provided for.

The fiscal situation, according to the estimates of the Secretary of the Treasury, is, therefore, as follows, in round figures: The total estimated revenues for the year 1917 are \$725,000,000, composed of the three following items: general fund, balance, \$77,000,000; estimated annual receipts, \$603,000,000; sugar duty, \$45,000,000. The total estimated disbursements are \$764,000,000; namely, \$858,000,000 less the \$94,000,000 included by the Secretary for preparedness. In other words, the ordinary expenses for 1917 are calculated at \$764,000,000 and the ordinary revenue at \$725,000,000, leaving a deficit in ordinary revenue of \$39,000,000. The problem, therefore, is how to raise this \$39,000,000 plus the \$200,000,000 or \$300,000,000 required for preparedness.

It is plain that if we are to devise a system which will have sufficient elasticity to yield even \$100,000,000 or \$200,000,000 over and above the \$200,000,000 or \$300,000,000, it will be im-

possible to depend entirely either on indirect taxation or on direct taxation alone. The current, for instance, is fast setting toward an increase of the income tax and it is said that we may expect \$100,000,000 additional revenue from the income tax, in place of the continuance of the emergency revenue law. There is, in our opinion, no objection to this additional \$100,000,000 from the income tax, which can no doubt be secured by adopting the following three measures:

- 1. The lowering of the exemption limit, say to \$2,000.
- 2. The increasing of the normal tax to two per cent.
- 3. A drawing together of the rates of supertax so that higher rates will be paid on somewhat smaller incomes.

I think that the majority of people who have given any thought to this subject, insist that the present Income Tax Law exempting incomes under \$4,000, is an unwise, discriminatory enactment, and that the minimum should be reduced to \$2,000 or \$1,500. The lower the rate, necessarily the larger number of citizens would contribute. This would unquestionably tend to diffusing wider and more active interest in the affairs of the nation and would lead to better citizenship. England has just reduced the minimum exemption of incomes from 160£ to 130£ (i.e., \$800).

Unfertunately, it is not probable that the first method will be employed, the lowering of the limit of exemption; and while there is no particular danger in the third point, namely, the application of the higher progressive or graduated rate to somewhat smaller incomes, it is to be hoped that the normal rate of the tax will not be greatly increased, for we must not forget that the fiscal situation in many of our leading industrial states is now becoming acute, and that the tide is fast setting toward the adoption of an income tax for state purposes. If the federal government increases the income tax to inordinate rate, it will render far more difficult the solution of our state and local problems.

But even at best the \$100,000,000 or so additional from the income tax is entirely inadequate to our needs. How, then, should the remainder be raised?

Here, it seems to me that we must have recourse both to indirect and direct taxation. In indirect taxation, three steps seem to be imperative. The first is a continuation of the emergency revenue law with its higher duties on liquors, its special taxes, and its stamp taxes in schedule A (documentary stamps) and in schedule B (perfumery, cosmetics, etc.). This will mean another \$84,000,000 or \$85,000,000, which will, in all probability. by no means be sufficient. In that case, we should urge an additional revenue from the tariff. Without entering at all upon the question of protection and free trade, it may be pointed out that simply as a tariff for revenue, the yield could be largely in-The revenue from customs tariff in 1915 was under \$210,000,000, an absurdly inadequate figure from the standpoint of pure revenue. We seem to be reversing the system in vogue before the Civil War. Before the Civil War, and when the same party was in power as at present, naturally the whole of our national revenues came from the customs tariff. Now a comparatively insignificant part of the whole is derived from that source. We ought to get very much more from the tariff. If we have a tax on sugar, why should we not have a tax on coffee and on tea? England — the great free trade country of the world - gets more revenue from tea than from any other imported article except tobacco, and about twice as much from sugar. Assuming that the relative consumption, and the rates of the tax on tea were the same in the two countries, we could easily get a revenue of \$90,000,000 from tea alone. If free trade England does it, why could not we do it? And if it be objected that such a tax would fall with heavier weight upon the poorer classes, why could we not largely increase the revenue duties on luxuries and on the better grades of imported commodities? In the third place, the system of internal revenue taxes, including both excises and stamp taxes, could be profitably enlarged. The European countries all get relatively larger revenues from such sources than do we; and the great democratic budgets of Lloyd George, for instance, in England, by no means neglect, as we do, this source of revenue. With comparatively little trouble and annoyance, we could increase our revenue from indirect taxation.

If, however, it were desired not to push indirect taxation to the utmost, there still remains one great source of revenue, namely, the inheritance tax. This has not been tapped at all by the federal government (except during the Spanish-American War), and there has been considerable reluctance to utilize this

method, because it is already employed by some of the states. The inheritance taxes in the states, with one or two exceptions, however, are very insignificant. It is only in New York that a fair revenue is derived therefrom. The complications of interstate taxation are such that the inheritance tax is gradually being recognized as not thoroughly successful in the states. Owing to these difficulties of interstate taxation, the evasions from the inheritance tax are exceedingly great. On the other hand, we have many examples of double, triple, or quadruple taxation of the same inheritance by different states. The total yield of all the inheritance taxes in the United States at present is only about \$26,000,000. In England, not to speak of the continental countries at all, the inheritance tax yields about \$160,000,000 and yet the total wealth of England is small compared with that of the United States. England's wealth is calculated at from \$70,000. 000,000 to \$80,000,000,000, and the wealth of the United States at about \$200,000,000,000 and almost all of this will have passed in the course of a generation, into new hands and would, therefore, be subject to an inheritance tax. If we were to levy an inheritance tax at only one-half the rates levied by England, we probably should have a revenue of some \$200,000,000; and if the federal government were to keep the larger share of this and return a moderate part to the states, not only would the states be getting a great deal more revenue from the inheritance tax than they are now getting, but the federal government would have another \$100,000,000 or \$150,000,000 additional income.

It must not be forgotten that the United States is the wealthiest country on the face of the globe. If England finds it comparatively easy to increase, as she is doing at present, her annual governmental income from \$1,000,000,000 to about \$2,250,000,000, it ought not to be an impossible task for a country which is two or three times as wealthy as England to increase its revenue by a few hundred millions. But in order to do this, we must follow the example of England and rely neither on indirect taxation alone nor on direct taxation alone. Let us have an increase of the income tax; let us have, if necessary, an inheritance tax, but let us not neglect the great additional revenues that can be easily obtained from the tariff, from excises, and from various classes of stamp taxes. The exact proportion in which we must rely upon the one or the other of these sources will depend very

largely, as was said at the beginning, upon whether we need \$100,000,000 or \$500,000,000, but a sole reliance upon either direct or indirect sources will surely be a hazardous undertaking.

I have now outlined my views, perhaps at greater length than I originally intended to do, and perhaps they may be of some little service in enabling the House Committee on Ways and Means to decide on a broad, intelligent, and acceptable financial program.

THE NECESSITY FOR A DEFENSE COMMISSION WITH GENERAL STAFFS FOR THE ARMY AND NAVY

CHARLES G. CURTIS


It is apparent to those who have followed the course of recent events that our system of government is virtually a failure in many ways, and is quite unable to provide us with either an army or a navy capable of doing its part in defending the country. It does not even provide the essentials of a modern fighting force; for our navy actually has no battle-cruisers, scouts, aeroplanes, or useful submarines, and our army has practically no up-to-date artillery, shops for its rapid manufacture, aeroplanes, or ammunition supplies.

Congress fails as a law-making body, not only because its members are not trained experts and refuse to be guided by those who are, but because it often permits political influences to overshadow the national welfare, and there is no expert body with duties defined by law which is equipped to advise in the decision of these important questions. The Secretary of the Navy fails as an executive, because he is a civilian and not an expert, his views and acts are frequently controlled by politics, and he also has no official advisers whose opinions he values sufficiently to follow. Even the President, from whom one would expect better things, generally disregards the advice of our best military and naval experts, and devotes much of his time and thought to political matters instead of giving it all to the business of the country.

When our forefathers founded the present system of government, they could hardly have forseen the very general contempt for all expert knowledge and experience, which has been one of the consequences of our national self-confidence and lack of training. If Democracy is to survive, some way must be found of changing this attitude on the part of the people.

Experience shows that our admirals and bureau chiefs, who really know what the navy needs, are powerless to impress their views upon Congress or upon the President. This is largely because they are not charged by law or by custom with this duty, either individually or as an official body, and the

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THE DECK OF THE NEW YORK



practice of the Secretary has generally been to discourage criticisms or advice not in line with his own views. The bureau chiefs are recognized only as individual heads of the various branches of naval administration. There is no way of ascertaining their collective opinion upon any naval question or problem. Their individual views are presented piecemeal to a non-prefessional secretary, who has to decide which are right. In short, the bureau chiefs do not embody the duties, responsibilities, or powers of a general staff.

Unlike other nations, we have in the laws governing our naval organization no provision for either a Defense Commission charged with the study of problems of State and naval and military questions as presented by experts, or a general staff charged with the duty and responsibility of preparing the fleet for war and clothed with authority to direct its operations.

Practically speaking, the Secretary of the Navy is the only functionary who is supposed to advise Congress or the President in these important matters; but, since he has no technical qualifications and is a political appointee, it is logically unsafe to leave our naval development to his direction. Certainly the practical experience of the last decade or two shows this to be the case.

It is evident that our government needs an official body of experts to study the problem continually, to watch developments here and abroad, and to take the initiative in advising the Presdent and Congress what steps should be taken to give us an army and a navy adequate for the defense of the country and efficiently managed. Such a body would operate as a National Defense Council or Commission.

In both our army and navy departments we should have also — what other nations have — a general staff controlled by a chief. This Chief of Staff should be the executive military head for preparing and directing the naval or the military forces. The chief of the naval general staff should be directly charged by law with the duty of advising the Secretary, and through him the President and Congress, what ships and other fighting machines should be built and how they should be managed and operated. He should also consult with and report directly to the Defense Commission. Finally, he should be explicitly charged with authority and responsibility — authority to direct

the operations of the fleet, and responsibility for its readiness for the purpose for which it is created.

The necessity for a general staff in our navy, and also for a recognized body of experts, or Defense Commission, to formulate naval and military policies and to advise Congress is very evident when we consider the extraordinary things which have happened in our navy during the last few years. The following are some of them, though many others might be cited:

It is nearly two years since the war broke out in Europe and since most thinking people realized that the time had come to begin strengthening our army and navy; yet nothing whatever has been done by any branch of our government which will put either of these defenses in a condition where it could repel such attacks as we may have to meet, with no more notice than England had two years ago. We have not even been able to procure an increase in our army sufficient to meet the dangers incident to the Mexican situation. Nine months have elapsed since the President became so impressed with the situation as to call for special reports from our army and navy departments. Four months have elapsed since Congress assembled; and yet Congress has not passed a single Act, nor has the government issued a single order that will cut any figure in really strengthening our army and navy. Indeed, the measures that Congress has under consideration at the present time are, as every expert knows. utterly inadequate and unfitted to bring about substantial improvement. Could anything be clearer than the fact that we have needed a recognized board of experts to recommend to Congress what it should authorize, and thus to secure reasonably intelligent and prompt action?

In March, 1915, eight months after the war in Europe began, two battleships — no more than the usual annual provision — were authorized by Congress. It has been brought out in testimony before the Naval Committee of the House that, instead of awarding the contracts for these battleships to shipbuilders who were equipped to lay the keels promptly, the Secretary ordered them built in the Navy Yards; and, as these yards have no building ways ready or suitable, the first one of the two battleships cannot have its keel laid before next fall, — this is, about seventeen months from the date of authorization, — and the other one not until some months later. The Secre-

tary, who claimed that the private bids were excessively high, took these two ships away from the shipbuilders and ordered them built in the Navy Yards, on the ground that the bids, technically considered, would exceed the appropriation (by a trifling figure); but he made no effort to perform a valuable service for the country by overcoming this technicality and placing the contracts where the work could be started immediately. The fact is that the bids were above the department's estimates, made months before, because the prices of labor and materials had meanwhile risen greatly. Although Congress, through its Naval Committees, was aware of these facts, it tacitly approved of the Secretary's action, making, a year after the original authorization, an appropriation for equipping two of the Navy Yards for laying the keels of these ships a year or more hence. An official advisory board would have prevented such senseless action.

Although the naval actions of the present war have shown that the battle-cruiser type of ship is highly important, and although other nations, since the war began, have been building many large and fast vessels of this type and our best naval officers have strongly advocated it, not a single battle-cruiser has been built or even authorized by our government. Instead, we have been building nothing but battleships, and only about two of these each year; while before the war Germany was building about four and England five or six each year.

Since the war began, there has been a great increase in warship construction abroad, and yet there has been no increase whatever in the yearly naval program of the United States. The battleships that we have been building, including those for which contracts have just been awarded, are capable of making only about 21½ knots; while the battleships that foreign nations have been building in the last few years are capable of making from 22 to 26 knots, and their battle-cruisers—of which we have none—are capable of making over 30 knots. Similarly, our destroyers, including the six just ordered, cannot make over 31 knots, while many foreign-built destroyers are capable of making 38 knots. Our government continues to ignore settled expert conclusions resulting from the European War, even after many of them have become perfectly plain to the lay mind.

Although experimental maneuvers conducted in recent years for the purpose of determining the necessities of the fleet have amply shown the need for scout cruisers, and this fact has been officially reported to the department, and although the experience of the present war shows that scouts, acting as such and also as commerce destroyers, are a very essential arm of the navy, we have not authorized any of this type during the last ten years. England and Germany have been building many very fast vessels of this type, and all naval experts recognize their absolute necessity, constituting, as they do, the "eyes of the fleet."

Practically nothing has been done by our navy or our army in the way of developing the aeroplane for war and building such machines as all experts know to be absolutely essential for success in naval or military battles. The aeroplane has been proved by the war to be both a scout and a weapon of vital importance; and yet this instrument has been practically ignored by Congress.

The development of the submarine and the construction of more modern types is another subject that has been virtually neglected so far as Congress is concerned. It has been brought out in testimony before the Naval Committee of the House that. in the case of our first large submarine, which was authorized in June, 1914, no construction work whatever has yet been done on either the hull or the machinery. In other words, two years have been wasted in the preparation of plans and drawings for this vessel, whereas other countries are actually building their submarines in about a year. Two more large fleet submarines were authorized by the following session of the same Congress, and up to the present date the contracts for these vessels have not even been awarded. The reason for the delay is as follows: When these boats were authorized, Congress, with insufficient knowledge of the art, inserted a requirement that the boats should have a speed on the surface of 25 knots. Later it was ascertained that the builders were unable to guarantee a speed of 25 knots, but offered to guarantee about 20 knots. If there had been either a general staff in our navy or a Defense Commission, all of this would have been known before the date of authorization and Congress would not then have stipulated a requirement which could not be met.

Last July the President, realizing the gravity of the situation, called upon the "General Board of the Navy" (a board appointed by the Secretary of the Navy for advising him personally in certain matters, but which has no legal status and whose advice he has rarely followed) for a special report upon what should then be done to enlarge and improve our navy. On July 30, the Board presented a report urging a large and immediate increase in our ships and specifying a definite building program which it thought essential for defense. The President and the Secretary, instead of disclosing this report or acting upon it, called upon the Board for a different report, limited to a much smaller expenditure (\$100,000,000 instead of \$265,000,000 involved in the Board's report), and the Board submitted a new report in which they made recommendations based on this limited expenditure. The President and the Secretary even then did not follow the advice of the General Board, but proceeded to recommend to Congress a third program, still more limited than the one recommended in the second report of the Board. other words, both the President and the Secretary totally disregarded the expert advice given by the Board and were content to make recommendations to Congress and the country, based upon their own guess-work regarding these technical and vital matters. The first and second programs of the General Board and that recommended to Congress by the Secretary and the President are shown in the following table:

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TABLE

TYPE OF VESSEL	GENERAL BOARD'S RECOMMENDATIONS July Report October Report	PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM
Battle-Cruisers Scout Cruisers Destroyers Fleet Submarines	6 4	2 3 15

Could anything more plainly show the necessity for an official board of experts, or Defense Commission, to come forward at this time and not only advise, but warn, Congress and the President?

The ignorance often shown by Committees of Congress and their inability to get at the truth in technical matters is well shown by the questions asked of Admiral Fletcher, when he appeared before the House Committee on Naval Affairs, in December, 1914. In an article entitled, "Proof that Big Navy In-

crease is Not Needed Now," in Pearson's Magazine for February. Allan L. Benson refers to Admiral Fletcher's testimony as showing that we do not need a larger navy, when as a matter of fact it shows nothing of the kind. The article is entirely misleading and implies anything but the truth. It introduces Admiral Fletcher's testimony with the statement, "The American Battleship strength at the time of the hearings before the House Committee on Naval Affairs was forty." The examination was conducted by a member of the Committee, Mr. Witherspoon, who, according to Mr. Benson, "had at his tongue's end the essential facts pertaining to the World's Navies."

"Mr. Witherspoon. Now, according to the Navy Year Book. Germany had battleships built, building and authorized, 39. Would you say that if she could send all those ships against us, we would not be able to resist them?"

"Admiral Fletcher. I should say that we ought to, if

we have the greater force."

"Mr. Witherspoon. Now it has been stated to us that if Germany were at war with us she could not afford, either, to send more than one-half her ships against us."

"Admiral Fletcher. That I do not know."
"Mr. Witherspoon. I am not asking you whether you know or not. Assuming that she could send only one-half her 39, would you not say that we could successfully resist that number?'

"Admiral Fletcher. Yes, Sir. I would say so if all our

force is available to meet her."

Mr. Witherspoon then asked similar questions in regard to the navies of England, France, and other countries.

The ignorance here shown is appalling. Not a single member of the Committee seemed to know that the forty United States battleships referred to in the Naval Register included a large majority so antiquated or so inferior that the suggestion of sending them against a foreign fleet would not be entertained for a moment. The truth is that if Germany contemplated sending a fleet to attack this country, she would select only vessels powerful enough to do the work; and, as she has been building a great many more of these powerful warships than we have in the last few years. she necessarily has more of such vessels. The fact is that Germany, at the time Mr. Witherspoon was questioning Admiral Fletcher, had at last twenty-one modern powerful warships (sixteen dreadnoughts and five battle-cruisers) such as she would be apt to send against us, while we had just ten battleships of corresponding power. And yet Mr. Witherspoon assumed that the forty battleships referred to in the Naval Register would be avaible for an engagement with a strong foreign fleet. The most extraordinary thing is that every other member of the Commttee apparently acquiesced in this assumption. At the present time, Germany has (not counting ships completed during the last year) twenty-six dreadnoughts and battle-cruisers which she could send against eleven of our dreadnoughts. A few years hence the discrepancy will be even greater. In the matter of scout cruisers, destroyers, and submarines our navy cannot even be compared with that of Germany.

Very few people have ever considered how many questions — many of them vital and dependent upon one another — must be intelligently considered and answered by the ablest experts before we can possibly build up an adequate navy. The following are some of them:

What types of warships and how many of each type shall be ordered the first year, and each subsequent year, and how many years shall the program cover?

What proportion of these ships shall be built in the Navy

Yards and what in the private yards?

What Navy Yards shall be employed for this purpose and what extensive enlargements and additional construction facilities shall be provided, to enable the Navy Yards to build any considerable number of ships and with any reasonable speed?

(To provide any substantial increase in construction facilities, such as is needed, will involve a long period

of time and great cost.)

What steps should be taken to induce the shipbuilders to enlarge their plants adequately and to increase substantially the speed of production?

Shall the contract price be fixed by competition, as heretofore, or in some other way,— as by a price-fixing com-

mission?

Shall Government Plants for making armor be established (a plan which will inevitably result in years of delay and in final failure to get satisfactory armor)? Or shall armor be made exclusively in private plants and these plants be encouraged to do the best they can for the interests of the government as well as their own? What shall be done in the way of developing the submarine and constructing a large number of this very important arm of the navy as soon as possible, and where shall these be built?

What shall be done in the way of developing the aeroplane and seaplane and constructing a large number of this very important arm as soon as possible, and where shall these be built?

What extensions shall be made in our gun-developing, testing, and manufacturing plants, and where shall these be located? (An exceedingly important and difficult matter, for if the enemy's guns are superior, our ships will be of little use.)

Where shall additional plants or shops be located?

(This applies not only to Navy Yards and docks themselves, and to government owned naval bases, but to all the industrial plants that in time of peace, as well as war, provide munitions and supplies for the navy.

Is it reasonable to assume that Congress would be able to deal intelligently with these questions, even if it had the inclination?

Equally numerous and complex questions naturally arise in connection with the army; and unless these are gone into and decided with the greatest care and with the best engineering knowledge available, our army also will surely lack, as it does now, a number of elements vital to its efficiency. Obviously the problems are so technical, complex, and difficult that they must be dealt with by one or more bodies of specially trained men before Congress attempts to deal with them. When they are, Congress will be relieved of much work which now hampers other important legislation.

Is it not manifest, then that there should be an advisory body to Congress and to the President, and, if occasion demands, to the people—a Defense Commission? This commission should be a permanent organization, non-policial in character, and charged by law with certain duties. It should acquaint itself with our determined national policies. It should study the probabilities and possibilities of their conflet with those of other nations. It should be in close touch with our naval and military organizations through membership of naval and military officers in its own body, and by consultation with the army and navy general staffs. It should consider what may be required of

these forces in meeting foreign aggression. It should call upon the two staffs for reports and their views as to the character and extent of the forces required to meet the necessities of the country resulting from its recognized policies, and should then digest these reports in the light of the different questions involved, and finally advise the President and Congress as to the best course.

To do justice to the matter this commission should be continually in session, and its members should be able to give substantially all their time to the work. They should hold office long enough to become thoroughly familiar with the work and with our national policy, and should have overlapping terms of office. One of the most efficient military organizations in the world, the British Admiralty, is directed by what is known as the "Board of Admiralty," which is in effect a War or Defense Council for the navy. This Board, or Council, is composed of nine individuals, one of whom is the presiding head. Of the other eight, four are highly trained officers of the navy and four are civilians.

While the foregoing dwells upon the need for a Defense Commission and mentions the general staff incidentally, it is obvious that a military head — using the term in its broad meaning — is necessary for the naval establishment. In other words, the direct control of the technical bureaus of the department must rest in a technical naval head. The true character of such a head has been established by many years' experience in other countries. It has taken the form of a Chief of Staff (though not always under that name).

Our naval organization has no general staff, nor are any of the makeshifts proposed from time to time and limited in their scope by notions of fancied expediency, in any true sense an embodiment of a general staff. The Navy Department organization to-day consists simply of a Secretary, under whom are a number of bureau chiefs with equal authority, but none of them clothed with the responsibility for the preparation of the navy or its efficient direction in time of war.

There should be provided in our organization a governing military head, under the Secretary and supported by a competent staff of advisers. He should be charged officially with the duty of planning what we need in the way of a fleet or other fighting machines and directing its operations. The general staff should control the military side of the organization; and

the civil duties which have heretofore been in the hands of the Secretary or his assistants should remain there. On the following page is a diagram showing a simple form of organization for the army and navy suited to our form of government and providing for a National Defense Commission and general staffs for the navy and army.

The need of a general staff for our navy was well brought out by Secretary of the Navy Moody, in a statement made to the Naval Committee of the House, on April 11, 1904, as follows:

"In my last Annual Report I invited attention to the importance to our Naval organization of the existence of some body—call it what you please—charged with the duty of giving responsible advice upon Military affairs. I said then, 'The organization which lacks this feature is defective in a vital part.' I believe it to be my duty now to take another step and make a specific recommendation.'

Secretary Cannot Make Plans


"Of course he must always be lacking in technical Military knowledge. • • • He cannot make plans for war or for important operations in peace. He cannot know best how to provide for the needs of the fleet, or by what methods the men may be best trained, or how the capacities of officers may be best developed and utilized. As to all these subjects and those cognate to them he must rely upon the best Military advice. It is not enough that there should be plenty of officers ready to give him advice when he seeks it. There should be those charged expressly with the duty of studying Military questions and giving advice for which they can be held responsible."

"Now such a body as I have referred to has been quite often called a General Staff, but I think the name is unimportant. The realities are the important things. By whatever name you chose to call it or however you may choose to constitute it, it is my deliberate opinion that some body of men charged with the duty I have attempted to de-

scribe should be recognized by law."

"It may be said that the Secretary already has the Chiefs of Bureaus as advisers. At the heads of those Bureaus, which you have now established by law, there are and will be competent officers with adequate technical and Military information. They are abundantly able to give safe council on the important duties with which their respective Bureaus are charged; but they are engrossed with the duties of the administration of their Bureaus. They

have no responsibility for the consideration of these Military questions to which I have referred, nor any duty to give advice upon them; and the world's experience has shown that no advice is good except that for which advisers are held responsible. The volunteer adviser is usually not



of much assistance. Much as I have profited by the advice of the Bureau Chiefs, I know by practical experience that it is impossible for them to take from their administrative duties the time which will enable them to consider these questions with such deliberation as would render them willing to accept responsibilty for advice.

Why, it will naturally be asked, has Mr. Moody's wise advice never been followed?

The view has been expressed that our "General Board" of the navy is an advisory body, and that, while it has no executive preparatory or war-directing functions, it is virtually a general staff so far as recommendations are concerned. Experience has shown that this is not so, and that this Board does not operate like a general staff in any important particular. It has no legal status or responsibility for results and its recommendations carry but little weight. It was created about fifteen years ago, and since that time the records show that its recommendations have been rarely heeded by the Secretary,—much less by Congress, and it has never carried weight with the people of the country. On the following pages is given a table showing the shipbuilding program recommended by the General Board, that recommended by the Secretary of the Navy, and that authorized by Congress in each of the last thirteen years. This shows that in most Administrations the Secretary of the Navy has disregarded the recommendations of the Board, and in every year Congress has cut them to pieces and has produced a navy very inferior to what the Board intended.

Mr. John Leyland, the celebrated English writer, says:

"Be this as it may, the General Board (of the United States Navy) was and is without responsibility for carrying out its recommendations. It has no executive power, nor has it any means of coordinating its views with those which emanate from the Bureaus."

"This system is unlike those which exist in the Naval Administration of Great Britain, Germany, and France. The Aide for Operations (in the United States Navy) is concerned with the work which is analogous to that falling within the province of the First British Sea Lord, but the latter is a responsible officer acting in practice as Commander in Chief of the Navy, while the Aide for Operations is merely an assistant of the civilian Secretary of the Navy, and in no sense controls the General Board. The same is true of the function of the other Aides who deal with matters concerning personnel, material, work, etc."

"Therefore the General Board does not necessarily influence policy and there appears to be wanting some or-

ganization analogous to the Board of Admiralty in the British Service or the French Superior Council of the Navy."

In testifying before the Naval Committee of the House recently Admiral Fiske, one of our best naval authorities, said:

"I also wish to say that my subsequent studies, discussions and reflections have led me to the belief that, no matter how much money we may spend, we shall never be able to get our navy into the condition of efficiency of certain other navies until we change the system which directs it to a system as good as theirs."

Construction-Recommended and Authorized Since 1903

Reprinted	from	Report	of	Secretary	of	the	Navy-1915.
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Recommended by the General Board.	Recommended by the Secretary of the Navy.	Authorised by Congress.
1908. 2 battleships	(Secretary Moody.) 2 hospital ships 1 battleship a	(Act of 1904.) 1 battleship. 2 armored cruisers.
3 protected cruisers 4 scout cruisers 2 fuel ships 3 destroyers	1 armored cruiser a 2 protected cruisers a 2 to 4 scout cruisers a 2 submarines 2 fuel ships a	3 scout cruisers. 4 submarines. 2 fuel ships.
1904	(Secretary Morton.)	(Act of 1905.)
8 battleships 6 destroyers 5 scout cruisers 6 torpedo boats	<pre>\$ battleships b 6 destroyers (if practi- cable.) b</pre>	2 battleships.
2 fuel ships 2 gunboat 2 river gunboats 2 Philippine gunboats.		
\$850,000 for submarines 1905.	(Secretary Bonaparte.)	(Act of 1906.)
8 battleships	2 battleships	1 battleship.
8 scout cruisers 4 destroyers 4 submarines 4 torpedo boats	2 river gunboats 2 scout cruisers 4 destroyers 2 submarines	8 destroyers. 8 submarines.
2 small gunboats 1906.	(Secretary Bonaparte.)	(Act of 1907.)
2 battleships	1 battleship, and, with hesitation, 2.	1 battleship.
1 gunboat 2 river gunboats 4 destroyers 2 fuel ships	2 gunboats	2 destroyers.
4 ships' torpedo boats 2 scout cruisers 2 small gunboats 1 ammunition ship	4 ships' torpedo boats	

Recommended by the General Board.	Recommended by the Secretary of the Navy.	Authorised by Congress.
1907.	(Secretary Metcalf.)	(Act of 1908.)
2 fuel ships	4 battleships 4 scout cruisers 10 destroyers 4 submarines 4 fuel ships 1 ammunition ship 1 repair ship 2 mine-laying ships (conversion of 2 cruisers now on list.)	3 battleships. 10 destroyers. 8 submarines. 2 fuel ships.
version of 2 cruisers now on list.) 4 ships' motor torpedo boats.	now on list.)	Purchase of 8 new fuel ships.
1908.	(Secretary Metcalf.)	(Act of 1909.)
4 battleships 4 scout cruisers 10 destroyers 4 submarines 8 fuel ships 1 ammunition ship 1 repair ship 2 mine-laying ships (conversion of 2 cruisers new en list.)	4 battleships	2 battleships. 5 destroyers. 4 submarines. 1 fuel ship. 1 destroyer whose vitals are located below the water line.
1909.	(Secretary Meyer.)	(Act of 1910.)
4 battleships	2 battleships	3 battleships. 2 fuel ships. 4 submarines 6 destroyers.
1910.	(Secretary Meyer.)	(Act of 1911.)
4 fuel ships	I gunoat 2 submarines 1 fuel ship 2 tugs 1 submarine tender	2 battleships. 1 gunboat. 1 river gunboat. 4 submarines. 2 fuel ships. 2 tugs. 1 submarine tender. 8 destroyers.

Recommended by the General Board.	Recommended by the Secretary of the Navy.	Authorized by Congress.
1911. 4 battleships 4 fuel ships 16 destroyers 2 destroyer tenders 5 submarines 2 submarine tenders 1 repair ship 4 scout cruisers 1 ammunition ship 1 mine layer 2 transports	(Secretary Meyer.) 2 battleships 2 fuel ships	(Act of 1912.) 1 battleship. 2 fuel ships. 6 destroyers. 1 destroyer tender. 8 submarines. 1 submarine tender.
1913.	(Secretary Meyer.)	(Act of 1918.)
4 battleships 2 battle craisers 2 gunboats 16 destroyers 6 submarines 1 ammunition ship 2 transports 2 tugs 1 submarine tender 1 destroyer tender	2 battle cruisers 2 gunboats 16 destroyers 6 submarines 1 fuel ship (conditionally.) 1 ammunition ship 2 transports 2 tugs 1 submarine tender 1 destroyer tender	1 battleship. 6 destroyers. 4 submarines. 1 transport.
1 submarine testing dock.	1 submarine testing dock.	1 supply ship.
1918. 4 battleships	(Secretary Daniels.) 8 battleships 8 destroyers 8 submarines	(Act of 1914.) 8 battleships. 6 destroyers. 8 or more submarines. 1 submarine testing dock.
1914.	(Secretary Daniels.)	(Act of 1915.)
4 battleships	2 battleships	2 battleships. 6 destroyers. 2 seagoing submarines. 16 coast defense submarines.
4 scouts	1 gunboat	1 oil fuel ship.

a Recommended in his hearings before the House Naval Committee. Not in his annual report.

b Recommended in his hearings before the House Naval Committee. No specific recommendation in his annual report.

NAVAL STRATEGY

BRADLEY A. FISKE, U. S. NAVY

Strategy is difficult of definition; but though many definitions have been made, and though they do not agree together very well, yet all agree that strategy is concerned with the preparation of military forces for war and for operating them in war—while tactics is the immediate instrument for handling them in battle. Strategy thinks out a situation beforehand, and decides what preparations as to material personnel and operations should be made.

Many books have been written on strategy, meaning strategy as applied to armies, but very few books have been written on naval strategy. The obvious reasons are that armies in the past have been much larger and more important than navies; that naval men have only recently had the appliances on board ship for writing on an extensive scale; and that the nature of their occupation has been such that continuous application of the kind needed for thinking out principles and expounding them in books, has only recently been possible.

Most of the few existing books on naval strategy deal with it historically, by describing and explaining the naval campaigns of the past and such land campaigns as illustrate principles that apply to sea and land alike. Perhaps the best books are those of Darrieus and Mahan.

Until about 50 years ago, it was only by experience actual war, supplemented by laborious study of the campaigns of the great commanders, and the reading of books on strategy which pointed out and expounded the principles involved in them, that one could arrive at any clear idea of strategy.

But wars have fortunately been so infrequent, the information about them has often been so conflicting, and so many results have been due to chance, that, in default of experience, the mere reading of books did not lead to very satisfactory results, except in the case of geniuses; and therefore war problems and war games were devised, in which the various factors, material and personnel, were represented and made as true to life as possible.

The tactical games resulting, which naval strategists now play, employ models of the various craft used in war, such as



THE WAR GAME

Maneuvering fleets on the game board. On this surface tactical problems may be solved and combinations tried out, quickly and on a small scale, that would otherwise require the services of a large fleet and considerable time and expense.

battleships, submarines, etc., and are governed by rules that regulate the movements of those craft on a sort of big chessboard, several feet square, that represents an area of water The strategic games and problems are several miles square. based on principles similar to those on which the tactical games are based in the sense that actual operations are carried on in miniature; but naturally, the strategical operations cover several hundred miles, and sometimes thousands. The aim of both the tactical and the strategic games is to determine as closely as possible the laws that decide victory or defeat; and therefore, for any country, the material, personnel and operations it should employ. Naturally the results obtained are not quite so convincing as those of actual war or battle; but they are more convincing than can be attained in any other way, as yet devised, especially as many of the operations of the game board that turn out well in games are tried out afterwards by the fleet in peace maneuvers. War games and problems may be compared to the drawings that an architect makes of a house which someone wants to build; the plans and drawings are not so realistic as a real house, but they are better than anything else; and, like the war games, they can be altered and realtered until the best result seems to have been attained, considering the amount of money allowed, and other practical conditions.

The idea of devising war games and war problems seems to have originated with von Moltke; certainly the fact of doing it was by his direction. Shortly after he became chief of the general staff of the Prussian Army in 1857, he set to work to carry out the ideas that he had in mind for several years, while occupying minor posts, but which he had not had the power to enforce. It seems to have become clear to his mind, that if a chess player acquired skill, not only by playing actual games and by studying actual games played by masters, but also by working out hypothetical chess problems, it ought to be possible to devise a system whereby army officers could supplement their necessarily meager experience of actual war, and their necessarily limited opportunities for studying with full knowledge the actual campaigns of great strategists, by working out hypothetical tactical and strategic problems. Von Moltke succeeded in devising such a system and in putting it into successful operation. Hypothetical problems were prepared, in which enemy forces were confronted with each other under given circumstances of weather, terrain, and distances, each force with its objective known only to itself; for instance, you are in command of such and such a force at such and such a place; you have received orders to accomplish such and such a purpose; you receive information that the enemy, comprising such and such troops, was at a certain time at a certain place, and marching in a certain direction. What would you do?

Classes of army officers were formed, and compelled to work out the problems exactly as boys at school were compelled to work out problems in arithmetic. The skill of individual officers in solving the problems was noted and recorded; and the problems themselves, as time went on and experience was gained, were made more and more to conform to probable situations in future wars with Austria, France, and other countries, actual maps being used, and the exact nature and magnitude of every factor in each problem being precisely stated.

By such work, the pupils (officers) acquired the same kind of skill in solving strategic and tactical problems that a boy acquires in solving problems in arithmetic — a skill in handling the instruments employed. Now the skill acquired in solving any kind of problem, like the skill developed in any art such as baseball, fencing, or piano playing, does not give a man skill merely in doing a thing identically like a thing he has done before; such a skill would be useless, for the reason that identical conditions almost never recur, and identical problems are never presented. Similar conditions often recur, however, and similar problems are often presented; and familiarity with any class of conditions or problems imparts skill in meeting any condition or any problem that comes within that class. If, for instance, a man memorizes the sums made by adding together any two of the digits, he is equipped to master any problem of addition; and if he will practice at adding numbers together, he will gradually acquire a certain ability of mind whereby he can add together a long row of figures placed in a sequence he never saw before, and having a sum he never attained before. Or a pianist, having acquired the mastery of the tecnique of the keyboard and the ability to read music, can sit down before a piano he never sat at before. and play off instantly a piece of music he never saw before.

Doubtless Moltke had ideas of this kind in mind when his plans for educating strategists and tacticians by problems on paper and by games were ridiculed by the unimagnative, and resisted by the indolent; and certainly no man was ever proved right more gloriously than Moltke. In the war with Austria in 1866, the Prussian Army crushed the Austrian at Sadowa iv 19 days after declaration of war. In the war with France in 1870, the Prussian Army routed the French and received the surrender of Napoleon III in seven weeks and two days, not because of superior courage or experience in war, but by more scientific strategy. As Henderson says: "Even the French generals of divisions and brigades had had more actual experience (in war) than those who led the German Army Corps. Compared with the German rank and file, a great part of their non-commissioned officers and men were veterans, and veterans who Their chief officers were practically had seen much service. familiar with the methods of moving, supplying and maneuvering large masses of troops; their marshals were valiant and successful soldiers. And yet the history of modern warfare records no defeats so swift and complete as those of Koniggratz and Sedan. The great host of Austria was shattered in seven weeks: the French Imperial Army was destroyed in seven weeks and three days; and to all intents and purposes the resistance they had offered was not much more effective than that of a respectable militia. But both the Austrian and the French armies were organized and trained under the old system. Courage, experience and professional pride they possessed in abundance. Man for man, in all virile qualities, neither officers nor men were inferior to their foes. But one thing their generals lacked, and that was education for war. Strategy was almost a sealed book to them." Also, "Moltke committed no mistake. Long before war had been declared every possible precaution had been made. And these included much more than arrangements for rapid mobilization, the assembly of superior numbers completely organized, and the establishment of magazines. The enemy's numbers, armament, readiness and efficiency had been submitted to a most searching examination. Every possible movement that might be made, however unlikely, had been foreseen; every possible danger that might arise, however remote, discussed and guarded against;" also, "That the Prussian system should be imitated, and her army deprived of its monopoly of high efficiency, was naturally inevitable. Every European state has to-day its colleges, its intelligence department, its schools of instruction and its course of field maneuvers and field firing."

Strategy may be divided into two parts, war strategy and preparation strategy; and of these two, preparation strategy is by far the more important.

War strategy deals with the laying out of plans of campaign after war has begun, and the handling of forces until they come into contact with the enemy, when tactics takes those forces in its charge. It deals with actual situations, arranges for the provisioning, fueling and moving of actual forces, contests the field against an actual enemy, the size and power of which are fairly well known - and the intentions of which are sometimes known and sometimes not. of the strategist in war is arduous, pressing, definite and exciting; and results are apt to follow decisions quickly. plays the greatest and oldest game the world has ever known, with the most elaborate instruments, and for the largest stakes. In most wars, the antagonists have been so nearly equal in point of personnel and material that the result has seemed to be decided by the relative degrees of skill of the strategists on both sides. This has been the verdict of history; and victorious commanders in all times and in all lands have achieved rarer glories, and been crowned with honors, than any other men.

Preparation strategy deals with the laying out of plans for hypothetical wars and the handling of hypothetical forces against hypothetical enemies; and arranges for the construction, equipment, mobilization, provisioning, fueling and moving of hypothetical fleets and armies. War strategy is vivid, stimulating and resultful; preparation strategy is dull, plodding, and—for the strategist himself—apparently resultless. Yet war strategy is merely the child of preparation strategy. The weapons that war strategy uses, preparation strategy puts into its hands. The fundamental plans, the strength and composition of the forces, the training of officers and men, the collection of the necessary material of all kinds, the arrangements for supplies and munitions of all sorts—the very principles on which war strategy conducts its operations—are the fruit

of the tedious work of preparation strategy. Alexander reaps the benefit of the obscure labors of his father, Philip; William is made German Emperor by the toils of Moltke.

The work of laying out a hypothetical campaign, involving hypothetical operations against a hypothetical enemy, requires of the strategist a thorough estimate of the situation, including a careful estimate of the forces of the enemy, material and personnel, and of the strategy that will probably govern his operations—whether he will act on the defensive, or assume the offensive; if he is to act on the defensive, how and where will he base his forces, how far will he operate away from his own shores? And if he is to act on the offensive, what direction will his operations take; will he secure an advance base; and if so, where? And as the character of the enemy's operations will depend on the personnel of the enemy general staff and of the high commanders afloat, who comprise the personnel and what are their characteristics?

To decide these questions correctly requires considerable acquaintance with the enemy country, its navy and its policy a full knowledge of the strategy, personnel and material of that navy, and a sound conception of strategy itself. But to decide the questions correctly is essential, because the decision will form the basis of the future plans.

Naturally, as the plan is entirely hypothetical and take effect at some indefinite time in the future. all the factors that will be in existence at that time cannot be foretold exactly, and therefore must be esti-This will necessitate several alternate hypotheses: mated. a war plan including mobilization and must be made out, based on each hypothesis. For instance, on the hypothesis that the enemy will take the offensive, one set of plans will have to be prepared on the basis that we shall also take the offensive, and another on the basis that circumstances may be such at that time as to make it wise for us to resort to the defensive; while on the hypothesis that the enemy is to remain on the defensive, a set of plans very different from the other two as to both mobilization and operation must be devised.

Each set of the plans just suggested may also have to be divided into two or more parts. On the basis that the enemy

will remain on the defensive, for instance, the circumstances when the hour for action comes, such as the fact of his being quite unprepared, may indicate the advisability of an attack on him as sudden as it can be made; while, on the other hand, circumstances such as the fact of his being thoroughly prepared may render it necessary for us to send a larger force than we could get ready quickly, especially if the enemy coast be far away, and may therefore indicate the advisability of deliberate movements, and even a protracted delay before starting.

But no matter what plan is to be followed, a detailed plan for every probable contingency must be prepared; and it must be elaborated in such detail that it can be put into operation instantly, when the fateful instant comes; because the enemy will put his plans into operation at the same time we do, and the one whose plans are executed first will take a long step towards victory.

Not only must the plans provide some means whereby the plans themselves shall get into full operation instantly when war breaks; other plans must also provide that all the acts which those plans contemplate must be performed. Not only must the plans provide that all the prearranged orders for putting the *Kearsarge* into full commission shall be instantly sent by mail, telegraph, and telephone to the proper officials, but other plans must also provide means whereby the officers and men shall actually march on board the *Kearsarge*, her ensign and commission pennant be displayed, all the fuel, ammunition, provisions and equipment be on board; and the *Kearsarge* sail at once, and join the commander-in-chief at sea.

Doubtless the most complicated and comprehensive plans are those for sending a large expedition on an offensive mission to a far distant coast; especially if that coast be guarded by an efficient navy, if it have outlying islands that would afford good bases for her destroyers and submarines, and if there are not good harbors which our fleet could seize as advance bases, from which to prosecute its future operations. The complexity of the task of planning such an expedition, taking due account, but not exaggerated account, of all the factors, favorable and adverse, is appalling; but the task must be undertaken and accomplished. The most tedious part is the logistics—the arrangements for supplying the fleet on the way and in the distant

theater of operations with the necessary provisions, equipment and ammunition, and above all, the fuel. The average super-dreadnought consumes about 460 tons of coal per day at full speed, and about 108 tons at 10 knots; and coal or other fuel for all the dreadnoughts, battle cruisers, cruisers of various classes, scouts, destroyers, submarines, ships, aircraft of different kinds, hospital ships, ammunition ships, transports and the fuel ships themselves, must be provided by means that must not fail.

While the work of planning an offensive movement to a distant coast is the most tedious and complex, the work of planning a defensive measure against a sudden attack on the coast needs the most concentration of effort; for whatever the plans require to be done must be done at once. This necessitates that the orders to be issued must be as few as possible, that they be as concise and clear as possible, that the things to be done be as few and as simple as possible, and that all possible foresight be exercised to prevent any confusion or misunderstanding, or any necessity on the part of anyone for requesting more instructions.

When the fateful instant comes, the final command to mobilize puts into execution whichever of the plans already made is to be followed; and for this reason it is clear that the various plans must be kept separate from each other, and each set of plans must include all the various orders that must be signed for carrying it into effect, including the particular word or phrase that directs the execution of that particular set of plans.

It is the story that the final order to the British Navy in the early part of August, 1914, was the word "Go." All the units went immediately, understandingly, unitedly; and the greatest machine the world has ever known was almost instantly in operation at full speed. No such stupendous feat, physically considered, had ever been done before. The mobilization of the Prussian Army in 1870 and of the German Army about August 1, 1914, were as great performances mentally and strategically, but not physically, by reason of the relative feebleness of the forces set in motion. This relative feebleness was due, of course, to the insignificance of muskets compared to navy guns, of railway trains compared to battleships, etc.,—an insignificance far from being neutralized by the greater number of the units, for one 14-inch shell has an energy equal to that of about 60,000

muskets, and no army contains anything approximating the powerfulness of a battleship.

Not only, however, must the strategist make plans in peace for preparations that culminate in mobilization, and simply ensure that the navy shall be ready in material and personnel when war breaks; he must also make plans for operating the navy strategically afterwards, along each of the various lines of direction that the war may take. In other words, the work of preparation strategy in making war plans may be divided into two parts — mobilization and operation.

The plans of mobilization deal naturally with all the activities concerned, material and personnel, and endeavor to arrange a passing from a state of peace to a state of war in the quickest possible time, and with the least chance of errors and omissions. A considerable degree of imagination is required, an almost infinite patience, and a perfect willingness to work indefinitely without any reasonable expectation of getting tangible results. A more hopeless task can hardly be given any man or body of men than that of working out plans, general and detailed, day after day, for contingences that will probably never happen, and to guard against dangers that will probably never come; preparing tables, diagrams and schedules, which are almost certainly doomed to rest forever in the sepulcher of the confidential files.

Yet this work is basic. Perhaps it is for that reason that it is obscure and dull; basic work is apt to be so. The spectacular success of an individual in any walk of life is often but the crowning of the unrecognized, and often utterly unknown work—of other men.

Strategy is not science only; it is an art as well; and although the art cannot be practiced in its perfection until after the science is well comprehended, yet the art of strategy was born before the science was. This is true of all those departments of man's activity that are divided into sciences and arts, such as music, surgery, government, navigation, gunnery, painting, sculpture, and the rest; because the fundamental facts—say of music—cannot even attract attention until some music has been produced by the art of some musician, crude though that art may be; and the art cannot advance very far until scientific methods have been applied, and the principles that

govern the production of good music have been found. The unskilled navigators of the distant past pushed their frail craft only short distances from land, guided by art and not by science; for no science of navigation then existed. But the knowledge gradually gained, passing first from adept to pupil by word of mouth, and afterwards recorded on the written and then the printed page, resulted first in the realization of the fact that various apparently unrelated phenomena were based on the same underlying principles; and resulted later in the perception, and still later the definite expression, of those underlying principles. Using these principles, the navigator expanded the limits of his art. Soon we see Columbus, superbly bold, crossing the unknown ocean; and Magellan piercing the southern tip of the American continent by the straits that now bear his name.

But of all the arts and sciences, the art and science that are the oldest and the most important; that have caused the greatest expenditure of labor, blood and money; that have been the immediate instruments of more changes and greater changes in the history of the world than any other, are the art and the science of strategy.

Until the time of Moltke the art of strategy, like most arts, was more in evidence than the science. In fact, science of any kind is a comparatively recent product, due largely to the more exact operations of the mind brought about by the birth of the science of measurement, and the ensuing birth and development of the mechanic arts. Before Moltke's time campaigns were won by wise preparation and skillful execution, as they are now; but the strategical skill was acquired by a general or admiral almost wholly by his own exertions in war, and by studying the campaigns of the great commanders, and reflecting upon them with an intensity that so embedded their lessons in his subjective mind that they became a part of him, and actions in conformity with those lessons became afterwards almost automatic. Alexander and Napoleon are perhaps the best illustrations of this passionate grasping of military principles; for though both had been educated from childhood in military matters, the science of strategy was almost non-existent in concrete form, and both men were far too young to have been able to devote much time or labor to it. But each was a genius of the highest type, and reached decisions at once immediate and wise, not by inspiration, but by mental efforts of a pertinacity and concentratedness impossible to ordinary men.

It was because von Moltke realized this, realized the folly of depending on ability to get geniuses on demand, and realized further the value of ascertaining the principles of strategy, and then expressing them so clearly that ordinary men could grasp and use them, that he conceived and carried into execution his plan; whereby not only actual battles could be analyzed, and the causes of victory and defeat in each battle laid bare to students, but also hypothetical wars and battles could be fought by means of problems given.

The first result of a course of study of such wars and battles, and practice with such problems, was a skill in decision a little like that developed in any competitive game, say tennis, whist, chess, poker, boxing, and the like — whereby any action of your adversary brings an instantaneous and almost automatic reply from you, that you could not have made so skilfully and quickly before you had practice at the game; and yet the exact move of your adversary, under the same conditions, you had never seen before. Of course, this skill was a development, not of the science, but of the art, as mere skill always is; but as skill developed, the best methods for obtaining skill were noted; and the principles governing the attainment of success gradually unveiled themselves, and were formulated into a science.

Naturally, strategy is not an exact science like mathematics, physics or engineering — at least not now. it ever will be cannot be foretold. The reason that strategy (like medicine and most other sciences concerning human beings) is not an exact science is simply because it involves too many unknown quantities -- quantities of which our knowledge is too vague to permit of our applying exact methods to them, in the way in which we apply exact methods to the comparatively well-known quantities and elements in the so-called "exact sciences." But a science may be a science even if it is not an exact science; we may know certain important principles sufficiently well to use them scientifically, even if we do not know them with sufficient exactness to permit us to use them as confidently as we should like. We may know, for instance, that it is folly to divide a military force in the presence of an active

enemy into such small forces, and at such distances apart, as to let the enemy defeat each small force, one after the other, even if we do not know exactly how far it would be safe to separate two forces of a given size, in the presence of an enemy of a given power. It is well to know a fact in general terms, even if we do not know it in precise terms; it is well to know in general terms that we must not take prussic acid, even if we do not know exactly how much is needed to kill.

So the studies and problems instituted by von Moltke, and copied in all the armies and navies of the world, have brought about a science of strategy which is real, even though not exact, and which dwells in the mind of each trained strategist, as the high tribunal to which all his questions are referred and by whose decisions he is guided; just as the principles of medicine are the guide alike of the humblest and the most illustrious practitioner, wherever the beneficent art of medicine is practiced.

It is clear that, in order to be skillful in strategy (in fact, in any intellectual art), not only must a man have its scientific principles firmly imprinted on his mind, but he must make its practice so thoroughly familiar to his mental muscles that he can use strategy as a trained soldier uses his musket - automatically. Inasmuch as any man requires years of study and practice — say, of chess — in order to play chess well enough to compete successfully with professional chess players, it seems to follow that any man must require years of study and practice of the more complicated game of strategy, in order to play strategy well enough to compete successfully with professional strategists. The game of chess looks easy to a beginner; in fact, the kind of game that he thinks chess to be is easy. But after he has learned the moves, he finds the intricacies of the game developing more rapidly than he can master them, and discovers that chess is a game which some men spend their lifetime studying. The full realization of this fact, however, does not come to him until after defeats by better players have forced into his consciousness the almost infinite number of combinations possible, the difficulty of deciding on the correct move at any juncture, and the consequences that follow after wrong moves.

So with strategy. The ease and certainty with which orders can be transmitted and received, the precision with which large forces can be quickly dispatched from place to place, and the tremendous power exertable by those forces, tend to blind the mind to the fact that transferring any force to any place is merely making a "move," and that the other player can make moves, too. If a man were never to be pitted in strategy against another player, either in games or in actual war, the "infinite variety" of strategy would never be disclosed to his intelligence; and after learning how to make the moves, he might feel willing to tackle anyone. Illustrations of this tendency by people of great self-confidence are numerous in history, and have not been missing even in the present war, though none have been reported in this country as occurring on the Teuton side. There has always been a tendency on the part of a ruling class to seize opportunities for military glory, and the ambition has often been disproportioned to the accompanying ability and knowledge - sometimes on the part of a king, prince, or man of high nobility, sometimes on the part of a minister, sometimes on the part of an army or navy man, who has been indebted to political or social influence for his place. But within the past fifty years, especially since the establishment of the general staff in Prussia and the studies of von Moltke, the overshadowing importance of strategy has been understood, the necessity of comprehending its principles and practicing its technique has been appreciated, and attempts to practice strategy by persons inexpert in strategy have been deprecated.

The game of strategy, while resembling in many ways the game of chess, differs from it, of course, in the obvious element of personal danger. It also differs from it in an equally important but less obvious way—its relation to the instruments employed; for in chess those instruments (pieces) are of a number and character fixed by the rules of the game; whereas in strategy the number and character of the instruments (ships, etc.) employed are determined by strategy itself, assisted by engineering. Germany realizes this, and therefore has established and followed a system whereby the character of the various material and personnel units of the navy, and even the num-

ber of them (under restriction of the money allotted), are decided by a body of men who are highly trained in strategy and engineering.

There is an intimate connection between policy and strategy, and therefore between naval policy and naval strategy; and while it is difficult to draw the line exactly which separates policy and strategy, it may be said in general that policy is the concern of the government, and strategy is the concern of the navy and army, to be employed by them to carry out the policy.

As naval policy and naval strategy are so intimately connected in their essence, it is apparent that the naval policy of a country and its naval strategy should be intimately connected in fact; for the policy cannot be properly carried out if the strategy that tries to execute it is not good, or if the policy requires more naval force or skill than the navy can bring to bear; and the strategy cannot be good if it is called upon to execute a policy impossible to execute, or if the exact end in view of the policy is not distinctly known. Some of the greatest mistakes that have been made by governments have been made because of a lack of coordination between the government and its navy, so that the policy and the strategy could not work together. We see an illustration of this throughout the history of France, whose civil and naval authorities have not worked harmoniously together, whose naval strategy has apparently been opportunistic and short-sighted, and whose navy in consequence has not been so successful as the large sums of money spent upon it might lead one to expect.

Across the English Channel we see a totally different state of things. In Great Britain the development of the navy has been going on for more than 1,200 years, ever since King Offa declared that "he who would be secure at home must be supreme at sea." For about 800 years thereafter the development was carried on energetically, but in an opportunistic fashion, following the requirements of the hour. In 1632, however, the Board of Admiralty was established; and with occasional interruptions, especially prior to 1708, the board has continued in existence ever since. A coherent policy of development has thereby been assured, and a wisdom of strategy established which more than any other single factor has made Great Britain the mistress of the seas, and almost the mistress of the world.

The wisdom of her strategy has been due largely to the fact of the close touch maintained between the civil government, including Parliament, and the navy; for by its very constitution the Board of Admiralty includes some of the highest officers of Parliament, the Cabinet and the navy. Its presiding officer is a member of the Cabinet and also member of Parliament; four of the officers are naval officers, high in rank, character and attainments: and the Junior Civil Lord is a civilian versed in naval matters. All the orders for great movements of the fleets and ships are directed by this board and signed by its secretary, the board, by a fiction of the law, being considered an individual replacing the Lord High Admiral, which it did, in 1632. board is supposed to meet every day with all the members present, the vote of each member carrying as much weight as that of any other member. Naturally, the First Lord of the Admiralty being a Cabinet officer and a member of Parliament, has a far greater influence on broad questions than any other member; and the First Sea Lord being the person of the most experience in naval matters, has the most weight on strictly naval questions. Theoretically, however, neither of these gentlemen can carry a measure opposed to the others; and any member, even a junior, has equal opportunity with the others to bring up and discuss any question and to attempt to get its passage by the full board; but in 1869 the First Lord at that time, Mr. Childers, brought about a change whereby the First Lord was made personally responsible to the government. This vastly increased the power of the First Lord, relatively to the others.

Two other navies, the German and the Japanese, which with the British, are the most efficient navies in the world, have systems somewhat different from the British. In Germany and Japan the Emperor is the head of the navy, and there is no civilian between him and it. In Germany there is no Minister of Marine, unless the Emperor himself may be said to be the Minister, which he practically is; and the navy is divided into three parts, each under an admiral. The three parts are the general staff, which deals with war plans and fundamental questions; the naval cabinet, which deals with matters of personnel; and the administrative section, which has to do with questions of material, including money, and the getting of money from Parliament. In Japan the Minister of Marine is by law a naval

officer, and under him is a Chief of Staff, also a naval officer. The Minister of Marine has the direction of the navy as a whole, but the ideas of the Chief of Staff are supposed to be carried out in matters that are strictly naval. The Japanese naval officer has a higher regard for the office of Chief of Staff than for that of Minister of Marine, because it is given for professional excellence only.

It might seem at first sight that in Germany and Japan there would be danger of lack of coordination between the civil and the naval authorities, and a tendency for the navy to become unduly self-assertive. Of course, one reason why there is no such danger is that the governments of those countries are controlled by men who, though civilians, have great knowledge of international affairs, and of military and naval subjects; another reason is that the navy is so vital a matter, accurate knowledge about it is so general, and interest in it so widespread and intense, that there is no great gulf fixed between naval people and civilians. Still another reason is the fact that in each country the Emperor is trained in military and naval duties as well as in civil duties, and therefore can effect in his own person the coordination of the civil and the naval authority: that is, of policy and strategy.

Such automatic and complete coordination is desirable not only in preventing the unnatural barrier between the civil and the military authority which exists in some countries such as ours, but in lightening the labors and enlightening the deliberations of the strategists. If for instance, a bold policy is to be enforced, and a large sum of money allotted for material and personnel, the strategists will be led to recommendations different from those to which they would be led if a cautious policy were to be pursued, and a small sum of money to be allotted.

Germany did not turn her eyes seriously towards the navy until the Emperor William II read Mahan's book, "The Influence of Sea Power Upon History." Previous to that epochal event, Germany had relied on her army to protect her interests and enforce her rights, being led thereto by the facts of her history and the shortness of her coast line. But the strategically trained mind of William grasped at once the situation laid bare by Mahan; and his military training led him to quick decision and prompt action. The necessary machinery was soon set in

motion, with the amazing result that in twenty years the German Navy became the second in power and perhaps the first in efficiency in the world.

Was this feat accomplished by prodigal expenditures in building vessels and other material of all kinds, and enlisting and commissioning a large number of officers and men? No, the expense was less than that of building our navy, even if a liberal allowance be made for the relative cheapness of things in Germany; and the mere enlisting and commissioning of officers and men was the simplest part of the undertaking.

How was it accomplished? In the simplest way imaginable: by following Moltke's plan of solving hypothetical war problems, and adapting the military war game (kriegspiel) to naval forces; playing numberless war games, and deciding from those games the naval strategy best adapted to Germany's needs — not only in matters of general principle, not only as to tactics, training, education, cooperation with the army, and the size of the fleet required to carry out the policy of the nation — but also as to the composition of the fleet, relative proportions of vessels of the various types, and the characteristics of each type. Nothing was left to chance; nothing was decided by guessing; no one man's dictum was accepted. The whole problem was attacked in its entirety, and a general solution found; and after this, the various divisions and subdivisions of the problem were attacked and solved, in obedience to the same principles, in accordance with the results obtained at kriegspiel.

If a very large and complicated engine of new pattern is to be built by any engineering company, no casting of the smallest kind is made until general plans have been outlined, detailed plans prepared from these, and then "working plans" made for the workmen. From the working plans, the workmen construct the various parts; sometimes in number several hundred. Finally, the whole intricate machine is put together, and the motive power applied. Then all the parts, great and small, begin their allotted tasks, each part perfectly adapted to its work, not too large and not too small; all working together in apparent confusion, but in obedience to law—fulfilling exactly the will of the designing engineer. So, the vast and new machine of the German Navy was designed in the drafting room of the kriegspiel; and though it has been gradually strengthened

and enlarged since then, each strengthening piece and each addition has been designed in accordance with the original plan, and has therefore harmonized with the original machine. Thus the navy has expanded smoothly, symmetrically, purposefully. No other result was to be expected: the strategy having been correct, the result was correct also.

Perhaps one contributing factor to the success of the German Navy has been her staff of officers highly trained in strategy by kriegspiel, that ensures not only sound advice in general, but also ensures that any time, night or day, a body of competent officers shall be ready at the Admiralty to decide what action should be taken, whenever any new situation is reported. This factor is most important; because in naval and military operations, even in time of peace, but especially in war, events follow each other so rapidly, and momentous crises develop so suddenly. that the demand for action that shall be both wise and instantaneous, is imperative. The chess player can linger long over his decisions, because his opponent cannot make his next move meanwhile; but in warfare no such rule or condition can exist. war, time is as vital a factor as any other: and the strategist, who, like Napoleon, can think faster, and decide more quickly and accurately than his antagonist is, ceteris paribus, sure to win; and even if ceteris are not quite paribus, his superior quickness and correctness will overcome great handicaps in material and personnel; as the lives of all the great strategists in history, especially Alexander and Napoleon, prove convincingly. bring a preponderating force to bear at a given point ahead of the enemy - to move the maximum of force with the maximum of celerity - has always been the aim of strategy: and probably it always will be, for the science of strategy rests on principles, and principles never change.

Thus while we see in Great Britain's Navy an example of the effect of a strategy continuous and wise, conducted for three hundred years, we see in the Japanese and German Navies equally good examples of a strategy equally wise, but of brief duration, which started with the example of the British Navy, and took advantage of it.

The German and Japanese Navies did not follow the British Navy slavishly, however; for the national military character of their people required the introduction and control of more military and precise methods than those of the primarily sailor navy of Great Britain. We see, therefore, a curious similarity between the German and Japanese Navies, and very clear evidence in each of the engrafting of purely military ideas on maritime ideas. And we see not only this, we see the reaction on the British Navy itself of the ideals of the German and the Japanese, and a decided change during the last ten years from the principles of "the blue water school;" as evidenced mainly by the instituiton of a Naval War College, including a War Staff, the employment at the Admiralty of general staff methods, though without the name; and the introduction into naval methods, especially naval gunnery, of mathematical procedures.

Previous to the Japanese-Russian War, ten years ago, the strategy of the British Navy may be characterized as physical rather than mental, depending on a superior number of ships and men; those ships and men being of a very high grade individually, and bound together by a discipline at once strict and sympathetic. All the personnel from the highest admiral to the humblest sailor prided themselves on being "British seamen," comrades of the sea, on whom their country placed her ultimate reliance. Maneuvers on a large scale were held, target practice was carried on with regularity - and navy ships carried the banner of St. George over every sea, and displayed it in every port. Tactics and seamanship filled the busy days with drills of many kinds; but strategy, though not quite forgotten, did not command so large a portion of the officers' time and study, as it did in Germany and Japan. The rapid success of the Germans and Japanese, however, in building up their navies, as instanced by the evident efficiency of the German fleet almost under the nose of England, and the triumph of the Japanese fleet in Tsushima Strait startled the British Navy out of her conservatism, and caused her to proceed at full speed towards the modernization of her strategy. With the quick decision followed by quick action, that characterizes the seaman everywhere, the British instituted a series of reforms, and prosecuted their efforts with such wisdom and such vigor, that, in the brief space of ten years, the British Navy has been almost revolutionized. As in all such movements, the principal delay was in bringing about the necessary mental changes; the mental changes having been accomplished, the material changes followed automatically. The change whereby the German and Japanese Navies became preceptors to their preceptor is like changes that occur in every-day life, and is one of many illustrations of how a young and vigorous individual or organization, endowed with proper energy and mentality, can appropriate whatever is valuable for its purposes from its elders, and reject whatever those elders have had fastened on them by circumstances or tradition; and develop a superior existence. It is a little like the advantage which a comparatively new city like Washington has over an old city like Boston, in being started after it was planned, instead of being started haphazard, without being planned at all.

The United States Navy was started not like the city of Washington, but like the city of Boston. It was modeled on the British Navy; but since the United States has never taken an interest in its navy at all comparable with that taken by Great Britain in its navy, and since our navy has been built up by successive impulses from Congress and not in accordance with a basic plan, the lack of harmoniousness among its various parts reminds one of Boston rather than of Washington. Due to the engineering and inventive genius of our people and the information we got from Europe, inferiority has not occurred in the units of the material; in fact, in some ways our material is perhaps the best of all. Neither has inferiority been evidenced in the personnel, as individuals; for the excellent physique and the mental alertness of the American have shown themselves in the navy as well as in other walks of life.

In strategy, however, it must be admitted that we have little reason to be proud. We do very well in the elementary parts of the naval profession. In navigation, seamanship, gunnery, and that part of international law that concerns the navy we are as good as any. But of the higher branches, especially of strategy, we have little clear conception. How can we have? Strategy is one of the most complex arts the world contains; the masters in that art have borne such names as Alexander, Cæsar, Nelson and Napoleon. Naval strategy is naval chess, in which battleships and other craft take the place of queens and other pieces. But it is a more complicated game than chess, for the reason that not only are there more kinds of "pieces," but the element of time exerts a powerful influence in strategy while it does not even exist in chess. The time element has the effect

not only of complicating every situation, but also of compelling intense concentration of mind, in order to make decisions quickly; and often it forces decisions without adequate time for consideration, under circumstances of the utmost excitement, discomfort and personal peril.

One dislikes intensely to criticize one's own country, even to But when a naval officer is studying — as he should continually do - what must be done, in order to protect his country from attack by some foreign foe, it would be criminal folly for him to estimate the situation otherwise than honestly: and to do this, it is necessary to try to see where his country is weak and where strong, relatively to the possible foes in question. If we do this, and compare the strategical methods employed by - say Germany and us, we are forced to admit the German methods are better adapted to producing economically a navy fitted to contend successfully in war against an enemy. Germany the development of the navy has been strictly along the lines of a method carefully devised beforehand: in our country no method whatever is apparent; at least no logical method. Congress, and Congress alone, decides what vessels and other craft shall be built, how many officers and men shall wear the uniform. It is true that they consult the report of the Secretary of the Navy, and ask the opinions of some naval officers: and it is true that the Secretary of Navy gets the opinions of certain naval officers including the General Board, before making his report. But both the Secretary and Congress estimate the situation from their own points of view, and place their own value on the advice of naval officers. And the advice of these naval officers is not so valuable, possibly, as it might be; for the reason that it is really irresponsible, since the advisers themselves know that it will not be taken very seriously. The difference between the advice of men held responsible for the results of following their advice, and the advice of men not so held responsible, is well-recognized, and is discussed fully in the reports of the Moody and the Swift Boards on the organization of the Navy Department. Furthermore, our officers do not have the machinery of the kriegspiel to help them. It is true that at the Naval War College, a war game apparatus is installed and that war games are played, and war problems are solved; but the officers there are very properly engaged in the regular work of a

War College, in educating officers in the principles of warfare, and have little time for other work. It is also true that the war games and problems there do lead occasionally to recommendations by the War College to the General Board as to various matters; but the connection between the conclusions of the War College and the decisions of Congress via the General Board and the Secretary of the Navy is so fragile and discontinuous that it may truthfully be said that the influence of the war games at our War College has but a faint resemblance to the determining force of the *Kriegspiel* in Berlin.

THE FIRST STEPS IN NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS

HERBERT L. SATTERLEE

The fact that we Americans refer to our government as "the Ship of State" is some slight evidence that once we were a maritime nation. The ideals of a people unconsciously find expression in the synonyms which they use. Our "Ship of State" carries aloft the flag of the Republic and is laden not only with the future of our country but with the fate of the principles of democracy - indeed a priceless cargo. We have been sailing along for years over pleasant seas. Favoring winds have filled our sails and the times of storm and disaster have been forgotten. Our people have come to believe that although tempests might try the skill and courage of other mariners, our course lay only over calm waters and there was no need to any longer provide heavy rigging and stout canvas, nor to practice that part of seamanship which teaches the handling of vessels when they are battered by merciless gales and threatened by engulfing seas. When the Navy League, throughout the past fifteen years of its existence, has continually reminded people of the need of a thorough overhauling and of providing against emergency, they would turn from their occupations only long enough to say: "There is not a cloud in the sky - from which direction would a storm come? Until you can tell us from what particular quarter we may expect a gale, and with what force it will blow, why should we be alarmed or pay attention to your warnings?" Our answer has been that the force and direction of the storm which might arise made no difference, but that our plain duty was to keep our ship in such condition and trim that it could meet any storm from any quarter - that it was our duty to be prepared.

In August, 1914, the lightning flashed in far-distant Austria and the storm broke. Since then most of the civilized nations of the earth have been drawn into its cyclonic vortex and we may not be able to steer clear of its destructive influence.

The time has passed when any rational thinking man can deny the immediate necessity of proper preparedness if we would fulfill the destinies confided to us by our forefathers and our duties to our children. Our people have awakened to the

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sense of our insecurity and are ready for a program of preparedness. The question is, what shall be the first step in that program?

In the person of the President, we have the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy and he is also the most potent influence in forming and promoting the foreign policies of the country. The Secretary of State is at the head of that great department which represents the government in its international relations and the Secretaries of War and the Navy are the executive officers of the military branch of the government, on land and sea, respectively. All these are executive. On the legislative or representative side, the Senate committees on "Foreign Relations," "Military Affairs" and "Naval Affairs," and the House committees having similar titles, investigate, consider and report upon matters within the same fields as those executive departments just mentioned. Committees of the Senate. other than those named, notably the committees on "Coast Defense," "Cuban Relations," "Finance," "Fisheries," "Immigration," "Inter-Oceanic Canals," "Interstate Commerce," "Pacific Islands" and "Porto Rico and the Philipines"; and other committees of the House of Representatives; for instance, those on "Appropriations," "Immigration," "Naturalization," "Insular Affairs." "Interstate and Foreign Commerce," "Merchant Marine and Fisheries," "Railways and Canals," and "Ways and Means," have jurisdiction not only of the raising of revenues and the disbursements of the government moneys, but of matters which effect our national policies and our commercial and economic affairs. The machinery has been provided for the careful consideration of all the different interests, conditions and circumstances that become factors in the sphere of national activity which is under discussion. The executive department of the government, except in such a rare instance as the present administration, reflects the opinion of a majority of the voters of the United Staes. The legislaive branch is composed of men who fairly represent the wishes of their constituents. The great majority of these men are earnest in their endeavor to fulfill their public obligations, and many of them, through long service, have become expert in the affairs of government and are very competent legislators.

Why, then, it may be asked, is there a spirit of unrest and dissatisfaction throughout the land? It is, in the first place, because the present administration and a great number of the present members of the Congress were elected to office under different conditions and when the problems which now confront us were not so apparent. The great issues of the day were not the issues of the last political campaign. The people of the country are seeing the edifice of international law crumble in the flames of war and are aroused to our own danger.

In the second place, it has become evident that the parts of the machinery of the government to which reference has been made, are not co-ordinated. No means has been adopted for the formulation of any general plan or the following out logically and systematically of any national policy or national strategy. The first step in preparedness must be the bringing together of these different Government agencies in some form. In all well regulated business establishments there is some board of or council in which the representatives of the purchasing, selling and industrial departments are in close touch so that each one may be familiar with the needs of the others and with the amount of assistance that he can demand from the others in order to carry out the policies which the intelligence and experience of all of them together have formulated. Also in the varied activities of business, sound legal advice must be relied upon, and in our government this is furnished by the Attorney General's department.

The idea of such a board or council is no new invention. It has been proposed from time to time by men who realized its necessity from many varied angles of observation. Almost every one of the patriotic societies or leagues has recommended it in some shape and it has appeared in political platforms. Of all the elements of preparedness, however, it seems to be that one for which there is the most immediate necessity. The part which our nation is to play in the world in defending its own interests, in protecting nations which are weaker and in preserving peace, the strategic importance of commercial enterprise and economic industrial development, the mobilization of engineering talent and transportation facilities, the resources of the country in men and money, the relations of all this to the other necessary demands upon the public purse must all be considered as a whole, and whatever legislation may be enacted must stand the

test of constitutionality. This can only be accomplished by the enactment of a law which will provide for the formation of a National Defense Board, by whatever name it may be called.

Some of the official members of such a board would necessarily be of such high rank that no one but the President, and in his absence the members of his Cabinet which belong to it, in the order of their succession, should preside over its deliberations. No Cabinet could take the place of it, because the legislative branch is not represented in Cabinet meetings and the Cabinet most usually represents only the political faith of the Presi-No "joint-committee" of the Senate and House of Representatives would serve as well, because the members of the Congress are often elected on different political issues from the President, and his point of view might not be given consideration. At the same time, although differences between the Senate and the House can at present be reconciled or compromised in "conference committee," the policies of the administration can only form a factor in the result through the advisory quality of the President's messages through his personal political influence or the negative force of his veto power.

Every consideration of this problem results in only one answer. Under the President, the Board should consist of the Secretaries of State. War and Navy (or an Assistant Secretary delegated by each of them), the Attorney General or one of his staff versed in international law and the preparation of bills, and the Chairmen of those committees of the Senate and House of Representatives which may be determined to have jurisdiction of affairs which are germane to national defense and the raising of revenues to carry out whatever may be passed to that end. Added to these officials, for technical reasons, and designated by the Secretary of War, should be the Chief-of-Staff of the Army and the President of the Army War College, and designated by the Secretary of the Navy an officer not below the rank of Rear Admiral who has commanded a fleet, and the President of the Naval War College. It would seem to be best also to add a certain number of civilians, preeminent in their respective lines of endeavor, and representing the different groups of men who work with their hands and with their brains, so as to make it reasonably certain that the best thought would be obtained on any phase of the subject under discussion. There are women who have, by quiet and earnest work, educated themselves to perform their part in the defense of their country who might be added to such a representative body with advantage to the public interest.

The Congress alone can provide such legislation and there is time during the present session to enact it. There are men in the Capitol who are more competent to prepare an appropriate bill for this purpose than anyone outside of it and they know better than anyone else what can and what can not be passed and sent to the White House for the President's signature with the probability that it will be approved. Most of the critics of Congress do not realize the practical difficulties of the legislators and their patience is shorter than the labors of those who are responsible for that branch of governmental activity.

The President has declared himself in favor of preparedness. The measure proposed is not open to the criticism that it is militaristic, because the great majority of such a board would be civilians and its whole purpose would be to devise measures for the upholding of national honor, the maintenance of national policy and the reasonable and sane formulation of plans for national action. Such a board as is proposed would contain among its members the leaders on the floor of both houses of the Congress and it may be assumed that they would not participate in advising the introduction of bills which would suffer the fate of most bills introduced "by request" or at the instance of any one outside of the Capitol and be referred to a committee, never to be heard of again.

It may be said that such a board would be unwieldly on account of its size, but it need not be so. It could be divided into sub-committees, each of which would have jurisdiction of certain topics. Moreover, an Executive Committee of the Board could receive and consider the reports of sub-committees and prepare the program of matters to be submitted to the full Board, which need only meet regularly three or four times a year and, of course, could be convened whenever the President might call upon it in an emergency. The Act of Congress creating it should give it power to summon witnesses, to appoint and remove employees, and fix a punishment for divulging its confidental business or military secrets. Important members of the Board would be representatives of the Army and Navy Reserves, the National Guard and the Naval Militia,

The Board would be advisory to all the Executive Departments and Congressional Committies interested in national defense and would recommend the legislation to carry out its plans and general lines of policy to be followed. It would be a continuing body, surviving administrations, outliving sessions of the Congress, maintaining those doctrines which protect and develop our national life.

The officers of the Navy League have adopted the wise policy of avoiding too much detail in the advocacy of the steps to be taken in preparedness and have urged that details be left to experts. It may be that the function of such a board as is suggested would be to formulate and procure the enactment of legislation that would establish a permanent, more concrete body, with fuller powers perhaps, which would supplant it. Certainly no practical, workable plan could be devised and enacted without the support of the various authorities and committees that have been mentioned. If experts on this subject are not to be found among them, then none exist. The President can recommend this first step to the Congress in a special message and it can save six months of precious time in this crisis. For it can not be denied that the combination of a lack of fixed policies concerning questions that vex us and threaten our peace, together with our lack of preparedness to maintain our rights, constitute one of the greatest crises that has ever confronted our nation.

Can anyone explain why these most serious matters should not receive attention from those in authority and be left, otherwise, for inevitable reference to the polls? In other words, that they may be left for settlement to the fate of political contest and not to scientifically accurate, calm and wise determination. If referred to the voters, there is no doubt at all about how they will decide this matter and it will be an overwhelming surprise to these men in public life who have not held and maintained definite conceptions of policy and consistent ideas about preparedness since August 1, 1914, at least, if not since the Spanish-American War, which gave us ample warning.

It would seem wise and reasonable for the Navy League in its Convention to adopt the proposition of a Board of National Defense as above outlined, as the first step in preparedness, and if it shall do that and follow it up earnestly and actively, striving to educate the people at large concerning the necessity and

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advantage of such a measure, it will have fulfilled an important part of its purpose. It can then feel it has done much towards outfitting our "Ship of State," not for any particular voyage or against a storm from any particular quarter, but so that it may continue to sail on under competent guidance, with a reliable chart and, to use the language of the sea, "fully found," below and aloft.





DR. EDMUND JANES JAMES
President of the University of Illinois

OUR NAVAL POLICY

EDMUND JANES JAMES
President of the University of Illinois

When your Committee invited me to deliver an address at this Eleventh Annual Convention of the Navy League of the United States, they certainly did not do it because of any evidence they had in their possession that I was an expert in ships or shipping — mercantile or naval. I have lived most of my life nearly a thousand miles from the nearest seaport, and have had little opportunity to learn to row a boat, let alone to sail one. Although I have had to cross the Atlantic several times in the course of my business and professional career, I am still so reluctant to "go down to the sea in ships" that I always try to find some way of going by land if is at all possible — no matter how long the way around may be.

And although my son, who is an officer in the navy, has tried long and hard to introduce me to the distinctions and mysteries of submarines, torpedo boats, torpedo boat destroyers, cruisers, dreadnoughts, near-dreadnoughts, sub-dreadnoughts, super-dreadnoughts, etc., etc., he has had but indifferent success; and I am still an incorrigible land-lubber to whom the very thought of the sea occassions rising emotions of the most violent kind; who always declines to read sea poems on account of their pathological effect; and gets seasick on the ferry boats of New York and Boston.

My attention, therefore, has been drawn to this subject not through any love or knowledge of the sea or sea life, but from a study of the place and function of the armed force of a nation in its life and prosperity. My discussion, therefore, of the naval policy of the United States on this occasion will not concern itself primarily with the question of how many ships or of what calibre, size, or armament the United States Navy should consist; for on this topic I have no intelligent opinion, and must depend in the first instance upon the advice of the expert.

I prefer to discuss the question — which, after all, is the fundamental one to the average American citizen — why should we have a navy at all, and if we were going to have one, why should it be efficient and strong?

I find that the average American citizen living away from the seaboard is not much interested in the building up of a navy for several reasons:

- 1. He knows little or nothing about it. He does not realize its function in the scheme of national defense. This Association may do much to dispel this ignorance. He distrusts the secrecy which the Department seems to find necessary for much of its business.
- 2. He distrusts the navy because, in his opinion, it is far more likely to embroil us in war than to prevent war or to defend us in case we are at war. As a friend of mine expressed it—"One damn-fool captain can get us into more trouble than ten able admirals can extricate us from." We cannot, he thinks, get an efficient navy anyhow, such as we must have if we are to be a naval power; and an inefficient navy can only get us into trouble.
- 3. He distrusts navy graft in location, equipment of navy yards and dry docks, etc. He knows he does not understand the secrets of navy power; he is afraid that those who do are working him.
- 4. He is at the bottom, as we all are in sentiment, a pacifist. A strong navy appeals to him as a sign of a jingo policy with which he wishes to have nothing to do. It signifies that we want to reach out and grab as much of the earth's surface as possible, like France and England and Germany. And he will none of it. He thinks our country is already ample, if indeed it be not too large for efficiency.
- 5. He is at bottom a real idealist and believes in peace as the condition of progress, and looks upon war as an obstacle to advance. He not only agrees that War is Hell; he knows it is wicked and inconsistent with the principles of the Christian religion, which he professes and tries to live up to.

I believe that this last feeling has more to do with opposition to increased armament than any other one force, and this does high honor to the mind and heart of the average American eitizen—the common man who makes up the real nucleus of our people.

My first proposition is that the wise naval policy of the United States must depend on our domestic and foreign policy

— in the last analysis, on the economic, social, commercial, and industrial policy of the United States. And this is a point, which we must drive home upon the average American citizen, in season and out of season, if we hope to convert him to what we consider the proper naval policy for the United States to pursue.

Now, if the American people wish to limit the production of their farms, mines, forests, and factories to the domestic demand:

If they wish to curtail or destroy foreign commerce and live absolutely within themselves, as China and Japan did for centuries, down to within a recent period;

Or if, permitting some foreign commerce, they will be content with having it carried on in foreign bottoms, with the possibility that in case of war, as at present, they will have to pay exorbitant rates of transportation or get no transportation at all;

If they wish to open our coast trade to foreign nations and yield in advance all cases in which disputes arise between foreigners and Americans;

Or if, having decided to build up a merchant marine by subsidies or government ownership they will be content to give up trade with neutrals in case of war, to leave the sea when ordered to do so, to submit to having their ships seized and taken into belligerent ports to be searched, to submit to having belligerent powers take off passengers from their ships en route to neutral ports — all this by nations whose interest it is to hamper or destroy American commerce, — and if they are willing to order their citizens to stay at home in case other nations go to war and make the sea uncertain by paper blockades and orders in council and declarations of war zones;

If they are willing to cease all commercial relations with belligerent powers when war breaks out and stop shipping to neutrals who ship to belligerents;

If they are willing to give up the Monroe Doctrine and permit any European or Asiatic power to consider any part of the Western Hemisphere which it may be able to purchase or seize as a proper subject of colonization and thus see one after another of the great European and Asiatic powers plant its fortresses within easy reach of our American coast line;

If they are willing to see foreign powers seize outlying portions of American territory, like Porto Rico, the Philippines, Hawaii, Alaska, and plant their standards upon them;

If they are willing that, in any and all international disputes on any and all international questions, the United States shall give way and sacrifice its claims to those of some other power;

If they are willing to say to all citizens of the United States, "You leave the territory of the United States at your own risk; if you go upon the sea or into other countries the American Republic will not undertake to extend to you the slightest protection;"

If you are willing that the United States shall give up all authority as to who may be admitted to the country and to American citizenship;

If they are willing to permit our domestic policy on the tariff, on the labor question, on the railway problems, to be determined by the influence of foreign nations;

In short, if they are willing that the American people shall continue to live, move and have their being only on the sufferance of other nations, European and Asiatic;

In a word, if we are willing to conduct ourselves as a nation of thoroughgoing poltroons and cowards, then our naval policy is very simple — we need no navy, large or small, strong or weak, efficient or inefficient.

Now, strange as it may seem, we have many able and patriotic American citizens who take this view. On other matters we should have to concede that they are sensible, hardworking, idealistic, successful, American citizens; and if we are to convert them from the error of their ways, we must advance arguments and not indulge in abuse, even if they set us an example sometimes of furnishing no arguments and of indulging in unlimited Billingsgate.

Our distinguished ex-Secretary of State, Mr. Bryan, and our fellow-citizen equally distinguished in another field, Mr. Ford, hold the view, if I understand them, that we should not increase either the army or the navy; and in this they are followed by many members of Congress and other good people.

Those of us who hold a different view must not underrate the influence of these gentlemen and their like. Neither of them is either a traitor or a coward — on the contrary, they are both gentlemen of distinguished courage and unquestioned patriotism. They cannot be laughed out of court. They voice a deep and widespread feeling in the hearts of the rank and file of the American people — a feeling which is and must continue to be one of the mainsprings of our hope of progress and civilization, a feeling which is born of the spirit and hope and outlook of the prophet — a feeling that some time or other international peace must come; that the era of good will to man, of a theoretical and practical belief in the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man is now at hand.

I think their views are full of danger to the American people; their cry of "Peace, Peace!" when there is no peace—and no liklihood of being any in their sense of the term for a long time to come—is a distinct menace to the welfare of this great republic, and we cannot afford to follow their advice in this respect. But their arguments must be met by arguments, and their views be countered by other views if disaster is to be by the American people. One of the difficult elements in the situation is that we all sympathize so heartily with the hope and longing expressed in their views that we find it hard to apply the cold facts of logic and history and to vindicate for our intellects the control which our feelings and wishes would so gladly throw off.

Our pacifist friends defend their views on two general grounds: (a), that other people will not attack us unless we first attack them; (b), that even if they do attack us we should follow the scriptural injunction and not strike back.

In answer to the first statement — one can hardly call it an argument, viz.: that other nations will not attack us unless we attack them first — I may say that this is an excellent example of what I should call the lack of historic sense on the part of our pacifists. All human history gives the lie to such extravagant and baseless statements. The present great war in Europe is a most striking illustration.

We are greatly blessed that we can gather to-day anywhere within the limits of the Great Republic — except on the Mexican border — to discuss in a calm and dispassionate manner the question of peace and war. It is, however, due to our good fortune rather than to our foresight and wisdom that this is the case.

With no more fault in the matter than we, Greece has little time or opportunity to discuss these subjects. Belgium, still less; unhappy Poland, none at all.

If this had been war on the sea as it has been on the land; if Germany had been able to carry the fighting over the whole water surface of the globe in the same energetic way as she has waged war from Ostend to Constantinople, we should surely have been in the war by this time. It was England's overwhelming domination of the ocean and the consequent possibility of carrying on ocean-borne commerce under the protection of the Union Jack that made the conditions, however onerous for us, still at least tolerable. With anything like equal fighting power on the ocean between the Allies and the Central Powers, the United States would have been forced into the conflict — and forced, not by its strength, but its weakness.

The American people have been living in a fool's paradise. Our leaders have with few exceptions incurred the just blame of lulling the mass of the people into a false sense of security. The watchers on the walls of our Zion have played us an ill trick. It was not merely men like Mr. Bryan or Mr. Ford: it was our leading statesmen — including two Presidents of the United States — our most influential newspapers, our great financiers, our clergymen, our leading women.

No one who has kept in touch with what was going on in Europe for the last ten years could have any doubt that a world war was coming. Every sign pointed to it.

The German Army was ready, the English fleet was ready; neither nation expected to have to use the other arm. France was ready, as was shown by the masterly way in which, all but unaided, she stayed the mighty flood of German invasion. Russia was ready, as was shown by the almost resistless force with which the tide rolled in on Eastern Prussia. Austria was ready, as was shown on every front.

Now, we had been led to believe by our mentors that nobody would — nay, nobody could — attack us, and as we had no desire to attack anybody else, we felt secure in going about our business. We can see now that if it had not been for the great war we should probably have been forced either into war with Mexico or into an abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine.

As it was, we got into a most unhappy conflict with the

Mexican Government, from which we emerged with lessened prestige and a distinct lowering of influence in Mexico, and throughout the world, and incidentally had difficulty with Germany which might easily have proved serious. The President of the United States found it also necessary to reverse the declaration of his party platform and his own views in the matter of the Panama Canal tolls, in order to avoid difficulties with foreign governments which we were not in condition to meet except by abject surrender.

Now, in the midst of all this sort of thing, our leaders were still assuring us that the days of a great war were over; that no nation would ever want to fight again, because the world was growing peaceable; that no nation would ever dare to fight again, because of the horrible destruction of war; and that, at any rate, no nation could reach us to do us harm.

And then, suddenly, the great war broke out, and we saw that no nation was afraid to fight — nay, that some nations seemed to want to fight — attracted, not driven into the struggle, like moths by a candle's flame; that so far from being frightened by the horrible methods of destruction which had been devised in preparation for the war, nations vied with nations in inventing new and more terrible agents of destruction, and army after army rushed forward to be swept away in those withering blasts. Then suddenly we awoke to the fact that any one of these first-class nations which could gain command of the seas for a short time might deal us sickening blows before we could ward them off.

We became aware that these various nations were looking forward to levying great war contributions at the end of the war upon their vanquished enemies—contributions which should make everything else of the kind in human history pale into insignificance.

Some Germans talked of bleeding France white; some Englishmen boasted that German commerce would never recover from the burdens to be laid upon it by the Allies.

And then we also became aware that we had all at once become one of the most unpopular nations in the world. Contempt and hatred were felt in almost equal degrees for Uncle Sam, who, by his cowardly and greedy conduct, according to their view, called down the imprecation of the nations.

We also noted the fact that the rapidly increasing wealth of

the American people was attracting the envious attention of our European brethren, while our almost defenseless condition provoked the question: "Why not tap Uncle Sam!"

Some of our optimists declare vociferously that Europe will be so exhausted by war that the world will be safer than for two generations past.

They forget that it was after a most desolating Civil War of four years' duration, with half the country ravaged and destroyed, and with the flames of passion and bitterness scarce dying down, that the American Government practically ordered the Emperor of the French — at that time reported to be the most powerful monarch in Europe — to withdraw his armies from Mexico on pain of war; and that within a year or two a demand was made on England to settle the "Alabama" claim which, if it had been refused, would probably have led to war.

The close of one war has frequently been but the opening of another. The talk we hear from the Allied governments about crushing Prussian militarism bodes ill for an early or enduring peace. The German pronunciamentos at the opening of the war, left little hope for national and international agreements looking toward permanent pacification.

The fact of it is that militarism does not crush militarism. Napoleon declared, after the battle of Jena, that he would dispose of Prussia for all time, and carved it up and reduced it almost to the province of Brandenburg. In less than a decade Prussia led in the uprising that overthrew Napoleon. The Congress of Vienna adjusted the affairs of Europe and the world so carefully and so scientifically that war was to cease and universal and permanent peace was to be ushered in. How successful it was may be measured by the fact that in the century from 1815-1915 scarcely a year has seen the temple of Janus closed. The wars in America by which the Spanish colonies threw off the yoke of the mother country; our seizure of Florida, dismemberment of Mexico, Civil War, and Spanish War; the Russian-Turkish War of the '20's; the Revolution of 1830-1848; the Crimean War: French-Austrian War: Prussian-Danish War: Prussian-Austrian War; Russian-Turkish War; Japanese-Russian War, and the World War of the present, are the answer.

We know not when war will come or who will start it or whether we shall be brought in or not. We do not admit that we provoked Villa to attack Columbus; but we do not know how far this attack will lead — through no fault of ours. It has displayed one rather embarrassing, humiliating, and almost disgraceful fact, viz.: that a nation of 100,000,000 of people cannot protect its own citizens living on the border from violence, outrage and murder. And what a commentary on the present attitude of the American people is the newspaper report, if true, that upon the announcement in the House of Representatives that the American Army had overtaken and dispersed a band of 500 bandits, business was suspended and the grave and reverend seigniors went wild with excitement and shouted with fierce exultation — worthy of a victory like the fall of Vicksburg or the defeat of Lee at Gettysburg.

What a commentary on the standards of military efficiency which this people of 100,000,000 have set when the overtaking of 500 bandits produces such excitement.

The issues of peace and war are not always in our hands. For lack of knowledge, we say they are in God's hands. The only thing in our hands is whether we shall be ready for the issue, whatever it may be.

As to the first point, then, viz.: that we shall have peace if only we are peaceable, it is refuted by the entire course of human history, and we need not tarry longer with it.

The second point is not so easy to answer in a satisfactory way. We are most of us professing Christians and all of us believe in the underlying doctrine of Christ's teachings, whether we attribute it to Him or not, viz.: that we human beings are all brethren and should act the part.

Mr. Bryan emphasizes this aspect of Christ's teaching almost to the exclusion of everything else:

"Resist not evil; but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if any man will sue thee at law and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also; and whosoever shall compel thee to go a mile, go with him twain."

And again:

"But I say unto you, love your enemies; bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute you; that ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven, for He

maketh His sun to rise on the evil and on the good and sendeth rain on the just and unjust."

This is the message of the Prince of Peace, whose followers we all are. But He had another message, which we ought not to forget, and which locks up in its mysterious depths certain secrets of His philosophy which we often overlook.

He declared on another occasion, in such emphatic terms as to impress His disciples in the most striking way, for it came as a solmen warning of what was going to happen with the spread of Christianity, as a solemn warning against a wrong idea they had formed of His mission:

"Think not," He declared in the most stirring words, as He sent forth His Disciples with their solemn commission, "that I am come to send peace on earth. I came not to send peace, but a sword. For I am come to set a man at variance against his father and the daughter against her mother and the daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law. And a man's foes shall be they of his own household."

St. Luke makes it even more vivid:

"I am come to send fire on the earth.

"Suppose ye I am come to give peace on earth! I tell you, Nay! but rather division. For from henceforth there shall be five in one house divided three against two, and two against three.

"The father shall be divided against the son, and the son against the father; and the mother against the daughter and the daughter against the mother; and the mother-in-law against the daughter-in-law; and the daughter-in-law against the mother-in-law.

How true a prophecy was this! Not only for his own time, but for all subsequent times! Wherever Christianity has come there has been conflict; fierce contests; wars and rumors of war; turnings and overturnings. It lies in the very nature of Christianity, which brooks no rival in the affections of its devotees.

Christ preached primarily not peace but justice and righteousness and mercy. He believed that peace would ultimately come; but as a result of the establishment of justice and righteousness and mercy—not as their forerunner. He gave no indication that he thought that there was anything in peace per se which would of itself advance the Kingdom of Heaven in the hearts of men. Quite the contrary, He knew as fully as we that the peace of tyranny, of justice, of unrighteousness, of cruelty, of sloth and of indifference, was all too common and recognized that war was necessary at times to break up this sort of peace, and make way for that Kingdom of Heaven on Earth, which he was always working for and praying for.

We have no way of knowing what Jesus Christ would have thought of the American Revolution; of the War of 1812; of the Mexican War; of our Civil War; of the Great War now in progress; and it has always seemed to me a sort of impiety to be dragging His name into these controversies.

What He thought of international wars no one knows. In His own day the entire run of the Roman Empire was beset by the most warlike enemies, and the Emperor was engaged in constant wars either to ward off the enemy or make a conquest of their territory. But not by word or suggestion, so far as we know, did Jesus Christ ever express an opinion either upon their wickedness or their justification. He seems to have rested secure in the belief that when all the individual men and women in the world followed his teaching then peace would surely come and abide with us. Until that time war was likely to continue and so it has, and so it will for a long time to come.

Christ, of course, shared the longing and the confidence, so wonderfully expressed in the beautiful language of the Hebrew prophets.

"The wolf also shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid, and the calf and the young lion, and the fatling together, and a little child shall lead them. ***

"They shall not hurt nor destroy in all my holy mountain, for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord as the waters cove the sea.

"And they shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more."

But all this is to come after, and not before the establishment of justice and equity and mercy. Peace cannot come until "righteousness shall be the girdle of the loins" of the rod out of the stem of Jesse.

And so, our pacifist friends have wrenched the meaning

of Scripture to serve their own purposes. They have put the cart before the horse.

I do not see how any man who keeps his feet upon the ground, who looks at things as they are, who has made a study of individual and national life as it has unfolded in the progress of the centuries, can imagine for an instant that peace—permanent, world peace—is to come about in any other way than by the abolition of the causes of war.

My views as to how this is to be accomplished are entirely different from those of our pacifist friends.

We have, of course, a classic example of the pacifist nation in China. It is a wonderful people, has had a wonderful history, and may properly enough be quoted as an argument in favor of passive-ism.

Egypt laid the foundations of our present civilization. The discoveries of man in the Valley of the Nile set forward the human race upon its long road of suffering and achievement.

But Egypt appealed to arms and Egypt disappeared.

Assyria and Babylonia spread and enlarged and intensified this civilization. But they appealed to the sword and by the sword they perished.

Israel gave us our religion. But in her pride and stiffneckedness she defied the armies of Rome, and Rome destroyel her.

The Hittites, the Greeks, and the Romans built up great civilizations. The Greeks gave us our Art and the Romans our Law and Government. But arms destroyed them as arms had built them up, and for fifteen centuries after the fall of the Roman Empire, Europe has been one vast battlefield—at no time more completely than just now.

And there stands China! Older than any of the nations; despising the warrior; too proud to fight; overrun time and again by the foreigner, but patiently taking him in, assimilating him, digesting him, so to speak, making him into a Chinaman, accumulating men and civilization — a testimony to the ages of the superiority of passive-ism over bellicosity.

But, friends, with the greatest admiration for China, the Chinese and Chinese civilization, I must agree with the poet when he declares:

"Better fifty years of Europe Than a cycle of Cathay." Some very able and worthy citizens of our Republic have proposed that we should protect ourselves by treaties, alliances, ententes cordiales, etc.; that, in brief, we should hire England to protect us and our interests in the Atlantic, and Japan in the Pacific—these being the two great naval powers of these two oceans. We could then, like Carthage, raise an army of mercenaries drawn from every European country, after the war, and thus, by ridding ourselves of all burden of military or naval service, devote out emergency to the accumulation of wealth and its pleasurable consumption.

This would be a career really worth while! How proud we could be of ourselves! How proud our children would be of us!

Nay! Nay! Friends, not so! Not so! A nation or a race, like a man, has its opportunity to play a noble or an ignoble part in human history. Egypt started our civilization, Babylon and Assyria enriched and spread it; Israel gave us religion; Greece gave art; Rome, government and administration; and when in the course of human events Rome failed and seemed likely to go the way of China, on account of malaria or the hookworm, or what not, the Northern Barbarians swept over the Roman Empire and poured new blood into the veins and arteries of Europe. A new world and a new civilization was the result.

A thousand years after the fall of the Roman Empire America was discovered and a new era began for the human race.

I believe that this great Republic of ours has the chance to make a contribution to world civilization which will rank with the contributions of Greece and Rome. But it is only an opportunity—not a necessity. If we do not utilize it, we shall perish. If we do not enter the open door, it will be closed to us. If we do not accept the burden, we shall shrivel up and disappear—go glimmering among the things that were. "Weighed in the balance and found wanting" may be just as truly our national epitaph as it was Belshazzar's.

I do not believe that we should set up as the peace-at-any-price nation.

On the contrary, let us set up as a nation to realize in its organization and administration the highest ideals of truth

and right and justice and mercy; fair play to all; equal opportunity; standing for our ideals abroad as well as at home. This means foreign commerce and world-wide activity.

We should go forward unafraid, standing for right things at home and abroad, inside and outside of the Republic; ready to perform our duties as we come to them. Of course, such policy will not ensure peace; it may lead to war. But we should follow it wherever it may lead.

A nation is in some respects like a man. As an individual, you should keep the peace, if possible. But your prime function is not to keep the peace. It is to do your duty. If doing your duty leads to conflict, let it come.

The man who runs away from it is a coward — no less the nation, and all history condemns the coward nation to insignificance and extinction.

If this view be correct, there can only be one answer to the question, "What should be our naval policy?"

We must have an adequate navy to preserve our independence.

A word or two more before I close, as to one or two things which ought to be done now.

- 1. We should get rid of the naval graft which Congressional Districts insist on sharing.
- 2. This will be done, in large part, if Congress can be persuaded to organize the Navy Department on sensible lines.

The people should insist on having a national defense commission and a navy general staff, if the General Board of the Navy cannot be made fully effective for the purpose.

This general staff should be required to make recommen dations for location and dislocation of Navy Yards, and for maintaining factories, arsenals, etc., under circumstances which will prevent individual districts from influencing the recommendations. It is absolutely necessary to have perfectly free and uninfluenced recommendations as a basis for action.

This staff should also make its recommendations as to the Navy ships and personnel without any direction or suggestions from the Secretary of the Navy or individual Congressmen. The country has a right to know what the experts think about the matter. It is up to the people then to decide what they want to do in the premises.

The people of the United States distrust the policy of Navy Yard graft, dictation of recommendations by the Secretary of the Navy or by individual Congressmen, and the policy of clamping on the lid when distinguished naval officers wish to express their views. Of course, discipline must be maintained; but a discipline which prevents the country from knowing the facts and the interpretation of these facts by its best men should be loosened up to a degree, at least.

In closing, I should like to emphasize that I am not a bellicosist—i. e., one who believes, like Ruskin, or Carlyle, or Nietsche, or Bernhardi, that war is a moral agency per se, a means of moral and religious uplift owing to the struggle involved in it—one who, like St. Paul before his conversion, breathes forth threatenings and slaughter. Nor am I a pacifist, like our distinguished ex-Secretary of State, who believes, if I understand him correctly, that there can be no such thing as a just war. I am a pacifist in the sense of one who would like to see all war abolished and the reign of the Prince of Peace come in. But this very Prince of Peace declared that He was come not to bring peace, but a sword, and His intention was to turn and overturn until justice and righteousness should prevail, and then peace would come.

In the meantime, if we wish to be in a position to promote peace and righteousness, we must trust in God, do justice, and keep our powder dry.

The most immediate and pressing thing, then, for the United States to do, if it wishes to secure the proper basis for the advancement of civilization within itself and in the rest of the world, is to provide a more effective system of national defense. It is essential to our safety and to the possibility of carrying out a reasonable economic or any other program, that the American citizen may feel that he can go about his business without the constant fear of possible disturbance which comes from wars and war's alarms. This can only be done by the creation of an adequate system of defense.

When the war is over and the world has had time to settle down again into something like normal conditions, it may be possible to organize a world league to enforce peace, with power and willingness to use power. God grant it may be so! Such a league, if possible, would, of course, enable us to dispense with a large part of the military force which would otherwise be required. But the time for that is not yet.

If we are to be at liberty, then, to pursue our own ways, to develop our own ideals of government and social organization uninterrupted by the interference of other nations, we must organize a practical and adequate system of national defense. You will note that I speak of national defense — not of national armament — to indicate that the object of the necessary increase of our army and navy is not aggression, but to enable us to maintain in a dignified, firm and effective manner our rights as a nation and the rights of our citizens wherever they may be, on land or sea, in the enjoyment of their lawful rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

I am heartily in favor of stretching the arm of the Republic over every sea and into every land to protect the American citizen in his legitimate activities. I am in favor of the nation having a definite policy and a definite attitude in favor of the maintainance and development of international law on the foundation of justice and righteousness and equality and mercy.

I am in favor of the American people having a dynamic and definite policy on all those things which are fundamental to the advance of human civilization. And if we do nothing more than raise our voice on all proper occasions in favor of justice and right and mercy, we must still be in a position to defend ourselves in our right, to take such an attitude and make such pronunciamentos.

We must be in a position to defend ourselves, not by treaties of neutrality, nor by agreements of offense or defense, nor by ententes cordiales, nor by triple nor quardruple alliances, but by the Grace of God and the power of the right and of our own right arm. The President of the United States should be in a position to defend our rights by a more effective means than literary notes.

I am aware that some people would depart from the policy outlined by George Washington and create for us all sorts of entangling alliances in Europe and Asia and America. We have created some of them already which will come home to curse us in the years to come. I am aware that some patriotic Americans think that we should engage England to protect us with her fleet by a treaty of offense and defense as the easiest

way out of a difficult situation—one which would save us much money. God save the mark!

I yield to no one in my admiration for the deeds and character of the English people and for the great contributions which they have made to human civilization. My lines of descent all run back to the soil of Great Britain or France. But we in America fought twice to get rid of England's domination, and there is no evidence that her hand would rest more lightly upon us now than then. It is to me, as an American citizen, an utterly revolting idea that this great Republic should live under the protection of the English fleet or that of the German Armies. I do not know and I think no one knows at present how large a fleet or army may be necessary to maintain our independence, but whatever it may be, we must have it.

I know not what men may think, but as for my own single self, I should feel that the blood of our ancestors who fell at Bunker Hill and Long Island, at Saratoga and Yorktown, in the winning of our independence, had been spilled in vain if the future before us now is to exist on the sufferance of other nations, be they one or many. In vain were the sacrifices of our fathers and brothers and uncles and cousins who fell at Vicksburg and Gettysburg, and in the battles of the Wilderness, thus sealing by their blood the unity of the Republic, if the outcome of it all is a people to be dictated to by Europe or Asia.

The deep humiliation of belonging to a pusillanimous people deprives a generous soul of all joy and comfort in life or living.

Bread and meat and clothes and yachts and automobiles and schools and colleges and all other necessities or luxuries of life are but so many added signs of increasing degradation and carry with them at bottom a stinging rebuke to the smallness of soul and meanness of spirit which such a people would cherish.

But with malice toward none, with charity toward all our unhappy brethren beyond the seas, with a determination to extend every aid to their suffering members, we must still insist that we have a right to safeguard our own independence of action and thought by the creation of a military and industrial power or forever give up all idea of being a moral or political force in the world!

HOW WE CAN BEST SECURE THE NECESSARY MEASURES OF PREPAREDNESS


S. STANWOOD MENKEN

For a member of the National Security League to talk on preparedness to the Navy League is truly carrying coals to Newcastle. In a large degree we are but followers where you have been pioneers for years, and have taken up your cry and re-echoed it with somewhat varied tone, adding the chorus of those whose call is for arms on land, as well as for forces on sea.

Year after year, notwithstanding discouragement and public neglect, you have had the vision to see the country's needs while the rest of us were blind. Your consistent labors in an apparently hopeless cause are proofs of patriotism of the highest order, and if the National Security League can but second your efforts it will not have lived in vain.

It seems a long time now since November 14, 1914, when Augustus P. Gardner aroused the country by his statements. We could hardly believe he was not a sensationalist, though an interesting one. I remember being impressed, and yet having my doubts about him and asking Mr. Herbert Parsons what Mr. Gardner's reputation was for reliability, and being a bit peeved when told Mr. Gardner was known for the exactness of his statements; for I, too, had prided myself on the strength of our army and had read with swelling breast of the navy which, ship for ship, equalled the best afloat, and did not want to be disillu-Then again, I knew a few army and navy men and admired them, and what was more, I had a great reverence for the Federal forces, especially the one I came in daily contact with, our great Federal Courts, and felt certain that, though we might have weakness in certain state administrations somewhere, and that sometimes the city administrations were derelict, our Federal Government and all its branches was the most splendid that could be conceived and carried out by mortal man.

Thus I was surprised to find that Mr. Gardner had censored, edited and deleted himself in order that by moderation he might gain a larger audience. In truth, his first prescription was a sugar-coated pill. The orthodox remedy was that defined by the authorities in the reports of the Naval Board and the General



A COAST DEFENSE GUN

Firing a 12-inch coast defense gun. The camera caught the flying shell just clear of the mushroom of expanding gases.



Staff. Then it was that the Security League was born. Mr. Gardner, though not entirely conscious of the fact, was the parent and your humble servant one of the attending physicans. With the kindly help of its many friends, the League has grown to its present lusty size of 141 branches, 18 Governors' Committees, and 80 Mayors' Committees, and every large city can claim the League as its own.

Its work so far has been to aid in bringing the issue of preparedness before the American people, and in this it has succeeded. It pledged itself to advocate preparedness on scientific and economic lines, to fight any measure that was not calculated to give a return in true value to the American people. It is for that reason that we have denounced the Hay Bill as a menace to the country, in conflict with all the recommendations of the general staff, and therefore presumptively a waste of public funds.

From the beginning the League pledged itself to nonpartisanship, moderation in statement and absolute neutrality, all of which it has faithfully adhered to. The development of our work, however, has been a most complex matter and has grown as we have learned what should be done to secure national security.

As bearing on the objective of bringing to the attention of America the measure of our preparedness, we have had to establish a proper estimate of what a modern army, based on the standards of the magnificent German organization, really is, and to appreciate the force of a navy such as Britain's in action, and make the people understand that according to such standards the United States had neither an effective army nor navy, and that in the modern sense we were truly defenseless against a first-class power. They had largely ignored the lesson of the Japanese War and had not given passing attention to report after report of our experts—the General Staff and the Naval Board—nor to the statements of successive Secretaries in both departments year after year, and it was apparent that if we were to succeed in bringing the lesson home we should have to do so by just such an extensive organization as we had formed.

We have been aided greatly, of course, by the trend of current events. In our work we have used large meetings and the generous aid of publishers, and the League has sent its literature of fact and argument to several hundred thousand people. As

you probably know, we have held several national conferences, one in New York, one in Washington, one in Chicago, and one in St. Louis, under the direction of the Mayors' Committees. In all these gatherings we have urged a general adherence to the plans of the General Staff of the Army and the General Board of the Navy, and have recommended universal military training We have emphasized the fact that universal military training of the young on a plan similar to the Swiss system was the supreme natural necessity, and we have been both gratified and surprised to find that wherever we have presented this proposition it was received with a cordiality and unanimity that indicated it was possible to secure this great boon for the American people.

This portrays the temper of the People — and yet what is the situation in Congress! Everyone (except certain Congressmen) knows that the demand is for defense on the lines of the expert, and yet our Representatives ignore this demand and dare to tolerate a bill like that of Mr. Hay, which violates every recommendation of every board of experts and denies all lessons to be gathered from our nation's history. It is a strange pilot. indeed, as Ferrero, the great Italian, says, who dares pilot the ship of state against the swirling stream of History; yet this is what Hay and Cummings are trying to do. Congress should not have permitted the bill to have a hearing, and that they did shows that the many are proving false to their trust either through ignorance or corruption. Whether it is ignorance or corruption or that form thereof known as influence, does not affect the result.

They should know that America, defenseless, may already be foredoomed; that they have wasted precious months; that their delays are intolerable, and that if we are attacked their's will be the penalty for the wreck and ruin of our country—and yet we call these men our Representatives! The nomenclature is either false or a grave reflection on our citizenship.

What we want in this country to-day is immediate defense, or as near so as our magnificent resources make possible. We cannot further tolerate civilian interference with matters requiring expert treatment. The situation requires a surgeon, not a faith cure, and the people are not to be fooled by a promissory note for an army, payable in four years, with a bonus of pork; nor by an instalment plan for a navy, payable in five

years, if party expediency and Mr. Daniels' shiftlessness renders advisable.

The course of Congress in this regard is but a repetition of the incompetence in the past, particularly painful because we had hoped for greater things. It exemplifies the truth of Lord Wolseley's statement, which I want you to listen to. It is from his introduction to Henderson's "Life of Stonewall Jackson":

"There are lessons which concern nations rather than individuals; and there are two to be learnt from the Secession War which are of peculier value to both England and the United States, whose armies are comparatively small and raised by voluntary enlistment. The first is the necessity of maintaining at all times (for it is impossible to predict what to-morrow may have in store for us) a wellorganized standing army in the highest state of efficiency. and composed of thoroughly trained and full-grown men. This Army to be large enough for our military requirements, and adapted to the character, the habits, and the traditions of the people. It is not necessary that the whole force should be actually serving during peace; one-half of it, provided it is periodically drilled and exercised, can be formed into Reserve; the essential thing is that it should be as perfect a weapon as can be forged.

"The second lesson is that to hand over to civilians the administration and organization of the Army, whether in peace or war, or to allow them to interfere in the selection of officers for command or promotion, is most injurious to efficiency; while, during war, to allow them, no matter how high their political capacity, to dictate to commanders in the field any line of conduct, after the Army has once received its commission, is simply to ensure disaster.

"The first of these lessons is brought home to us by the opening events of this unreasonably_protracted war. As I have elsewhere said, most military students will admit that had the United States been able, early in 1861, to put into the field, in addition to their volunteers, one Army Corps of regular troops, the war would have ended in a few months. An enormous expenditure of life and money, as well as a serious dislocation and loss of trade, would have been thus avoided. Never have the evil consequences which fellow upon the absence of an adequate and well-organized Army been more forcibly exemplified.

"But, alas! When this lesson is preached in a country governed alternately by rival political parties, and when there is no immediate prospect of national danger, it falls on deaf ears. The demands made by the soldiers to put the Army on a thoroughly efficient footing are persistently ignored, for the necessary means are almost invariably required for some other object, more popular at the moment and in a parliamentary — or party — sense, more useful."

These words, and like utterances of Homer Lea, must be brought home to the American people, to teach the burden and danger of the individual's neglect of political duties.

The National Security League was formed not alone for the purpose of demanding proper military forces, for the name was deliberately chosen — but because it was felt that democratic institutions and the right of the nation to live was being tested. and that national security was dependent upon many other things than a mere organized force in arms. Primarily, the first necessity of our 100,000,000 people is to know themselves, to understand their own shortcomings and to rouse themselves to general responsibility for inefficient methods. Speakers on preparedness can find benefit in setting forth the history of military deficiencies and of the weakness of the militia as a defense, and of the extreme costliness of war because of improper military training; but they must point out the fact that such conditions are symptomatic of the entire course of American political life, and that the American people have been continually neglectful of civic duty and have at all times tolerated a measure of incompetency on the part of office-holders from the highest to the lowest, which would have brought ruin and disaster in any less favored country. We all see the evil when it is near to us. We all know the story of municipal corruption and the wastage of municipal franchises and the shameful history of cities and other large centers of population. We have not, however, realized the extent to which states have been misgoverned to the great loss of their people, nor have we ever fully pictured the burdens which we have suffered through the continued failure of Congress to legislate either with prevision or efficiency. The story of slavery enactments, with its sixty years of hesitation and compromise on the part of our national assembly, which resulted in so handling the matter as to plunge us into a civil war: the story of the tariff, with the sixteen bills and a myriad of amendments, each bill being the signal for a more or less violent panic; the treatment of finance measures, anti-trust and conservation, all illustrate what I mean, and, when understood, point to the need of a higher and more enlightened civic standard if we are to have a national government in future such as is necessary for any country aspiring to observe the traditions of our people and maintain itself in the fore rank of world powers.

In making this statement I do not wish to place the blame on Congress entirely, because there have always been fearless, hard-working and high-minded men of all political parties in that body. The obloquy, painful as it is, is directly that of the people who have elected misrepresentatives year after year, or tolerated their designation by political bosses, who, if not corrupt, were a national danger because of their lack of conception of national needs.

Therefore, I respectfully submit that the primary provision for national security must be found in the awakening of the in dividual citizen to a sense of obligation of individual service to the state and to the duty which rests upon him to prove democracy's right to rule. We cannot expect America to accomplish great things unless its citizens are willing to give to it greater patriotism. We cannot neglect our country any more than we could our business and expect it to prosper, and we realize that America's position bears a direct relation to the individual effort that citizens give to its upholding and strengthening.

In treating these problems we should do so with a full recognition of the very elements that constitute our nationality. We must not offend the prejudices or tendencies of any one class or people of any particular descent so long as America is first in the hearts.


A country divided within itself must fall, and a united nationality is the best bulwark for national defense, and best guarantee of consistent upbuilding. While having these matters before us we can aid the work of the melting-pot by adopting strong measures for the Americanization of our people. There is no reason why our country should support a foreign parasite who comes here to share our prosperity and not carry his part of the burden of government. America is for Americans, and while no one would in any way limit it as a haven to the oppressed of all lands, we cannot afford to be the abiding place of any but those who come here with the spirit of living up to the high spirit of our institutions.

216 Necessary Measures of Preparedness

Then, again, we must realize that for the success of America certain economic truths must be recognized and generally understood, and that government which accords with true economic principles is in a commercial age of great competitive nations the best sponsor for national growth. We cannot go ahead and defy the science of economics any longer by blind confidence in Divine Providence or by the toleration of haphazard legislation. We have scraped the top soil of our resources, and with increasing population must have a sense of the responsibility to safeguard and develop our physical resources in conformity with our best intelligence, if our national eminence is to be maintained and future generations are to have a continuance of the general happiness and prosperity which has been the boon of our people in the past.

In a word, new world conditions and our own situation make it necessary that we should have a higher quality of citizenship and an enlarged sense of responsibility on the part of the individual. It is this broader work which the National Security League is interested in forcing forward the very moment its members can be assured that our shores have been safeguarded from attack, and attention can safely be directed to our own internal affairs.

To do so is to undertake the greatest conceivable work for our country and to prove our faithfulness to our trust, which is to preserve our Constitution not alone for the present, but for all future generations.



THE TORPEDO BOAT DESTROYER NICHOLSON

She is a vessel of 1,080 tons, whose 16,000 H.-P. engines drive her at a speed of 29.8 knots. She has four twin tubes for firing 18 inch torpedoes and mounts four 4-inch guns. Her complement consists of five officers and about 80 men.

THE MANUFACTURE AND SALE OF MUNITIONS OF WAR

CHARLES NOBLE GREGORY, A.M., LL.D.

In the Encyclopedia Britannica under the title "Gunpowder" I find that fatal material described as "An explosive composed of saltpeter, charcoal and sulphur," and the statement added "Very few substances have had a greater effect on civilization than gun-powder.

That the higher development of life (which is civilization) should be fostered by a new and terrible means of inflicting death, seems a paradox. Yet we must reflect that the first necessity for any developing civilization, with the wealth and prosperity which it creates, is defense against the barbarism which it offends by its advance and tempts by its prompt accumulations. Greek and Roman discipline furnished a considerable element of this kind and protected Greek and Roman arts, law, and letters remarkably; but the one great invention which at once gave civilized man dominion over savage man, even when a hundred-fold outnumbered, was gun-powder. That made the renaissance possible. That made the conquest of the American Continents by our European ancestors assured and furnished the basis of all that has followed. We are here, our blood, law, language, and church spires are here, as a result.

Brawn had to give way to brains. The Chemist was more than the Smith. The Armored Knight upon his Armored Charger went down before the Musketeer, before the man on foot, the noble before the peasant, and democracy became possible.

In the struggle for existence weaker forms of life survive by fecundity, by powers of flight or of climbing a tree or digging a hole, but the finest and freest by power of attack and defense.

We, I submit, wish to develop and maintain a race of this finest and freest type, not guinea-pigs or white rabbits, not antelopes, squirrels or rats, but men inferior to no creatures in power of attack and defense. I say attack, because that is often the best form of defense.

I speak of gun-powder, but I figure by that all those warlike supplies on which defense must rest.

218 Manufacture and Sale of War Munitions

Beasts still fight with talons and hoofs, claws, horns and fangs and nothing else. So did man once, but when the first anthropoid ape or primitive man broke a branch from the oak and with it struck down his foe — when in the Garden Cain slew his brother with a club, preparation began. The dominion of the prepared over the un-prepared began and has never ended. To which class shall we belong?

If Abel had been vigilant and had had the bigger club, what a benefit to the world his club would have been! As it is, I suppose, we are all sons of Cain.

I am here to advocate one source of safety, and that mechanical, and not picturesque or heroic. Namely, that the business and laboring men of this country be allowed to freely manufacture munitions of war and freely vend and export them to all, except the enemies of the United States.

I claim these rights for them because they are lawful, because all nations have agreed to them, and far more, because they conduce to the welfare not only of our own country but of mankind and are therefore politic and right.

First: They are lawful. Neither International nor Municipal Law forbids them. By custom and prescription the workers of the principal nations, including our own, have for generations exercised them.

Our first Secretary of State, appointed by Washington, asserted them in a communication to the British Minister, May 15, 1793. Mr. Jefferson says:

"Our citizens have been always free to make, vend and export arms. It is the constant occupation and livelihood of some of them. To suppress their callings, the only means perhaps of their subsistence, because a war exists in foreign and distant countries, in which we have no concern, would scarcely be expected. It would be hard in principle and impossible in practice. The law of nations, therefore, respecting the rights of those at peace, does not require from them such an internal disarrangement in their occupation. It is satisfied with the external penalty pronounced in the president's proclamation, that of confiscation of such portion of those arms as shall fall into the hands of any of the belligerent powers on their way to the port of their enemies."

Alexander Hamilton, our first Secretary of the Treasury, is equally positive to the same effect. In a Treasury circular of August 4, 1793, he declares:

"The purchasing within, and exporting from the United States, by way of merchandise, articles commonly called contraband, being generally war-like instruments, and military stores, is free to all the parties at war, and is not to be interfered with."

If the democrats question our views, I cite Jefferson, their founder; and if the republicans, I cite Hamilton, their founder.

Mr. Seward, the great Secretary of State under Abraham Lincoln, when Mexico objected to the sale of military supplies to the French under Maximilian, answered with equal decision, asserting our right and saying that otherwise, "Commerce,.... instead of being free and independent, would exist only at the caprice of war." (December 15, 1862). Mr. Seward and our whole people were most hostile to the French occupations and ultimately compelled its abandonment, but the rule was too clear to dispute and too important to in any way abate.

Hon. John Bassett Moore, our greatest and ripest international publicist, to whom I owe my other references, in his digest prints eighteen pages of extracts to like effect from Secretaries of State, Attorneys-General, and Presidents, from Henry Clay, General Grant, Marcey, Fish, Evarts, Bayard, Frelinghuysen, Blaine, Foster, Olney, and John Hay, and also a clear and strong opinion by Mr. Elihu Root.

The famous Lord Chancellor Westbury was called the boldest Judge that ever lived and was said, in a celebrated decision, to have "abolished Hell, with costs." He quoted from the opinion of our own Supreme Court, written by its greatest scholar in international law, Justice Story, and approved the following passage:

"There is nothing in our laws or in the law of nations that forbids our citizens from sending munitions of war to foreign ports for sale. It is a commercial adventure which no nation is bound to prohibit, and which only exposes the persons engaged in it to the penalty of confiscation."

In 1901, our United States Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held the same as to exports of war supplies to

Great Britain during the Boer War; and, in 1905, the English Courts held like doctrine as to the shipment of contraband during the Russo-Japanese War.

Two years later, in 1907, the second Hague Conference, representing substantially all the nations of the world, adopted the following convention:

"A neutral power is not bound to prevent the export or transit on behalf of one or the other of the belligerents of arms, munitions of war, or, generally, of anything which can be of use to an army or fleet."

This declaration was especially desired by Germany. One of our delegates at the Conference said to this writer that apparently the main purpose of the Conference was to prevent any interference with the export of arms by the Krupps at Essen.

Austria-Hungary and Germany promptly ratified this convention, November 27, 1909, which merely re-affirmed the established rule.

Mr. Bryan, then Secretary of State, who is believed to have communed more often with the Dove than with the Eagle, in January, 1915, in a communication to Senator Stone, fully confirmed this doctrine.

This right so deeply grounded in practice, precedent and agreement, in the opinion of statesmen and of judges, is constantly attacked and criticised, and sought to be revoked by direct statute: it is constantly condemned as immoral and impolitic by the thoughtless and uninstructed, though well intentioned, advocates of peace. I submit that these critics misapprehend the effect of the rule and the results which would flow from its repeal.

The ability of a peaceful commercial state to freely exchange her wealth for war supplies in the world's markets is her only great defense and her one chief bulwark.

If she could not use her cash and her credit in the world's marts to equip herself for defense when attacked, her wealth would be merely a lure to the robber states, a source of weakness and not of strength.

If a nation, the moment she is assailed, finds all outside ports closed to her, all markets shut, if she must resist the premeditated and prepared attack with such munitions as she has on hand then either the peaceful commercial nations must be rapidly and hopelessly conquered and enslaved, or they must change their whole type and adopt the military policy in its entirety and, to be safe, keep always at the top notch of preparedness with nothing lacking to defeat any foe. Certainly the cause of peace can not be served by offering to peaceful and prosperous nations like our own the dilemma of destruction or the adoption of the extremes of militarism.

Yet, if by this change of rule you sterilize the wealth of these countries, so that in time of war it can draw to them no equipment, that would be the result.

Any nation caught unprepared must miserably perish or miserably submit. She could not get from outside, as this writer lately pointed out in The Outlook, "A pound of powder, a gallon of petrol, an ounce of copper, a gun, a sabre, a harness, or a horse."

As General Wood said recently to a Committee of Congress: "We are gradually accumulating most of the gold of the world. We had better stiffen that supply of gold with a little iron."

If the rule allowing a belligerent to buy and neutrals to sell war supplies were abolished, all this wealth would be, in case of attack, as useless to us as a ton of gold to a shipwrecked sailor dying of thirst on a barren reef.

This writer lately said, and he would re-affirm:

"Wars now are sudden as conflagrations in their origin and the advantages of preparation and initiative are immense. Why make them vastly greater? Why tempt to secret preparation and sudden aggression by greatly reducing the resources and avails of the defending power? Why aid the wolf and hamstring the lamb? Why by a change of law and policy aid and encourage the predatory policy, and debilitate defense? Such change must stimulate war and discourage peace."

Such a change of law and practice, it is submitted, is highly opposed to the general interests of mankind. It magnifies the power of the prepared and predatory states and it hinders and prevents the defense of the pacific states. It helps the carnivorous states, and it hurts the herbivorous states, as it were. It sharpens the fangs of the wolf, constantly used in attack, and it takes away the antlers of the stag, as constantly

used for defense alone. It tends to embroil the nations and to destroy their balance and repose. It is a pernicious, unwise, and immoral restraint, an injurious change in a just rule.

But it has been urged that in the present war one side commands the sea, and therefore the other is excluded from our markets, which are in fact open to only one, and that this is not "true neutrality."

I submit that because one of the belligerents has an advantage over the other, got by the exercises of war, is no ground for changing the rule to his detriment. The neutral does his full duty if he leaves his market door open freely to both, letting either hinder the other in his access as much as he can. The neutral vendor has nothing to do with access. That is the business of the belligerents, each to get it for himself and to defeat the getting it by the other.

At present the Central powers are denied access to our markets by the British naval supremacy. During the South African War, when the Boers, for like reason, had no access to German markets, the German dealers still thought it right to sell to Great Britain large quantities of munitions, although Germany was friendly to the Boers and profoundly hostile to England.

This writer tabulated, from the British Custom House reports, large numbers of sales, and submitted the same to the American Academy of Political and Social Science at Philadelphia, in 1915. The neutrality board of our government verified the figures, except for some minor and insignificant errors, and filed them with the Department of State, and Senator Cabot Lodge kindly wrote this writer that they were used in the reply of the United States to Austria. The practice of Germany was entirely correct, and so is the exactly similar practice of the United States at the present time.

The practice of Germany, moreover, in fostering her enormous establishments privately owned for the production of arms and munitions is wise and politic and affords us a most useful example.

The Paris correspondent of the Army and Navy Journal recently mentioned that the works at Essen employed a hundred and thirty thousand hands. The Ambassador of one of the great powers, long in the diplomatic service, recently told this writer

that no one in the service could fail to see that the principal business of the Army and Navy Attachés of Germany was to place foreign orders for arms and munitions with their great factories. Thus, with profit to Germany their colossal works in times of peace were established, sustained, and extended. Thus, like manufacturers in other countries were undermined, discouraged, and broken down. When war came, Germany was prepared and ready to increase her supplies from within, and the other countries which had too much depended upon her were in quite the opposite situation. Cannon for the defense of Antwerp had been contracted for in time of peace by a Great German maker, but the great part, though a year over due, were not delivered. Many of the bombs furnished by the German makers would not explode, and Antwerp fell a rich and easy prey to the invaders.

This incident illustrates the danger and inconvenience of depending upon a neighboring state for munitions of war. That state may be at any time your enemy in war and may contemplate that situation long before you awake to its menace. Even if not your enemy in war, it may, as an incident of war, become wholly inaccessible to you, however friendly, as Germany to the South African Republics during the late Boer War, and as all the American Republics to Germany at the present time. Moreover, private factories are apt to be numerous and widespread; therefore, in case of invasion, they afford greater prospect of safety. No part of the country which continues to resist is apt to be wholly without such resources.

Our army arsenals, which largely manufacture our arms and munitions are, with one exception, near Atlantic tide water and between Boston and Philadelphia,— a very important, but, after all, limited and exposed part of the United States. The one exception is the Rock Island Arsenal, which occupies an ideal position in the heart of the Mississippi valley.

In the present war, the great factories at Liege,— for many forms of arms, perhaps the greatest in the world,— were early captured by the central powers and became a part of their warlike assets. Lodz, in Russian Poland, had a like fate. Over one-half of the industrial plants of France were, in like manner, seized, and held by the enemy.

Our Middle West and Southwest, with their abundance of

coal and iron, their oil and copper, their vast systems of transportation and their thronging labor markets, ought not to be forbidden or discouraged from the manufacture and sale of munitions of war. Let their unsurpassed resources and energies be mobilized in these lines purely for the gains of commerce; yet they remain a great safety and resource to this republic in case of attack, or emergency.

There is no wiser proverb than that which advises against putting all your eggs in one basket. Let our arsenals be maintained, but by no means refuse to utilize and recognize the energy, capital, and labor embarked by private enterprise in like productions whose enormous contributions can be switched in a moment from foreign commerce to the aid of our flag and our country.

Far be it from me, even to think of our seacoast as defenseless or abandoned; but our flag and our republic deserve something more than a first line of defense, and that first line deserves a loyal unshrinking support from behind, not merely in men but munitions.

Our whole supply of sodium nitrate, on which the manufacture of explosives depends, comes by sea from Chile. In case of war with a naval power, or with two naval powers, stronger than we are upon the sea, it would be instantly cut off.

Modern science has taught us to derive nitrates from the air by the use of electricity. The process requires elaborate machinery and preparation. Its installation requires a length of time. Its product is as valuable as a fertilizer of our fields in peace as for the manufacture of explosives in war. It is produced most economically by water power. Our country abounds in water power, much of it belonging to the government; 10,000 horse-power goes to waste at the Rock Island Arsenal on the Mississipi and at innumerable other points the waste of this vast source of energy is far greater. Government should encourage in every way such factories to utilize this waste power. They are as wholesome in peace as they are needed in war. They enrich us in one and they defend us in the other and add vastly to our independence and security. The needed capital is understood to wait only permission to harness the water now running to waste, and to make it work for the profit of capital, for the employment of labor, and the safety of us all,

Senator Underwood, than whom no man in public life is more entitled to our gratitude and our confidence, is urging the establishment of a government plant for this purpose and I am not suggesting anything in opposition to that plan.

March 30 last he said: "Germany at the beginning of the war had two hundred and seventy thousand tons of nitrogen. The supply was exhausted in two months." That Germany, lacking water power, has had to create great steam power plants for this purpose, which are much less economical; that to get two-thirds the power Germany is using, we would need one hundred and twenty thousand horsepower, and that for economy this should be developed in one place; that there are few places capable of developing such power, and if the government delays, private capital will preempt them.

General Crozier testified: "These processes are now controlled by private individuals in this country. We do not know how to use them," but he thinks we would not apply in vain to "the patroitism or other good will" of the owners of these processes.

The chief objection to undertaking to manufacture our whole supply at one government plant is that it leaves us dependent upon the safety of those works. The protected activities of a single popular member of the diplomatic corps might destroy them over night. The wider plan by which the government and private enterprise at various points both produce this essential supply will most conduce to safety, and some sacrifice of economy is warranted.

As to the advantage of these developments, I do not speak alone. As to the danger and disadvantage of depending upon narrow and inadequate war supplies, derived from a limited and exposed territory, I do not speak alone.

I trust it is not invidious to refer, among many, to two men, as thoughtful and far-sighted as any in our service, who in the past three months have fully and in greater detail testified in support of these views before the Committee of Military Affairs of our House of Representatives,—namely, Major General Leonard Wood, late Chief of Staff, and Brigadier General William Crozier, for fourteen years Chief of Ordnance.

The Department of Ordnance recognizes that such private factories are an aid to and not a hindrance to the work of

our arsenals, and that they promote in every way the efficiency, the advance in inventions, and the supply of ordnance and munitions.

England had depended too much on inadequate government arsenals, but all that has been changed. The man of the greatest energy and resources in the Kingdom was made Minister of Munitions of War and given a free hand. A pamphlet just received from Sir Gilbert Parker says, "We have multiplied our production of munitons nearly three hundred fold and we are taking steps to multiply it many times more." Workers have been registered, private factories by the hundred taken over.

General Crozier testified in January that both sides ran short of ammunition in the first six months of the present war. That Germany was the first to recover, because she had her factories mobilized and was ready to use their installations. That France, too, recovered quickly, but England more slowly because short of government factories and unable to mobilize private works, and that neither of these has yet caught up.

Lloyd George said, in the House of Commons, on December 20, last: "The place acquired by machinery in the arts of peace in the nineteenth century had been won by machinery in the grim art of war in the twentieth century. In no war ever fought in the world has the preponderance of machinery been so completely established."

He showed that all the successes and failures of the war had been due to "mechanical preponderance." He said that the allies had the mechanical superiority in the navies, and were accordingly supreme on the sea. "What we stint in munitions we squander in life, that is the one great lesson of munitions," he said.

Our lesson of the present war is that the consumption of powder and munitions is both vastly beyond all experience, and beyond the most modern and liberal estimates, as our Chief of Ordnance has testified. In one great battle, as much was used as in the entire Boer War.

Rapid fire guns are of infinite importance for attack and greatly more for defense, but they are prodigal of powder and ball. Guns of much increased caliber are used even as field

artillery, because modern machinery can move them as horses could not, and they, too, are prodigal of powder and ball.

When for a time supplies of munitions failed the Russian Army, those brave men fought desperately with clubs and failed and died, and the prepared swept over Poland.

The lessons I would urge upon the nation are:

That we have a right by all laws, international and municipal, to manufacture and freely sell to all comers munitions of war (except when restrained by special laws, as along our Southern border).

That such right ought to be fully preserved and freely exercised, because it vastly strengthens our country for defense in this time of unprecedented menace and of unfathomed danger.

That such rights should not only remain unabridged, free from hindrance or discouragement, but should be fostered, protected and encouraged.

That in so doing we adopt a policy hostile to no nation and salutary to our own.

WHY WE NEED A NAVY GENERAL STAFF


E. K. RODEN

A great deal has been published lately about the unpreparedness of the navy and its lack of battle efficiency. It is charged that our navy is unbalanced, that it is short of officers and men, that it is deficient in many classes of ships, particularly battle cruisers, that it is lacking in torpedoes, mines, and ammunition, and that as a whole the navy is far below the standard claimed for it by the opponents of an adequate navy. But this is not all. We are told by naval officers of high rank and undoubted competency that these charges are not only true, but, what is still more serious, that the organization and administration of the navy is absolutely unsuited to and incapable of placing the navy on a war basis without the greatest congestion and utter confusion.

If all of these charges are true, and they seem to be, then in the name of justice and of common sense may we not ask: What is the matter with our Navy? Why is such a state of affairs permitted to exist in the most important department of our national system of defense, a department to which we owe our standing among the nations of the world and a department to which we must ever look for the maintenance of that standing, not to mention the Navy's primary function as our fundamental and first line of defense? We do not need to go far to find an answer to this question; it can be summed up in just five words—lack of a general staff.

In every business organization of any magnitude the first requisite needed to insure success in the undertaking is efficient management. Without a board of competent directors or management in which is vested full power of administration and responsibility, no business is likely to succeed. The same thing applies with equal, if not more, force to our naval establishment. For the past 15 years Congress has appropriated over a billion and a half dollars for the navy, a sum greatly in excess of the appropriation for the same purpose of any other power except Great Britain. If wisely expended under the direction of a general staff this vast sum would have insured us a navy second only to that of Great Britain, yet at the present time our navy is rated as a fourth-class power.

The fleet steaming out of Hampton Roads during the maneuvers of 1916. The New York in the foreground.





Why is it that with an equal appropriation the German Navy is to-day 30% greater than our own Navy? Almost every naval officer accepts the fact that the German Navy is not only twice as strong as our own, but that it has gained this superiority by means equally open to us. Germany at the present time has twice as many sailors of all ratings to man the ships as the American Navy. Again, Germany owns a splendid aeronautical corps, an effective submarine service, and a fine group of battle cruisers. It also possesses a logical and concrete organization, headed by a tried-out efficient general staff, and this has been accomplished at an expenditure equal to our own, with the result that Germany has a fleet not only 30% greater in combined units, but as a whole more modern in construction than our own.

Why is this so? Because of our lack of a real general staff with full power to direct how the money appropriated by Congress for the navy shall be spent. Under our present system the experts of the navy can only advise as to the type and variety of ships to be constructed. The final decision as to whether the navy shall construct dreadnoughts, battle-cruisers, scouts, submarines, or other type of highly technical ocean-going fighting machines rests with Congress, a body whose members, whatever their loyalty and patriotism, have neither the time nor the training necessary to decide those questions. To complicate matters further, every four years there is appointed a new civilian Secretary of the Navy, with new plans and new ideas, and absolute power to put them into effect.

Let us examine our present Navy Department organization and see what we have under the law as it stands to-day.

We have a Secretary and an Assistant Secretary, both civilians and both presumably unschooled in war. Under them are the following independent entities, each, under the law, of equal authority with the other:

First, A Bureau of Yards and Docks.
Second, A Bureau of Navigation.
Third, A Bureau of Ordnance.
Fourth, A Bureau of Construction and Repair.
Fifth, A Bureau of Steam Engineering.
Sixth, A Bureau of Supplies and Accounts.
Seventh, A Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.

Eighth, A Chief of Naval Operations.

Until within the last year, every conceivable activity of a navy was represented in the organization, save the one most important of all — the use of the navy in war.

There existed no single authority charged with the responsibility for the military preparation of the navy for war and its efficiency in the conduct of war. We had no recognized thinking and planning department operating under a military chief who would be held responsible for his advice and guidance, and whose duty it would be, under the civilian head of the Navy Department, to guarantee to the nation the biggest possible return for its investment in a navy—success in battle.

How far does the law which was enacted by Congress during the past year and which created the office of Chief of Naval Operations, provide for this fatal defect in our naval organization?

Under that law, the Chief of Operations "shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, be charged with the operations of the fleet and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war."

Here we have a skeleton of a form stripped of all substance. There has been created in effect one more executive bureau in a department already overweighted and weakened by a plethora of executives of co-equal authority. We still lack that legally constituted office that shall have the power to coordinate all the military as distinguished from the civil activities of all the various bureaus in the Department, to the end that that office may be properly charged with full and sole responsibility under the Secretary for the preparedness of the navy for war and its proper and efficient direction during war.

The work of all the bureaus is of a purely logistic character. We may search in vain in the present organization for any proper legal recognition of the strategical or war directing function. There should be provided in our organization a governing military head, under the Secretary, and supported by an adequate staff. This military head should have authority over and above all bureaus in all matters pertaining to the military functions of these bureaus. He should be charged with sole and full responsibility under the Secretary for the preparation of the navy for war and for its efficient direction in war. He therefore becomes the responsible adviser of the Secretary upon all matters

affecting the military preparation and employment of the naval forces. The Secretary of the Navy is not obligated to act upon the advice of this legally appointed adviser. The Secretary's authority and control is in no wise hampered or abridged; on the contrary, it is strengthened by the support of weighty and most intelligent counsel. If the advice of the Chief of Staff upon any matter affecting the military control of the navy is not accepted and acted upon by the Secretary, the responsibility passes from the Chief of Staff and is accepted in full measure by the Secretary.

The foregoing concensus of opinion is held by many officers of rank and experience and is therefore entitled to the utmost consideration by our national legislators. A large navy does not necessarily mean an efficient navy. Efficiency is possible only with an administration that expends honestly and economically appropriations given by Congress, with the single purpose of employing the ships and personnel so as to develop their full capacity in case of war. Such an administration, presided over by a general staff, is what the navy needs. By providing a general staff to direct and control the navy under the authority of the President and the Secretary of the Navy, Congress would be following the step which every other great nation has long since taken.

The Navy League has always advocated the passage of a bill to provide a General Staff for the Navy. Our present law is a step in the right direction, but it does not go far enough.

Nevertheless, the present heads of bureaus, supplemented by the head of the Naval War College and other officers of professional distinction, would constitute a most satisfactory Naval General Staff. Endow the Chief of Operations with the authority over all other Department agencies in everything affecting the better efficiency of the fleet. Make the Chief of Operations solely responsible under the Secretary of the Navy for all military matters connected with the administration of the navy, for the readiness of the navy for war, for the plans of operations for war, and for the ultimate efficient conduct of war.

By this arrangement the various bureaus will remain as at present constituted, with full authority to execute all technical matters with which the bureaus may be concerned in regard to the manufacture or preparation of material or provisions for war. The enactment of such a law would secure co-ordination of authority and focus responsibility, something that is lacking in the present General Board.

To a great many not well acquainted with the present administrative system of the navy, an impression prevails that the General Board as now composed performs the functions of a General Staff. This is a misconception. The General Board was called into existence in 1900 by an order of the Secretary of the Navy. It has performed, and is doing, important work; but, like the council of Aids, it lacks legislative sanction and has no permanent status whatever. It has no power to enforce its plans and recommendations, but is acting mainly in an advisory capacity.


Thus, if the General Board suggests a well-thought-out plan adapted to the best interests of the service, it is dependent on the approval and sanction of eight bureaus and the Secretary of the Navy to get that plan adopted. The plan must pass through the hands of the various Aids, after which it goes to the Chiefs of Bureaus, each giving their opinions on the merits of the proposed plan. The matter is finally laid before the Secretary, and if the plan does not appeal to him, owing to conflicting views and seeming difficulties tacked on during its travel through the various bureaus, the plan finds its way into the fileroom for permanent rest and obscurity.

Many excellent ideas and well planned schemes for the improvement of the naval service and many a valuable invention have been buried in the pigeon holes of this fileroom. And not a few of these ideas and inventions have found their way into foreign navies, where they are now utilized with excellent results.

Under the present organization the General Board is at its best a compromise of disjointed elements with perpetual friction minus executive authority; it lacks directive force with power to direct. What the navy needs is a real general staff, stripped of useless red tape and vested with full and undivided authority and responsibility for the complete preparation of the navy for war.

For the good of the service, let us hope legislative action on this very important matter will be taken soon. The Navy League will rejoice in the creation of a real permanent General Staff of the Navy.





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THE NAVAL AEROPLANE

LIEUT. COMDR. H. C. MUSTIN, U. S. N.

The importance of the aeroplane in naval warfare is far from being well understood in this country; the general impression, even with many naval officers, is that its particular function is scouting; as a matter of fact its scouting ability is, perhaps, the least valuable of its assets.

It is also not generally appreciated that if our fleet is inadequately equipped with aeroplanes, it will be at a very serious disadvantage. Consider for the moment one feature alone — spotting gun fire (observation of the fall of shots); a squadron of battle cruisers with guns of 15 (or more) inches caliber, whose fire is controlled by aeroplanes, can defeat an equal or perhaps greater number of dreadnoughts that are without this means of fire control. This statement, which is particularly interesting for the reason that there are no battle cruisers in our navy, will be explained presently; in the meantime I will make some comments on the present status of Naval Aviation.

Although the present war in Europe has caused a great advance in the efficiency of the military aeroplane and its tactics, the belligerent powers, as far as we know, have made but little progress with the design of naval aeroplanes and the development of their tactics. The reason for this is that nearly all the air operations have taken place over land or, when over sea, in localities where flight can originate from smooth water. The need for real naval aeroplanes — the type that can operate from floating bases far from smooth water — has therefore not been pressing.

No doubt the necessity for these types is appreciated by foreign naval officers, especially those detailed for aviation duty, but none apparently has had the time and opportunity to work out the deep sea aviation problems; all the aeronautic resources for design and manufacture on both sides engaged have been worked to full capacity in the effort to prevent the enemy from getting control of the air over land.

In the meantime the small group of naval officers in our service who have been on aviation duty the past two years have worked steadily on the one idea of developing the deep sea requirements in aviation. Something should be said here of the first problem in naval aviation which is, obviously, getting into the air; the hydroaeroplane, or aeroplane that starts and finishes its flight on water, can not get into the air unless the water is considerably smoother than in average conditions on the open sea; a hydroaeroplane must attain an air speed on the surface that is equal to its low flying speed limit before it will have sufficient lift to get into the air under control; this speed, for the various types we require, ranges from 40 to 60 miles per hour. Any one who has had any experience in speed boats will recognize the futility of attempting to start a flight from the surface of water that is at all rough. We thoroughly demonstrated this in our air operations at Vera Cruz in 1914 where, as in other places in the region of the trade winds, there is seldom an afternoon that a fast hydroaeroplane can get up flying speed on open water even if it could be hoisted overboard without damage. At Vera Cruz, fortunately, we were able to make use of the smooth water inside the breakwater and consquently were able to make flights every day for more than a month.

It should be noted that, as far as actual flying is concerned. the air conditions in the open sea are far better than the air over land; it is the inequalities in air, such as gusts, up trends and down trends, that make the operation of an aeroplane tiresome and, to the inexperienced pilot, dangerous. The velocity of the wind means nothing if it is a uniform velocity: a strong steady gale of wind feels about the same to an aviator as still air. In the open sea the wind comes to us over a surface that is comparatively flat — there are no mountains, hills or valleys, or hot and cold areas to disturb it; the gusts, or changes in velocity, at sea are usually horizontal, and those are comparatively easy to take care of. Consequently, provided we have some satisfactory means of getting into the air at sea, we can guarantee operation in nearly all kinds of weather; but if our fights must originate from the surface of the water, then the naval aeoplane will be only a fair weather apparatus and of little naval value. except in operations near the coast.

This first problem, getting into the air, has been satisfactorily worked out in our service; we have been experimenting for over two years with an apparatus, called the catapult, which launches the aeroplane from the ship's deck into the air at flying speed. This exceedingly important auxiliary to the naval aeroplane is

now being rebuilt into what we expect is its standard form, and will be given its final tests during the next two months. As now designed, although with the transporting and stowage facilities for aeroplanes it occupies a large space on a ship's deck, it is so arranged that it does not interfere with gun fire.

The development of the catapult has not been such a simple problem as would appear at first glance; in the design work one must consider all the different conditions and effects, more than twenty, that enter into the problem of releasing an aeroplane from the catapult at sea; in addition there are certain structural modifications in the aeroplane itself that are required to make it suitable for catapult work. These points are now well understood in our Naval Air Service and in this respect alone we have a momentary advantage over our possible enemies; but this will not last long against two notable resources abroad: a thorough knowledge of aerodynamics, and the facility for spending liberally and promptly all the money necessary to perfect any valuable military asset.

The second problem in naval aviation, finishing flight, is not as difficult as the first; we have found that the ordinary hydroaeroplane can be landed in much rougher water than one would expect: in fact, landings without damage can be made in a seaway very much rougher than the limit for getting off. Various plans and devices have been suggested for enabling the aeroplane to return directly to the ship; while it is possible that something on those lines may be worked out in the future for specially designed ships, the schemes are of no value to the fleet at present. The principal difficulties being the motion of the ship due to the waves, and the uncertain air near the ship's deck due to eddies caused by obstructions on deck. This uncertain air can be felt in an aeroplane two or three hundred feet above a ship even when she is at anchor in a breeze; if underway and steaming into the wind — which is the condition recommended by the advocates of landing on the ship — the air over the quarter deck would be very bad indeed. On one account, for the present at least, our procedure will be to land in the water and then be hoisted aboard ship: along these lines we have developed a special type of crane and certain means for facilitating landing in a very rough sea.

The problem of finishing the flight is, from a military standpoint, of much less importance than the commencement. One can readily conceive that under several conditions in naval warfare there are but two principal events for the air service, commencing the flight and carrying out the mission of the flight; for example, in a gale of wind the torpedo-carrying aeroplanes are launched for an attack on the enemy's battle line or troop ships; after delivery of the torpedo attack, the question of what happens to these aroplanes is interesting but comparatively unimportant.

For work with the fleet we require three types of aeroplanes. Type I. The High Speed Fighting Aeroplane.

Type II. The Medium Speed Torpedo Carrying Aeroplane. Type III. The Slow Speed Spotting Aeroplane.

The above constitutes the first line of the Naval Air Service; these machines all must be suitable for launching from the catapult and capable of being hoisted on board ships. There are other qualities desired are all well within the designing and manufacturing resources of this country. There follows a brief outline of the characteristics of each of the three types with some talk on the kind of work each is required to perform.

TYPE I. THE HIGH SPEED FIGHTING AEROPLANE.

This is a one-or two-seat machine with a maximum speed of about 100 miles per hour carrying a gun for attack on other aeroplanes and, when required, bombs for attack on dirigibles; this machine must be a fast climber; also it must be designed with very little stability so it will be sensitive in its control and thus have the best possible maneuvering qualities. On account of its high speed this machine can have only a small radius of action when carrying two aviators, but on special occasions it can be used as a one-seat machine either to increase its radius of action or increase its climbing ability.

The chief duties of this machine are: protection of our Types II and III (the torpedo carriers and the spotting aeroplanes), attack on those two types of enemy machines, and destroying or driving in the enemy's air scouts. Type II aeroplanes, when in condition for a torpedo attack or a bombing expedition, will be so heavily loaded that they will have little defensive power against the enemy's high speed, fast climbing fighting machines. Type III when engaged in spotting must carry such a large quantity of fuel that reserve lift for armament is not available; besides the control of ship gun-fire will keep both occupants of

Type III fully engaged in their particular duties; one, the pilot. in keeping station in formation; the other, the observer, in his spotting and communication work, which is a much more complicated matter, in a general engagement, than the uninitiated would expect. As the advantage given by aeroplane control of long range gun-fire is very great, there is no doubt in the future a new and very important feature in naval battle tactics will originate from the questions of protection of our spotters and interference with the enemy's.

Another duty of the Fighting Aeroplane will be attack on dirigibles, and only a very fast climbing machine can be expected to succeed in this sort of work; for this duty certain alterations in equipment, very quickly made on the spot, are necessary; just what those will be it is not proper to state in a paper of this kind, but it can be said that with this type in sufficient quantity we can with certainty break up dirigible operations against us.

It may be asked here how can we expect success against dirigibles, when aeroplanes abroad thus far have not given a better account of themselves; the principle reason for the poor showing of aeroplanes in dirigible attacks abroad are:

1st. The dirigible bases are within a night's run of the scenes of their operations so they can, and do, take advantage of the protection afforded by darkness.

2nd. Atmospheric conditions in the North Sea are such that average air conditions for aeroplane flying are bad. This has been explained to me by a neutral aviator who has flown a great deal in that region.

3rd. The percentage of really expert aviators abroad is very small. It is well known that the expansion in all the belligerent air services has been so great that pilots are rushed through their school work and into service after less training time than we know is necessary for his rudimentary flying instruction; furthermore, the source of supply is now very largely from civil life, and pilots from this source are lacking in the military of naval knowledge and experience indispensable in service avaitors, if real efficiency is to be expected.

TYPE II. THE MEDIUM SPEED TORPEDO-CARRYING AEROPLANE.

This is a two-seat machine with a maximum speed of about 80 miles per hour, designed primarily to carry a torpedo of the

kind now carried on battleships or to carry an equivalent weight (about 1,800 pounds) of high explosive bombs. This machine would have only a small radius of action when carrying its torpedo or when loaded to full capacity with bombs, but without these weights it can be given an equivalent weight of fuel that will add five or six hours to its cruising radius. The chief duty of this type is torpedo attack on the enemy's battle fleet or troop ships: for this work only one seat will be occupied. Here is a function of the naval aeroplane that not only will deserve very important consideration in naval battle tactics, but also — if there is an ample number in reserve — will make invasion of this country by sea a very dubious undertaking. It would not be proper in this paper to state just how this type will be operated against the enemy's battle line, but it can be said that our plans are such that the chances for success are far better than the chances in attack by torpedo boat destroyers; the work will be more or less of the forlorn hope variety, but past performance in other lines in the U.S. Navy shows that we can always count on more volunteers than the number of aeroplane seats available. The fact must not be lost sight of, as mentioned above, that aeroplanes of this type must have their escort of fighting machines to counteract the enemy's best means of defense, namely attack by his aircraft.

As a bomb-carrier Type II would probably not be used except in attacks on naval bases - particularly those that an over-sea enemy would establish within working distance of our home coasts — as likely as not in neutral territory and perhaps before any formal declaration of war. Bomb attacks by aircraft on moving ships in the present state of the art of bombdropping is not accurate enough to make it an effective means of offense; this is on account of the fact that there is not yet (and probably never will be) a means of determining instantly the course of an aircraft relative to any object on the surface; also no instrument can tell the directions and velocities of the various air currents below an aircraft at a high altitude. However, we will not lose sight of the fact that there are possibilities, under favorable conditions, in a swift low-altitude attack with bombs on ships underway: for example, when swooping down in misty weather or from low-lying clouds the aeroplane would be visible to the ship's lookouts and anti-aircraft gun pointers only a few seconds before the pilot had come so close to his target that he could not very well miss; but the pilot's chance of escape from effects of his own bomb under such circumstances would be remote.

Type II, when carrying extra fuel instead of its torpedo or bombs, will be used for scouting. In this condition it will have to be armed for protection upon possible contact with the enemy's fighting types. As a scout it will carry two aviators instead of one, for we have found the problem of air navigation out of sight of land too difficult to be undertaken in a one-seat machine.

TYPE III. THE SLOW-SPEED SPOTTING AEROPLANE.

This is a two-seat machine with a maximum speed of about 60 miles per hour and fuel capacity for 12 hours' flight on reduced throttle. The chief duty of this type is spotting for control of gun-fire, and this is the reason for its long endurance and the consequent slow speed; it will have to take the air early in the maneuvers preceding an engagement and perhaps wait several hours before firing commences.

Now to explain the statement in the first part of this paper relative to an engagement between battle cruisers and dread-noughts. It should be noted that as firing ranges increase, the difficulty in observing the fall of shots, even from the highest point avaliable aboard ship, increases; finally when the great ranges that are possible with guns of 15-inch calibre and over are used, the point of impact of the projectiles is invisible to the spotters in the fire-control tops of the firing ships. At long range firing it is absolutely necessary to control fire by spotting; this on account of the following two reasons:

First. The Naval range finder is inaccurate at great ranges. Second. Even when the exact distance of the target is known, there are always disagreements in the sight-bar ranges and actual ranges that must be corrected by spotting observations; the greater the range the greater are these disagreements.

If the battle cruiser with its long-range guns keeps at a distance outside the limits of spotting from fire-control tops, it will be hit only by chance shots from an opponent without aeroplanes. The battle cruiser with its advantage in speed

can choose the range for an engagement with the slower dreadnoughts; consequently if its fire is controlled from an aeroplane it can make a reasonable percentage of hits—very effective on account of the plunging effect at long ranges—while being nearly immune from the fire of the dreadnought without aeroplanes.

When ships are matched in speed and gun power, those that have aeroplane fire control have a very positive advantage over those that control from the tops; it is well known that the one who makes hits first with the very destructive projectiles of this day will at once have a big lead in the engagement.

Another duty of the Type II machine will be patrol of the fleet when cruising in war time. This type, on account of its slow speed, is not suitable for scouting runs of any great length; but it can establish a patrol of the main body of the fleet during all of daylight, outside the limits of torpedo range—keeping a lookout for submarines that may evade the outer screens, and also looking for floating mines. On this duty these aeroplanes would carry only one aviator; in place of the weight of the other aviator, some would carry a special type of bomb—now being developed—for attack on submarines; the others would carry guns for the same purpose.

It should be said here that, although aeroplanes or any other types of aircraft are not a certain protection against submarines, they are far better than any other means now in existence for protection of ships underway.

For the distribution of the above types in the fleet, a standard equipment as follows seems logical; it is practicable for each of our dreadnoughts, armored cruisers, and, when we have them, battle cruisers (the pre-dreadnought type battleship is inconvenient on account of deck arrangements for installation of the catapult and aeroplane stowage facilities; it probably would not be in the first line anyway):

- Two (2) Type I. Fighting Aeroplanes.
- One (1) Type II. Torpedo-carrying Aeroplane.
- Two (2) Type III. Spotting Aeroplanes.

A full set of spare structural parts and spare motors for each of the above.

On scout vessels of the new high-speed type that has been proposed, facilities can be made available for a much larger

quota of aeroplanes; this type ship will require no Type III spotting machines; provisions should be made for two (2) Type II torpedo-carrying aeroplanes and the greatest number practicable of Type I fighting machines. These ships should carry the largest practicable quantity of aeroplane spare parts not only for their own use, but to furnish a reserve of spare parts for the heavy ship outfits. They also should be equipped with shop facilities for minor repairs to aeroplanes and motors.

On smaller scout vessels there will be little space available for aeroplanes; this should be utilized for two or more, if practicable, of the Type II torpedo-carriers, which would normally be employed on scouting duty, but would always be available, if the opportunity arose, for offensive work.

It is hoped that the preceding remarks on the use of the various types of naval aeroplanes will throw some light on the following important considerations:

First. Unless in war time we have sufficient aeroplanes of the fighting type in commission we may as well have none of any type in the fleet. The torpedo-carriers and spotting machines, if not well protected, will not last long enough to be of any use against an enemy well equipped with fighting machines. Control of the air must be the ultimate end in view.

Second. We can never develop a comprehensive and efficient system of naval aeroplane tactics unless we have material and personnel sufficient to permit working in large groups with the fleet. All these problems must be worked out in peace time and the personnel thoroughly drilled, especially in the co-ordinating features of their work: on account of the high speeds and the comparatively great number of the units dealt with in naval aviation there is no branch of service work where thorough coordination is so vital to success. While our possible enemies in Europe are so much tied up with military aviation that they have no resources to spare for the larger problems in naval aviation we have the opportunity to take a big lead in this work; and this can be done at an expense to the government which, in comparison with the other naval expenditures, is ridiculously small.

Third. The art of flying is a comparatively insignificant part of the attainments a naval aviator must have; the man in com-





mand of a naval aeroplane must not only be an expert flier. but also must be well versed in the subject of naval aeroplane tactics, as well as being a seaman and navigator. He also must have sufficient knowledge of the other naval equipment and tactics to be sure of knowing what it is he sees, in order that he may avoid disastrous mistakes, such as incorrect scouting information or attacks on our own ships. The best source of supply for naval aviators is obviously the line of the navy; with ample flying school and practice flying facilities these officers can be qualified in about three months; but if we must draw our aviators from other sources, such as civil life or from the enlisted personnel, it is quite evident a much longer time for complete training will be required — the period will be a matter of years instead of months. The idea is frequently expressed that all we need is an aeroplane is an aviator, something on the order of a chauffeur in a motor car of a quartermaster aboard ship, who will take care of the manipulation of the controls. while a naval officer not an aviator will act as navigator and observer and command the aeroplane. It would be just as reasonable to say that we can put individuals in command of our ships who are not capable of handling them, simply because the commanding officer of the ship does not actually take the wheel underway. If, for example, a torpedo boat had a speed of 80 to 100 miles per hour and had to be steered up and down, as well as right and left, and at the same time be maintained right side up by other rudders, is it likely that the commandne officer would control her while in close formation by word of mouth to a helmsman? Decidedly not; he would be at the controls himself. On the other hand on long flights not in close formation the aviator in command of an aeroplane could safely turn over the controls to a relief aviator who need not be qualified in much else but the handling of the machine and care of its details: to this end we are now training enlisted men of the navy for the rating of aeroplane quartermaster, but for each of these we must always have at least one fully qualified aviator for command of the aeroplane. In time some of these enlisted men might work up to full qualification as naval aviators, just as some enlisted men have worked up to commissions in the line of the navy and eventually to command of ships.

In this paper, as regards material, the discussion has been limited to the needs of the fleet—the first-line work of the naval air service. The equipment of the second line—the coast bases—is of secondary importance and will be reserved for discussion at a later date. The first factor of preparedness—or, as it might be called, insurance against war—is the offensive fleet of the navy; if the fleet is not adequately equipped in aviation personnel and material it will never be at its full efficiency.

THE SUBMARINE


LAWRENCE Y. SPEAR

The activities of the submarine boat in the great struggle now raging in Europe have created a great public interest in this type, which is reflected in the space devoted to the subject by the public press during the last year or two. While, as a result of this publicity, much accurate and valuable information has reached the public, it is unfortunately true that at the same time a great mass of misinformation has been spread broadcast. so that some widely-held opinions as to the powers and limitations of the submarine are not well founded. However this may be. I believe I am perfectly safe in asserting that the people of the United States are now convinced that an efficient submarine service of adequate size is essential to the national defense. As this conviction is shared by all competent naval authorities and experts, it is certain that a serious effort will now be made to build up such a service. I hope to demonstrate to you, in the course of my remarks to-day, that one of the elements vital to the success of such an effort is the proper organization of all governmental activities concerned with the general subject of national defense.

While probably everyone present here to-day has some general knowledge of the submarine, there are comparatively few who have had the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the most important details, either by inspection of the boats themselves or by study of plans. Therefore, before proceeding with the main theme, I have thought that it would be useful and not uninteresting if a portion of my time were devoted to familiarizing you to some extent with the problems involved in the design and construction of an efficient submarine. To that end, I propose, with your permission, to illustrate what I have to say by a series of pictures, by which, with the comment thereon, I will hope to add to your knowledge of the subject and thus enable you to appreciate more easily the great part played by organization or lack of organization in the coming effort to provide an adequate submarine defense of maximum efficiency.

It is a truism that the design of every ship is a compromise, and, from what you have just seen and heard, you can readily understand why this is especially true of the submarine, where







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the number of conflicting demands is greater than in the case of the ordinary ship. For instance, here we have to deal with two kinds of speed, surface and submerged; two kinds of radius, surface and submerged; and two kinds of stability, surface and submerged; where, other things being equal, a gain in one means a loss in the other. You have also seen how the necessity for installing two power plants and the special mechanisms required for submerged navigation - none of which are fitted in the ordinary ship — inevitably results in placing a premium on space, so that no single detail can be considered independently, lest it encroach on space absolutely necessary for some other essential feature. Again, the submarine designer is under peculiar limitations as to weights and their disposition. A moderate amount of over-weight in the ordinary ship has no serious harmful results as a rule. In fact, the only penalty exacted, is a slight decrease in speed. In the case of the submarine, however, any material overweight must be avoided at all hazards, for if the designed weights, plus the designed allowance for under-estimates and contingencies, be exceeded, complete failure of the boat results, for while she may still operate on the surface, she will be unable to submerge. Moreover, the matter does not end with the limit on total weight, but extends to its disposition, for if the final center of the weights is not in the proper position with respect to the center of the ballast tanks, the boat cannot be brought to the proper trim for running submerged. Under these circumstances, it should be apparent that no single feature in the design of a submarine can safely be adopted without reference to the whole. In fact, it would be difficult to find a case where division of authority and responsibility could be more dangerous. Any private individual who should propose to solve this problem without fitting his organization to these stubborn facts would be a fit subject for the attention of a lunacy commission. Yet, in so far as legal organization goes, our government is to-day forced to put the main elements of this problem into separate water-tight compartments and to trust to the personal element in each compartment to establish communication with the orders. Thanks to the occupants of the compartments, communications do somehow get themselves established, so that the machine moves, but at the cost of great delay, many misunderstandings and a certain number of mistakes otherwise avoidable.

It may be of interest at this point briefly to summarize the agencies now employed to bring a United States submarine into existence after funds for the purpose have been provided by Congress. The first step is the determination of the desired military characteristics, that is, speed, radius of action, armament, This work is entrusted to the General Board of the Navy. a body which has no legal authority or responsibility. If submarines to achieve the desired result could be marvelously produced by a wave of the magician's wand, the task of this Board indeed would be easy, since it would be confined to determining the ideal characteristics. As a matter of fact, however, practical limitations both on the engineering and the financial side have to be considered. Consequently, in order to reach the best possible decision, it is nescessary for the Board to command complete and reliable information with respect to these limitations. The Board being itself without legal standing, naturally has no control over any agency capable of supplying it with this information. In practice, it must look to the Navy Department for anything it requires, and as we shall see later, as matters now stand, no single agency in the Navy Department is necessarily in a position to supply such information. Moreover, no legal obligation rests upon the Department or anyone therein to supply the Board with any information whatever. It may be argued that since the question has finally to be settled by practical possibilities, all useful purposes are served if the General Board merely fixes an ideal and leaves it to the designing branches to attain the desired results as nearly as possible. As a matter of fact, however, such a course is full of pitfalls. The characteristics set by the Board reach the technical bureaus after approval by the Secretary, that is to say, the Navy Department. and in practice these bureaus are bound to make a sincere and diligent effort to secure them. This, of course, is as it should be and no harm is likely to result, provided not only the desired ends but the means of accomplishing them are kept clearly in sight. It may happen, however, that in order to obtain, for instance, the speed desired, it is necessary to employ a type of machinery which from considerations of reliability or safety is extremely undesirable. Of course, if the objections to such machinery are positively known and fully appreciated at the time. the bureaus may pursue the matter back through the Navy Department to the General Board, with a view to affording the Board an opportunity to revise its characteristics in the light of this additional information. If, however, as is apt to be the case, the machinery in question is of a new type, its probable performances is, of course, a matter of opinion, and under the conditions set, it is likely that the bureaus will aim for the speeds set by the Board and accept disabilities, in connection therewith, which perhaps the Board would have been quite unwilling to accept. Thus it will be seen that the initial step in the production of a submarine is beset by organization difficulties.

Having selected in this manner the qualities which it is going to endeavor to secure in the boat, the Department, that is to say, the Secretary, now turns the matter over to the three technical bureaus concerned, viz., Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, and Ordnance. While the Bureau of Construction is charged with responsibility for the weights of the ship as a whole, it must of course rely on the other two bureaus for the weights of parts coming within their cognizance. Out side of this question of total weight, the authority of each bureau in its own domain is absolutely final. This means, then, that the torpedo tubes and guns are placed in one compartment. the engines, the shafting, the propellers, the electric motors and the storage batteries in another compartment, and the balance of the boat and its fittings and equipment in the third compartment. It is obvious that if these bureaus attempt to work out a complete design or to draw up complete specifications to be met in a builder's design, nothing could be accomplished if the actual procedure were carried out independently within the legal lines of demarkation between these bureaus. There must, necessarily, be consultation and co-operation, even if no official agency to that end exists. The legal responsibility, however, is not altered by such extra legal proceedings, and human nature being what it is, there is an inevitable tendency for each bureau to make sure of the things for which it is legally responsible and to let the other fellow take care of himself. As what is best for one is often worst for the other, there is nothing to keep a dominating influence in one bureau from playing havoc with that fing balance of qualities on which maximum efficiency depends.

At times, now happily past, the lack of any effort towards sincere co-operation between the bureaus has been clearly ap-

parent to those familiar with the workings of the Navy Department, and with things as they are, there is unfortunately no real assurance against the return of such unhappy conditions. However, even the perpetual existence of the will to co-operate does not give security against the unconscious exaggeration by the personnel of each bureau of the relative importance of the features for which it is in law and in fact solely responsible. It seems fair to conclude that, under these conditions, any good results accomplished must be achieved in spite of the organization and not on account thereof.

While it is not difficult to cite from past experience instances where the best possible results have been missed through defective organization, it is on the other hand very easy to exaggerate the defects of the present system. In the case of the submarine, there has been an unfortunate tendency to condemn on insufficient evidence the results achieved to date, and upon this basis to argue the existence of non-existent faults in the Navy Department. Any attempt to improve Navy Department organization based on hysterical and partisan statements in the public press and not upon the actual facts can hardly hope to be successful. At the present moment a considerable section of the public has been led to believe that, mechanically speaking, such submarines as we possess are, if not complete failures, at least distinctly inferior to the submarines possessed by European powers. This is distinctly a case where distance lends enchanement to the view. There are inherent difficulties in the design, construction, and operation of submarines, from which no navy has escaped or can escape. It is not the custom in Europe as it is here for the public press to discuss such matters, and hence we do not hear of the troubles encountered there, while in this country an incident on the voyage of a submarine, analogous to the puncturing of a tire on a motor trip, may be dressed up for the public as evidence of some grave deficiency in material or personnel. opinion excited by partisan controversy often necessarily influences administrative action, those sincere friends of the navy who hope to secure an improved organization by a sweeping condemnation of all results achieved under our present system are unfortunately apt to do as much harm as good. The facts are that, in certain important respects, the majority of our submarines are superior to the European boats of the same date and tonnage, and so far as can be ascertained from available information, there is no pronounced inferiority in any respect. though doubtless the longer experience in Europe has removed from the realm of conjecture some questions which on this side are still in process of solution. Owing, however, to the fact that we have had in this country the benefit of a large part of the development work carried out in Europe, it may safely be asserted that from a mechanical standpoint, we are now practically abreast of the times. Naturally the European Nations will benefit from the lessons learned from the present war, before we are in a position to do so, but in so far as submarines are concerned, such lessons are not so important as they are for other classes of ships. It is a peculiarity of the submarine due to its almost complete helplessness on the surface and its almost complete protection submerged, that its effectiveness and its limitations can be almost absolutely determined by peace maneuvers, a condition inapplicable to other types by reason of the impossibility of foreseeing with accuracy the effects of gun fire.

So far we have dealt almost entirely with the engineering problems connected with the design and construction of the submarine; and I trust that I have made it clear that, owing to the complexities involved, the case is one which would justify an even more elaborate organization than is necessary for ships of other types.

I want now to call your attention to certain larger aspects of the question. What is wanted is an efficient submarine service adequate in size to our needs. Of course, the possession of an adequate number of well-designed and constructed boats is a "sine qua non," but no matter how many boats you have or how excellent they may be from a mechanical standpoint, you have not an efficient submarine service if you lack an adequate trained personnel and a properly organized system of bases for supply and repair, and, above all, a definite plan for the use of the service in war. All of these components are necessary to efficiency, but you may fail in some degree in all but the last and still avoid disaster. The war plan, however, is vital, as it affects not only the movements and handling of the boats when war is imminent or declared, but its require-

ments should determine the peace training, the military characteristics of the boats themselves, that is, speed, radius of action, armament and size, and also the location of the bases. the extent of the facilities required in each case, etc. In fact, the war plan dominates the whole situation. It would not be fitting for me, and it is no part of my purpose to express any opinion here as to what would constitute a proper war plan for the United States submarine service. There are, however, certain general considerations which we are all qualified to discuss, which would seem to be worth some examination. Taking into account the stage which has now been reached in the mechanical development of the submarine, and the geographical conditions of the United States, it is obvious that in the near future the greater proportion of the United States submarine service must be devoted to coast defense. Now, from the broadest point of view, the defense of the coast involves the main battle fleet, the submarine and mine services, the fixed fortifications and the mobile field army. Under the tried and true maxim that a strong offense is the best defense, a crushing blow by the main battle fleet in enemy waters or mid-ocean might well result in practically perfect security for the coasts, and it is axiomatic that the battle fleet must always be free to deliver such a blow when the enemy's strength permits. Unless, however, the fleet is so immensely superior to all possible enemies as to make the results certain, a second line of defense involving the other four branches above mentioned must be provided. Each one of these separate branches is essential to perfect defense, but perfect defense cannot be obtained unless they exist in the proper proportions and unless their efforts are properly co-ordinated. In fact, you cannot to-day determine how many submarine boats you need or what their type should be, unless you know the extent to which they are to be supplemented by fortifications, mine fields and a mobile army.

At the present moment, there exists no government agency responsible for the creation or management of the second line of defense as a whole, and here again we suffer under the evils of divided responsibility.

It will perhaps be of interest at this point to assume the existence of such an agency and under this assmption to glance at a few of the questions with respect to the submarine service

upon the answers to which our action would be dependent. Such a body would no doubt begin by analyzing the performances of submarines in the European War with a view to determining the possibilities and the limitations of the type as it now exists. The operations of the British submarines in the Sea of Marmora, the Baltic, and the Mediterranean, and of the German submarines in the North Sea, the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean. prove beyond a doubt not only the ability of the type to operate at great distances from their base, but also their ability to pass with comparative immunity through long stretches of water, the surface of which is effectively controlled by the enemy. A study of these performances in the light of known facts as to the displacement and other qualities of the boats actually used, coupled with the results drawn from our experience with smaller types, would lead to certain definite and reliable conclusions as to the size of the boats required for efficiently carrying out the different war plans which would be under consideration at the beginning of such an investigation. Such a study would certainly reveal the fact that within reasonable limits the size of the submarine should be determined by the distance of her operating field from her base. As to limitations, the results of the defensive measures adopted by the British in home waters demonstrate the possibility under certain conditions of securing a passive defense against submarines by means of booms, nets, special mine fields and so on. If, therefore, we contemplated offensive action in enemy waters where conditions permitted such defense, it would obviously be necessary to provide our boats with those special features of design which would be required to enable them to get through such defenses. On the other hand, we would certainly not encumber our boats with such appliances if our war plan called for their use against the enemy fleet in our own coastal waters or in midocean, since in this case it would be impossible for the enemy to limit our operations by such means as those above mentioned. Again before determining the numbers of submarines required for the efficient performance of a given task, we should have to reach a conclusion as to the effectiveness of each unit. In drawing conclusions in this respect from the European War, we should have clearly in mind the fact that under the conditions of that war, the submarines on each side are continually operating in waters of which the enemy is in absolute control of the sur-

These conditions are bound to deprive the submarine of much valuable information, which under different conditions would be available and which would add enormously to its unit efficiency. The conditions as to information of which we could assure ourselves in our own field of operations would thus have a considerable influence on final decision as to the numbers and types of boats required for the performance of any given task. Moreover, the probabilities of a complete or partial failure on the part of the submarines to accomplish any given task would be given due weight in determining the extent to which it would be necessary to provide for additional means of defense. The particular points just mentioned by no means cover the whole subject, but they have been cited merely to illustrate the nature of the questions which must be dealt with. The essential fact which I wish to emphasize is that the war plan as finally adopted would necessarily assign certain fields of operation to the submarine. The location of these fields, their distances from the submarine bases and the probable conditions which would exist there will determine at once the type and size of boat most effective for the work, as well as the numbers required.

If the above contentions be correct, in the absence of any such actual study of the subject, we will only by accident hit upon the size and type of submarine most efficient for our purpose of defense. At the present moment, broadly speaking, the size is more or less determined by accident. Congress, which provides the funds and thus fixes the size, must reach its conclusions and discharge its duty in the light of such information as it is able to get. The formal recommendations of the Secretary of the Navy with respect to the submarine service are not only quite independent of the recommendations of the Secretary of War with respect to fortifications, mines and field army, but are influenced by many other considerations than purely military ones. They cannot, therefore, be taken as representing responsible naval advice to Congress based upon complete information and careful study of the whole problem. It is the custom of Congress to supplement the formal recommendations of the Secretary of the Navy by information derived from naval officers summoned before it. As a rule, the testimony of such officers is necessarily confined to the details of the matters of which they have immediate charge. As no one officer, however, represents any organi-

zation charged with the complete responsibility for the efficiency of the submarine service, the natural result is an apparent divergence of views, which to say the least, must be confusing to the hearers. When traced back to the origin, it will nearly always be found that wide divergence of views, is due entirely to the absence of any definite war plan. No better illustration of this can be found than the apparent great difference between the views recently expressed before the House Committee on Naval Affairs by Admiral Grant, in immediate command of the Atlantic Submarine Flotillas and Admiral Benson, the Chief of Operations. Admiral Grant strongly recommended that all future submarines be of about 800 tons surface displacement, whereas Admiral Benson approved the recommendations originating within the Department for smaller defense submarines of about 500 tons displacement. There can be little doubt that the difference in these recommendations was due to the difference in ideas as to the tasks to be assigned to the submarine. Such apparent difference of opinion between prominent and capable officers can hardly fail to be confusing both to Congress and to the public. It is therefore broadly speaking only accidental if out of all this confusion Congressional action results in appropriations for those sizes and types of submarines which would prove most efficient under actual war conditions.

In other words, at the present time we have no organization dealing with the second line of defense as a whole; that is to say, we have no one body which is required to consider and determine upon the necessary balance between the submarine service. the mine service the coast fortifications, and the mobile army. Until we do have such a body, it is impossible for us to determine how many submarines are necessary to adequate defense; and. more than that, it is impossible to say how big those submarines should be and what qualities they should possess. from the fact that the proper size for a submarine depends entirely upon what you wish to do with it. If you require it only to operate within a short radius from its base, say from 200 to 300 miles, it is utter folly to build large submarines. If, on the other hand, it is a military necessity that the boats should operate at from 1000 to 1500 miles from the base, then we undoubtedly require larger types. Until it is definitely determined how the United States submarines are to be used,—where their operating fields are,—it will be only by accident that we ever secure them of the proper size.


While much might be added to this hasty survey of the submarine problem in relation to the question of naval and military organization, it seems unnecessary, as enough has been cited to warrant the following conclusions:

First, in the absence of any competent governmental agency charged with the responsibility of dealing with the second line of defense as a whole, we are not even in a position to say how many submarines we should have and of what sizes and types they should be.

Second, owing to the lack of certain agencies in the organization of the Navy Department itself, the production of the best possible submarine of any given size and type is undoubtedly hampered.

In conclusion, it is no part of my purpose to suggest remedies for such defects in our organization as exist, and I am content if I have made it clear to you that the success of the coming attempt to develop an adequate and efficient submarine service is dependent upon questions of organization rather than upon mechanical and technical engineering considerations; for while perfection, particularly in propulsive machinery, has not yet been attained, it is nevertheless a fact that submarines of American design and construction have proved themselves in the European War to be at least equal to those of European origin, while the performance of a large number of boats under severe war conditions has demonstrated beyond question the fact that such mechanical difficulties and disabilities as still exist in all submarines are no bar to the efficient performance of the service for which such boats are designed and constructed.





THE NAVAL RESERVE

New York's naval militiamen on their summer cruise on a battleship. This organization was mustered into state service 25 years ago. During the Spanish war they gave nearly a thousand men to the Navy and furnished complete crews of officers and men for many vessels.

NAVAL PERSONNEL AND THE RESERVE

HON. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT Assistant Secretary of the Navy

To naval officers and people who have followed the needs of naval preparedness for the past decade or two, instead of the past year or two, the present phenomenon of public interest is gratefully surprising, and while everything should be done, of course, to encourage this public interest and public information, certain features of the awakening are just a trifle amusing. Taking as an example the question of personnel,—that is to say, the question of manning our ships with officers and men,—a great many people believe that in the past six months or a year they have made startling discoveries of revolutionary interest. A year or so ago I made a simple statement of fact which was known to anybody who could figure with a pencil, that in order to man all of the ships of the navy with full complements, 18,000 more men would be necessary. The headlines of the newspapers carried the news abroad on the front pages as a new discovery. A few weeks ago, in answer to a question before the Naval Committee of Congress, I stated the simple fact, known to any person familiar with the duties of the navy, that in case of war with a first-class naval power, we should undoubtedly need over 200,000 men in the Naval Service.

The fact is, of course, that the people of the country are for the first time beginning to be interested in real facts instead of in oratorical generalities. Of course, some individuals are taking personal advantage of the change of mind of the public to pose as the fathers of preparedness, where their own record, when they themselves were in a position to make the record, proves quite conclusively that they took no steps to lead, but merely followed the accepted popular frame of mind of their own time.

In this matter of personnel, for instance, down to this great awakening of the present day, every Secretary of the Navy, every officer of the navy, knew full well that only a certain number of ships in the navy could be fully commissioned. For instance, in 1912, when President Taft reviewed the so-called great mobilization in New York Harbor, a surprisingly large number of ships there present were in bad physical condition; some had actually to be towed to their anchorages; others were kept affoat by working the pumps day and night. A great

number of them were short of officers and men, and it was only by the use of the Naval Militia and by the authorization, under doubtful legality, of short-term enlistments that the quota was as large as it was. Further, the public believed that all was well with the navy, whereas any person who was interested enough to ascertain the facts knew the dangerous weakness which existed.

All this is, of course, history. It ought not to concern us at the present time; it only does concern us because of the fact that a few selfish individuals are trying to gain personal or political profit by a misstatement of historical facts. It is, therefore, unnecessary for me to go any further into the deficiences of the past, more than to add that when I became connected with the service in an official way, three years ago, while things seemed to be running beautifully on the surface, the accumulated shortness in materials and men had become an alarming danger. Nor will I go into the really great additions in material and munitions during the past three years, nor into the increase of four or five thousand men in the personnel during this period. What you and I are concerned about to-day is the present situation, and I will give the facts with special reference to personnel as clearly and as briefly as possible.

No navy has in time of peace been maintained on a complete war footing; that is to say, a certain number of older ships have been kept in reserve with only partial crews, the intention being to fill out these crews with reserves in case of war. The General Board of the Navy has recommended 15,000 additional men this year, and this recommendation has also been made by the Secretary to Congress. This is probably the maximum number of men which we could enlist in one year in addition to the usual quota. and this number will take care of the increase of the fleet during the coming year and of the deficiencies of the past. It will not and does not pretend to put every ship in full commission. goes without saying, of course, that the highest efficiency would be obtained by putting all ships in full commission and keeping none in reserve, which would require at least another 10,000 men; but it is fair to say that no nation has in time of peace conducted her naval establishment in this way, trusting to the existence or creation of a reserve force at least sufficient to fill out the crews. I think that if Congress authorizes the enlistment of 15,000 additional men this year, a thoroughly proper step will have been taken, though it must be with the distinct understanding that more men will be necessary next year to take care of the additional construction. Certain people have been spreading the report that the reason the navy is now undermanned is that we cannot get men to enlist. This is, of course, absolutely false. Not only are we accepting only one man out of six who apply, but for the first time almost in our history the legal limit has been maintained day and night during the past two years. In addition to this the so-called "unpopularity" of the navy is disproved by the fact that 85 per cent of the men whose terms of enlistment expire are at the present time re-enlisting in the service. This is a far higher average than at any prior time.

Coming now to the question of officers, it is also true that we are short; that we need many more, but that we cannot merely by passing an act of Congress, add officers to the service. The best thing possible has been done, and that has been to add to the number at the Naval Academy, making it half again as large. The benefit of this increase of course, will not be felt for a number of years, and, during the next ten years, at least, the problem of the lack of officers will be a serious one.

In view then of these facts, in view of what we have learned from Europe in regard to the actualities of modern warfare, it becomes clear that immediate steps must be taken to create a reserve of officers and men, which in time of war would fit without delay or loss of motion into their proper places. I have said that we should need in the naval service under war conditions over 200,000 men. This is based on our own war plans and on the increases made in Europe. If we take the regular forces of our navy in time of peace at 75,000 this means an addition of at least 125,000 men. The Naval Militia of 8,000 will, of course, be of the greatest assistance, especially in their present state of greatly improved efficiency, but they will be but a drop in the bucket. Where, then, is the reserve to come from? It goes without saying that after war breaks out it is too late to begin to train a reserve force. The work and the training must be done in time of peace.

Three classes of individuals must necessarily make up this reserve:

First, the former retired officers and enlisted men of the regular Navy and Naval Militia. Probably we cannot ultimately count on more than about 15,000 of these.

Secondly, men now engaged professionally in sea-faring pursuits, that is to say, the officers and men of the merchant marine, over-seas, coastal, Great Lakes, fishermen, etc. We cannot, of course, stop all of our commercial activities by taking all of these into the naval service, and it is probably a fair estimate that not more than 30,000 or 40,000 would be taken into the naval service. This leaves us still with a deficiency of at least 75,000.

Thirdly, and this would, of course, be by far the largest class, civilians not connected with the merchant marine of the regular naval service. The proplem of creating a proper reserve of 75,000 of these men is a great one, far less great, of course, than in the case of the army, but it is not a problem which can be solved in a day of a year. We are taking the first step, however, this summer, by adopting a leaf from the note-book of the army. We are going to hold on the Atlantic Coast a great "Naval Plattsburg."

This naval training cruise for civilians will be held probably on nine battleships of the reserve fleet, each ship manned by her reserve crew of about 300 and adding thereto 300 civilians. These ships will start from various ports along the coast, from Boston on the north to Charleston on the south. They will rendezvous and cruise in company for three weeks, taking part, we hope, in the war game on the 20th of August, thence returning to their home ports. Here the fourth and final week of the cruise will be given up to exercise in matters of local defense in co-operation with the Coast Artillery and with the owners of suitable motor boats of the locality. This first year we are endeavoring to get men of really valuable qualifications to take this cruise; that is to say, civilians who have a love for and knowledge of the water or else men who have mechanical or electrical ability. As at Plattsburg, they will be given the routine work of drill and general training during a part of the day, but will be allowed to specialize during the afternoons in the subject for which they are more fitted; as, for instance, gunnery work, signalling, navigation, boat work, engine, electrical, or radio work.

At the end of this cruise each man will undoubtedly be of some value, however slight, in time of war, and if he so desires will be tentatively assigned to a station where he would immediately report on telegraphic instructions.

To be sure, this will add only about 2,700 men to the naval reserves, but if the experiment works, it will be possible during following years to extend the opportunities for training, not only on this coast, but also to the Great Lakes and to the Pacific. .

What I want especially to emphasize is that every naval officer has during the past known what war would mean. The need for preparedness has existed in the past just as it does to-day. At last I believe the people of the country are going to accept the judgment of the men who know, of the men who are paid by the people to know. The war in Europe has brought home to us facts which have always been facts, but which we have been unwilling to learn until now. The Navy is doing everything possible to increase its efficiency. I think that it is the consensus of opinion among the great majority of the officers of the service that the time for knocking has gone by, and the time for boosting has come. They want, and the Administration, irrespective of party questions, wants, the co-operation of everybody in the work of building. Heaven only knows there is enough constructive work to be done at the present time if the people of the country, through their representatives in Congress, will only give us a chance to do that work! Every minute of time taken up in perfectly futile and useless argument about mistakes in the past slows up construction that much. Worse than that, it blinds and befogs the public as to the real situation and the imperative necessity for prompt action. How would you expect the public to be convinced that a dangerous fire was in progress. requiring every citizen's aid for its extinguishment if they saw the members of the volunteer fire department stop in their headlong rush towards the conflagration and indulge in a slanging match as to who was responsible for the rotten hose or the lack of water at the fire a week ago? I sincerely hope that the members of the Navy League all over the United States will devote themsleves wholeheartedly to constructive and not to distructive labors. in maria semanakan

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LESSONS OF AMERICAN HISTORY

EDWARD BRECK, M.A., PH.D.


A great man has said, "The more history you know the wiser you are!" According to this standard the American people fall considerably short of wisdom, for the study of history has never been considered by Americans in any other light than as a means of indulgence in smug self-glorification. To this end the historic Muse has been all but bereft of her garment of truth, and the American people, broadly speaking, is to this day shamefully ignorant of the actual facts of its development.

Whatever be the reasons for this lamentable condition, the remark made about us by a bright foreigner, that we are a "nation of villagers," is quite true. Not one American in fifty has, in years gone by, taken more than a languid interest in matters beyond his own county or state, and only the Federal elections or the upheaval of a great war have been able to drag him out of his traditional parochialism. As for examining into the condition and the political tendencies of Europe or Asia, with a view to guarding against possible dangers to American ideas and policies,— may we say with justice that more than one per cent. of our citizens ever proceeded thus far beyond the confines of self-complacent narrowness?

The result is that, at this very day, we have politicians of nation-wide reputation and influence still preaching complete reliance upon the millions of quite untrained men whom our President could summon from the soil, as the Sparti sprang from the dragon's teeth; and this in spite of the warnings of the wise and historic-read Washington, who, even in the isolation of those early days, advised his countrymen that they had no right to expect to be free from "those painful appeals to arms, with which the history of every country abounds."

We are enjoying the privilege at this time of listening to the words of many expert and distinguished men, who tell us what should be done to attain to that state of preparedness which the Navy League advocates, in the quickest possible way; and in order to appreciate more fully what is proposed, and to secure that clearness of view which an historic perspective invariably ensures, it may not be unprofitable for us to pass in

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rapid review certain well-established facts in the history of these United States, which are calculated to point salutary lessons.

A burnt child fears the fire, but too often a burnt nation forgets almost over night that there has been a fire. The possibilities of future national conflagrations were never more explicitly pointed out than by Washington himself in the very earliest days of our history, and his wonderfully far-seeing advice on the subject of defense is as pertinent today as it was then. But, in spite of it, the army and navy were so neglected after his retirement that, from 1808 to 1812, the former consisted of less than 10,000 officers and men, while the navy was as good as a non-existent, until the depredations of the Mediterranean pirates resulted in the building of a few fine frigates. These, with their splendid personnel, were all that we possesed, when there came to us in 1812 one of those crises foretold by Washington, when the choice between disgrace and honor left us no decision but for war, "a war," as President Wilson has rightly called it, "of arms brought on by a program of peace." Stung to action at last by the outrageous impressment of our seamen, we declared hostilities against Great Britain, with a standing army of 6,744 officers and men, and a navy of seventeen vessels, mostly of little military value, carryng 450 guns. This force was to oppose the veteran armies of England and the greatest fleet the world has ever seen, consisting of a thousand vessels and 28,000 guns!

So impressed were our Conscript Fathers in the Congress assembled by this appalling difference in power, that they were on the point of passing a bill to keep our few fine frigates, like the Constellation and Constitution, within our harbors, lest they should become the victims of British naval prowess! In fact, it was only the presence in Washington of two loyal and indignant naval officers, who made representations to their friends, that prevented this step, though by the narrowest of majorities, and opened the way to the glorious career of our famous frigates and their magnificent crews, whose performances during the ensuing war shed immortal lustre upon American arms, and garnered about all the glory that we reaped during that disastrous and totally unnecessary war.

I say unnecessary, because had we possessed a reasonably powerful navy, including a squadron of ships-of-the-line, plus a really efficient army, there would, in all probability, have been no war, for the simple reason that England would not have dared to take the risks of a war with America merely for the sake of her orders in council and the blustering proof that an Englishman once was an Englishman forever. What such a fleet and army would have cost us would have been but a paltry sum compared with the actual costs of the war, direct and indirect. Furthermore, had we been properly prepared, heedful of the advice of Washington, and had England nevertheless dared the conflict, there is no military authority who does not know that she would have been soundly thrashed. Her great line-of-battleships would not have been able with immunity to convey troops across the seas, and Canada would now be a part of the United States.

But if you will take trouble to inspect the American school and college histories used even at this day, you are very likely to get from them the impression that we actually thrashd Great Britain! In them you will find nothing of the bill passed by Congress to raise thirteen new regiments for the avowed purpose of "conquering Canada," a purpose which we so lamely essayed to put in practice that at the end of the war we were in possession of no part of Canada; in fact were glad enough to have prevented the British and Canadian troops from invading our own soil!

In these so-called histories you will find nothing of the solemn fact that up till the signing of the treaty of peace, the only decisive victory for the American arms on land was at the Thames, where the British were largely outnumbered. Our defeats are mentioned with indulgence, and many of them metamorphosed into victories; the disgrace of Detroit, where 1,800 Americans, mostly, to be sure, militia, surrendered without a blow to 720 British and 600 Indians, being about the only frankly confessed disaster. These books gloss over the affair at Bladensburgh, where fewer than 1,500 British put to almost instant flight over 5,000 Americans, after which they gaily marched to Washington, burned down our capitol, and committed other villanies with contemptuous immunity, whereupon our Secretary of War fled to Baltimore and resigned!

At Plattsburg two columns of Americans, some 13,000 in all, recoiled before 2,000 British.

Do these books tell their readers that we outnumbered the enemy more than ten to one? I have never found this truth stated in one of them. One recoils before the speculation upon the outcome of the War of 1812, had England not had her hands full with the terrible fight against the Corsican usurper.

Fortunately for us, the high quality of our sailor-men, and the practice given them by the action with the Old World pirates in the Mediterranean, gave us almost consistent victory on the sea and, while it was weakness, especially naval weakness (so England thought it and had a logical right to think it), that brought on the war, so on the other hand, it was naval strength that played a great part in bringing it to a close which allowed escape with undiminished territory. Not only the grand work of our frigates, that humiliated the proud ensign of England, but the victories of Perry and Macdonough were efficacious in preventing the threatened invasion from Canada.

At the close of the war, while negotiating the treaty of peace, we were careful to say nothing concerning the principal cause of the war, which was the impressment of our seamen. And thus ended this disgraceful combat, which was caused in the main by the total neglect of the wise advice of George Washington,— in other words, by a neglect of reasonable preparedness.

The war between the States offers a large number of vitally important lessons to the present generation. The first is the decisive influence of sea power, and in this connection we must not forget that, in a somewhat less degree, we are in the same position as Great Britain, since any serious attack must come from across the water. This means that we stand and fall with our navy, even supposing that there were no such thing as a Monroe Doctrine, the upholding of which our President has called "a solmen pledge." Do Americans fully appreciate that this means that, in case South America should be attacked by one or more European or Asiatic nations, the American Navy would have to fight hostile fleets, not only off our own coasts, but very possibly off the shores of the Argentine or Chile?

The Monroe Doctrine was not seriously challenged until the Civil War found us with our hands full. But, before taking up the Mexican question of the early sixties, let us remind ourselves that it was naval power that finally brought the heroic South to her knees. It would be a bold historian who would assert that the South would have been beaten in four years; or in ten, or perhaps in any time, if she could have kept her ports open for the exportation of cotton and the unlimited influx of supplies and munitions of war. It was not until our navy became strong enough to blockade the ports of the South that economic and military starvation caused her political fall.

Then it was that Uncle Sam first found himself in a position to turn his gaze southwards to Mexico, where Napoleon was attempting, in fullest contempt of the Monroe Doctrine, to establish an empire under French influence with the unfortunate and duped Maximilian at its head.

Let us recall the situation exactly, in view of the oft repeated assertion by the advocates of disarmament, to the effect that after the present great war the belligerents will find themselves in such a state of exhaustion that danger from them will be unthinkable. How was it in 1865? The United States had just finished a terrible struggle of four years against the bravest and toughest of foes, and, according to the tenets of the Pacifists, she must have been so weakened as to be incapable of asserting herself against aggression. Was this the truth, in spite of the fact that aggression threatened from the two most powerful nations of the world? Let us see.

Hardly had the war closed when Secretary Seward called upon the French government to withdraw its troops from Mexico, upon the frontiers of which our army was concentrated. In those days the French military prestige was what that of Prussia is today, and Louis Napoleon was the essence of pride and ambition. But did he hesitate to obey the mandate of the American Government? Not a day! The Tricolor bowed before the Stars and Stripes, and Napoleon's army slunk off in the dark, leaving the miserable Maximilian to his fate.

The next step taken by our government was to demand of Great Britain the payment of damages for the depredations against our merchant marine by the Confederate privateers, which were fitted out and launched in England with the connivance of the British Government, to which it was made plain that war would be the result of a refusal to arbitrate. The world

knows the result. A government bitterly hostile to the government of our country, and possessing the greatest navy in the world, recoiled before the idea of a war with the United States.

And why in 1865 did the Union Jack and the Tricolor bow to the Stars and Stripes? Because, far from being weakened in military sense by the four years of terrible war, she was at that time incomparably more mighty than she ever had been before!

Without taking time to follow out this significant and instructive train of thought, it is sufficient to say that, after the present war, several nations will possess veteran armies such as the world never saw before, and some of them will have navies that will possibly be nearly intact. Their financial weakness will not interfere with a renewal of hostilities, and perhaps may have the effect of a desire to recoup at the expense of some very rich and very weak country, somwhere over seas!

Though there were plentiful signs that the chronic Cuban question would soon develop into war, nevertheless Congress did little to increase or strengthen either navy or army in the years immediately preceding 1898, no doubt reflecting the general optimism and carelessness of the whole country in regard to foreign complications.

There was no lack of warnings of a political and military nature, but the American people has ever been of a singularly conservative and unresponsive nature. The fact is not even now appreciated that the Navy League itself has been preaching the gospel of preparedness since 1902. The people, however, knew but one thing, and that was, that the United States was composed of over 75 millions inhabiting the richest country in the world, while the possible adversary — Spain — was a miserably poor land of some fifteen million of mostly illiterate people.

The year 1898 found us with the smallest regular army in our history in proportion to population, less than 29,000 officers and men, or four one-hundredths of 1 per cent. of our inhabitants.

It is true that some efforts had been made to increase and strengthen our defenses. For example, the Endicott Board in 1885 brought about an order for the emplacement of 2,362 pieces of ordnance, but in 1898, thirteen years later, only 151 of these guns were in position!

We were without accurate maps, and had no statistical knowledge of the enemy's resources. We had no reserves of ammunition except for the soldiers of the regular army.

As an example of the ignorance, even of our experts, General F. Lee, our Consul General at Havana, testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs that there were between 97,000 and 98,000 Spanish troops in Cuba, while General Miles estimated them at 150,000. The actual fact was, that there were 196,820 Spanish soldiers in Cuba, 155,302 of them regulars; 36,582 of these were in the Province of Santiago.

On March 9th, the Congress voted \$50,000,000 for "national defense," but nothing for offense, and not a cent was available even for offensive preparations. Many mines were laid, but our coast was practically defenseless to a first-class naval enemy.

All our artillery pieces, field and heavy, were constructed for and actually used black powder, and while poor little Spain armed her troops with the best rifle in the world and gave them smokeless powder, our great rich country had just enough smokeless powder to supply our regulars and one regiment of volunteers, the Rough Riders. All other volunteers, among them, the flower of our youth, were sent to the front and some of them actually into battle, with an obsolete gun and black powder!

At the battle of Caney the Second Massachusetts, as good a volunteer body as we have ever had, had to be withdrawn from the firing line after serious losses, because their old Springfields could inflict little or no damage to the enemy, while the smoke of their black powder served but to give the enemy the range.

In the same manner the fire of our field guns served the enemy the same purpose.

After two months of feverish preparation, this rich and proud country succeeded in getting together 17,000 men of the Fifth Army Corps at Tampa, and the confusion and inefficiency that followed in the effort to embark could be justly compared only with the mise-en-scene of an opera bouffe. It is significant of the state of mind of our people at that time, that, when one of our newspaper correspondents at Tampa, Mr. Poultney Bigelow, dared to tell the truth in his dispatches, his words were greeted with incredulity, with jeers, and in some quarters with the cry of "Traitor!"

Since then every historian, including Colonel Roosevelt, has testified to the humiliating truth of these charges.

At last the regiments, and really fine ones they were, so far as the personnel went, got afloat in transports hired for the purpose and for the most part quite independent of naval or military authority. By the most exceptional luck, and with the aid of the navy, the men were landed near Santiago, though they had no proper means of landing, and could not have done so if the weather had not been perfect, or if the Spanish army had made a determined effort to prevent the landing. If such a man as Weyler had commanded at Santiago the expedition of the Fifth Corps might have suffered disaster right there.

Spain clothed her troops properly for a tropical campaigr in summer time. We sent our men down there in winter clothing, with heavy woolen shirts. For the 17,000 we provided just three ambulances, and the medicines used at the battle of Santiago were only what the individual surgeons had with them, for the reserve supplies arrived just in time to go on the last transport, and, if this transport had not returned to Port Tampa by mistake, these medicines would not have gone at all. Not only that, but the medicine lists were mislaid and the medicines could not be found for many days, as nobody knew in what ship they were!

The army was warned repeatedly by experienced men, and the orders of the Surgeon General were exemplary, but they could not be carried out. The men were told to boil all their drinking water, but after the first few days they had no cups to boil it in. They were warned against the sleeping on the ground in the tropics, but there were not blankets enough to go around, especially after many of the soldiers had given their blankets away to the wounded and others, or left them by the wayside.

To command these 17,000 troops we sent a general who weighed about 300 pounds, and who had to be helped upon his horse. This, I wish to say at once, is not meant as a slur upon the commanding general, who was an officer of loyalty and distinction, but whose physical character rendered the full display of his undoubted talents impossible under the trying circumstances. Though he was able to concentrate a high percentage of his troops on the firing-line, the climate so affected

him that he was out of touch with the front nearly all day of the principal battle; and no other cause than physical weakness can be ascribed for his singular dispatch to Washington the morning of July 3rd, saying that he was seriously considering a withdrawal from the battlefield. No one has ever asserted that the appointment of this general to the command of the Fifth Corps was anything but a case of favoritism, for there were plenty of excellent commanders at the disposal of the Secretary of War, who would not have been handicapped as was the officer chosen.

Few, very few indeed, of our countrymen appreciate even today the narrowness of the cleft that separated our soldiers in 1898 from disaster, nay, from probable annihilation. supine lack of all initiative of the Spanish commanders, something that could never be repeated, was all that saved us. "Had there been on the Spanish side any generalship worthy the name, it is doubtful whether there would have been anything left of Shafter's army," is the way in which Seargent puts it. The Spaniards had plenty of time to concentrate a force of twenty or even twenty-five thousand men at Santiago, which could have taken up an unflankable position, forcing Shafter to a continuous offensive against odds, and the fever would have done the rest. As it was, it is most probable that, if the Spaniards had placed on the heights of Santiago the men who were idly and unnecessarily defending quite unattacked positions to the west of the city, these would have been enough to keep back the Americans for a week, until the dread fever touched them, and then? One shudders to think of the inevitable sequel! It would have been a special Providence if a man of the Fifth Corps ever looked again on the soil of his country! And even as it was, with Providence called upon as never before to make good our shortsightedness and inefficiency at Washington, the Surgeon-General reported that there was not an American soldier who returned from Cuba without the germs of disease in him.

In this miserable business, when the richest country in the world sent its sons to slaughter in a manner that should arouse indignation to the pitch of frenzy, we lost some 350 men from bullets and over 1.350 by disease. These are some of the lessons of our history, and in the contemplation of the practical efforts for real and immediate preparedness, which the gradual awakening of the American people are now making imperative, it is well to keep the past constantly in mind.

Have we learned our lessons?

AN ADDRESS BY HON. POULTNEY BIGELOW

I had a beautiful speech written out, but it was forgotten in the excitement of coming here, and I have nothing to say except what will please you — which has come through other channels, like a turning glass.

There is no use talking to intelligent people like you. You are all of one mind. You are Americans. You are patriots. That won't do.


But instead of entering upon a historic review of the diplomatic relations (I forget the exact title) which would last a few weeks, I will give, in a few capsules, a short history of '76 and a short history of England for a few hundred years, and finally a bouquet of flowers presented to China. Then I will pronounce the benediction.

But how can I let pass these revolutionary words uttered by this man Colonel Thompson, who has just scuttled from this hall? The words that he uttered are most revolutionary the most unhome-like words I ever heard—"you should apply to specialists for information!" That has not been heard in the halls of Congress for many years—for many a long decade,

I have no sympathy with those cheers of yours. I wish to state that I come from the most literary county of New York — Ulster. And it is there that you must get behind things. There is where the forces come from that make up this great country. And there are only a few people like myself, who are rich enough to go on and find out what the trouble with the country is.

We are finding fault with the Secretary of the Navy. Why, that is all wrong. We have put him there. We have had worse men in office before. You don't begin to know what we have suffered. Why an administration that has turned out Bryan can do wonders still.

I speak to you as a patriot. I have a prejudice against boy orators. I don't think any man has a right to talk until he is in my age class. When he is in the grandfather class he can talk. It always rubs me the wrong way to have an "Orator of the Platte" put on me. No! No, you have nothing like that river in this part of the country. It is only 150 miles long and very shallow, and two miles wide at the mouth.





But let us go back to Americanism and first principles. That puts me in mind of a story. The other day I wanted to sell a bull calf, and one of my kind neighbors came over and offered me a dollar. I said, "Abraham, a dollar is not enough." He said, "But a dollar is a great deal of money." I said, "Yes, but I can get more than a dollar; besides, the price of meat has gone up on account of the war." He said, "We ain't heerd of no war. What war be you talking about?" I said, "There is a great war going on in Europe." "No!" said he; "is there? Tell us about it." You see, I am considerable of an oracle in Ulster County - of course, in Washington you don't notice how much I am. I said, "Yes, there is a war going on over there. The Kaiser is making a good deal of trouble." "The Kaiser," said he. "Kaiser did you say? Oh, well; when does his term expire?" So you see there are troubles around us. We may escape them if we only have the same faith that landed the Puritan Fathers at Plymouth Rock, when they had hoped to get in on the sugar islands --- where they could make some money.

We have queer ideas in this country. We think it important whether our fleet is smashed to pieces. We think it important whether the Germans come here and lap up every dollar in the savings banks. We are wrong. We have lived through dozens of these scares, and we have blind faith that there is a special Providence to care for drunkards, fools and for Americans.

And I am not going to disturb that faith by any word I may say. Besides, I am a good Democrat, and I have spent many years in trying to find a good Democrat to vote for. Very few have taken as much pains as I have. I had some trouble with a Presbyterian minister in the backwoods of the Catskills because one day he remarked in his sermon that all Democrats were horse thieves. Now the salary that I helped pay him didn't call for that, and I objected strongly. He said, "Oh, you come so seldom; but I will change it," So he did. He said, "All horse thieves are Democrats."

It is sometimes dangerous to try to explain too much. I hope Mr. Henry Ford won't try to explain away the message President Thompson will send him. I see you are prejudiced against Henry Ford. He took me once in a Ford car, but you

see I am still here. He nearly killed John Burroughs. He had a grudge against him, so he made him a present of a Ford car. Burroughs thought it was made to hunt bird's nests in. I was on the trip. He nearly killed himself. John Burroughs is 80 years old, and Henry Ford is rather senile. I only mean you think he is young when he talks.

It was the devil that invented English, to make trouble for the newspapers. At any rate, as we went along, every little while Henry Ford would say, "John, there is a bobolink." Then John would give the little car a jerk, stopping it, and when the little Ford would stop, he would say, "No, it's a tit-willow," and go on again. In German they say, "He has a bird in his head." Henry Ford has it bad now; but Henry Ford is a very good, sweet gentleman — some people think he ought to be on the inside of a building. Especially if it is a lunatic asylum.

Government represents always two principles. General George Washington was the first principle we had in this country — you may say, he was the first man that had principles. He was a gentleman. He was a farmer of wealth, and he gave liberty and justice to this country. Only men of wealth can give liberty to a country. It is only men of wealth who have done any good for the common people. It is only wealth that gives the leisure to do, even if men have the will to do, good. Our early founders were men of wealth. A man is always a man of wealth if he has the leisure to help his fellowmen. Time is the most precious thing we have - next to the poor - and only a real man can stand up and give his time to protest against abuses (especially like Admiral Fiske, who had the courage to resign when he was not in harmony with the Government). Such men will always exist, but they could never exist unless they were men of wealth — that is, have enough to give them this leisure time and opportunity for thought and study.

The founders of our republic were men of wealth. Jefferson was a man of wealth. Adams was a man of wealth. The founders of democracy, and of this privilege of the masses, universal license — that is called universal suffrage — were all men of wealth. And if they had dreamed that universal suffrage was to degenerate into mob rule — the rule of laborites,

the rule of organized bands of men whose only idea is to attack those who have accumulated something and put it aside for their fellowmen—if our forefathers had dreamed of such a prospect, they would themselves have committed political suicide and remained under the British flag. You can see from that, that I am not running for the Presidency this fall.

You get the two principles — Washington representing the principle of preserving what we have; obeying the laws; observing our treaty obligations. Then the other, the demagogue, of the type of Jefferson. I never understood it absolutely until I read the eight volumes of his life, and there you will see that he was bitten by the strange microbe of the guillotine. One strange thing, the moment the King's head fell in the basket, and the moment the mob began to howl about rights, we were at once told we must obey the dictates of that mob, and repudiate our loyalty to the France that had saved us, and because Washington raised his hand against that he was denounced as a royalist. You read the declining years of Washington, and they are the years of a disappointed man a man who received hisses in every assemblage that he attended, and who retired to Mount Vernon wearied of public life. There was nothing to attract him afterward again but a war. You know in 1799 we were getting ready for war because that mob declared war upon us. They seized our ships and even came over here and issued letters of Marque in our waters. We were conservatives and pacificists. Thomas Jefferson was a pacificist, and instead of arming the country and deliberately taking sides, he forbade all intercourse of Americans with the rest of the world. And so we were being robbed by England on one side and the directorate on the other — (Napoleon) and when we sent our minister over to Paris he was ordered out of France like a tramp. We submitted to it. We were pacificists.

Now, don't think for a minute there is any unique distinction in the name of Daniels.

And we even sent three commissioners after that, and the agents of the French came and demanded of them so many millions of dollars before they could even enter into negotiations. After that insult we could not stand any more. Then we said we will arm. And just because we did, that French Govern-

ment came to terms. Every time that we have shown that we have in us the spirit of our ancestors we have managed in some way to get our way.

We have at this moment a larger influx of aliens than ever before in our history. They frighten people by the voice they have in our politics, and they make us think this country has changed. But it has not changed — at least, I do not think it has changed. I do not believe in evolution. I do not see that there is a man to-day that is better than the average man that fought at Thermopylae. I do not see that there is any change in the relations of men or women. We do see changes in conditions, but when you strike the spirit of the man to-day we see all about us deeds of heroism. Remember what little England did for Europe. These days will come again. We have been for thirty years under the schoolma'ms; all over the country the boys have been taught "it is very rude to punch a boy's head," and "you mustn't muss up your clothes." Really, we are all feminists.

Now, in 1800, the French and the Spaniards together captured an American vessel and had taken her into San Domingo. We had an enterprising little squadron down there, and we thought we would cut that boat out and bring her away. So we got a crew, and decided to wait until a schooner was there and capture it and then sail back like an innocent cargo boat. We did it, and captured the schooner with 701 men on board. And innocently as we were sailing back along comes a shot. We hove to, and a British lieutenant comes on board, thinking he has a little fish boat, but finds he has a man-o'-war, or rather a boat with a man-o'-war crew.

Then you jump to 1846. There is a very magnificent man. He is magnificent so long as he keeps out of politics—that is Fremont. Fremont is one of my heroes. He took a little gun and went across the plains. When they found he had a little gun along, they hurried up to stop him from taking the gun across. I am talking now of 1845 or 1846, when there were no railways. But he went along and raised the American flag in San Francisco. He hoisted the flag and took the entire country with a handful of men. He had to keep his expedition small, because it was a purely exploring expedition—purely scientific. So there we have California, with all that lies be-

tween, as large as Europe, captured by this man who knew how to play diplomacy without paying too much attention to his technical orders. If he had been stopped by the pacificists there would never have been any California because the British admiral there was going to hoist his flag if the Americans had not. That is only a small thing. You remember that for adding the California coast to this country Fremont was brought home and court-martialed and dismissed from the army. Of course we now recognize his merits, after he is dead, and that is what we must all expect, if we do anything of that kind.

Now, there was another case of diplomatic activity. In China, at Lucknow, there was a Chinese battery that fired on an American vessel. If that word was sent to Washington there would be a lot of diplomatic trouble. So the American vessel just sailed in and smashed things up, and that was the end of it.

You remember when Perry went to Japan. He had no right to do that. He had no instructions except as a Commissioner, to retire. Instead of that, Perry got his guns in order, for he wanted to be received in style. Consequently, Perry came away, treated with great henor in Japan, and the name of Perry is blessed not only in Japan, but in this country as well.

We made a great deal of bad blood with England over her behavior in the Civil War. But when you think that we were cutting each other's throats here and destroying ourselves, what was easier than for a combination of England, Spain and France to divide this country? The wonder is not that England should have listened for a moment to such a proposition, but that she did not do it.

Suffice it to say that the American who goes about the world to-day, everywhere he goes, finds, under the British flag, equal opportunities. The English ports are open everywhere. There is no discrimination, and the flag of England has been the flag of free trade and generous treatment to all countries.

We were the first in Japan. We were the first in China. We made a treaty with the Chinese in 1860 and had the opportunity of making that country ours. We had only to treat those people with decency; but from the time we made that

treaty in 1860 until to-day we have frittered away our opportunities. It was the Navy that gave us China. It was the Navy that gave us Japan. When I first went to the coast the American consul had been sent to jail for embezzlement. The surprise was that he got into jail. The next time I went out there was an American consul lying under fifteen indictments for going to jail.

Every naval officer knows this kind of thing; but when I say it out loud, I say, "Our consular service is the best in the world." It was simply scandalous. An American merchant trying to do business out there goes to his American consul and finds as a rule that he is a man seeing how much he can make out of the office, instead of seeing how much he can help the American flag. You see, I am not trying to make myself more popular than necessary.

There are so many instances of Divine interposition in our affairs that makes me more reconciled to Daniels. Have you ever heard of the famous transport Gussie? People know of Decatur, Farragut and the passing of the forts of New York. They don't remember the Gussie. She was a very famous transport. She was able to go six and a half knots when the wind was favorable. Her mission was a secret. Nobody knew of it excepting five newspaper reporters who were on board. The commander was my friend, Captain Dorst. He wore his spurs as a calvary captain. He was promoted for this. He didn't know a donkey engine from a horse. He was great, with his spurs on. We were all men on board, so we didn't have to dress very much. We had a couple of regiments on board of the First United States Infantry, and a finer body of men I never saw.

However, to come back to this great historical episode of the *Gussie*. We had orders not to let anybody know about it. least of all the Cubans, because we had to land some Cuban generals. And so, to be as secret as possible, we made all the noise we could.

It was the custom in those days not to furnish a transport with anything by which you could get from the transport to the shore. I might also say we had about fifty mules aboard, so we had a great deal of intelligence.

After stopping at every place possible, and taking on two additional newspaper correspondents, to have our mission kept secret in order to have still more secrecy we went straight to Moro Castle, and steamed gently down to make our landing. We announced ourselves everywhere, and were fired at When my cavalry friend saw anything that looked like a nice beach to land at, he picked it out. By God's mercy we got in, and hove to, but we could not get out again, and could not drop our anchor, and there we stuck. Then we began to disembark our mules. This consisted in merely pushing the mules overboard. By voluntary help we managed to get a yawl boat down, and then another, and in the midst of it began the rattling of a quick firing gun in the fort, and the bullets began peppering around, and it was very unpleasant. Everyone behaved as though it was a Coney Island picnic, and we went ashore.

And to show you what piety will do for this great nation, we brought back a machette and an officer's hat, and we routed 2,000 men, and even captured a prisoner. The prisoner's name was Hosen, and when he came on board and we interrogated him, he said the only complaint he had was that we had not captured his whole family.

After announcing ourselves all along the coast, our cavalry captain decided to get rid of the Cubans. They didn't want to go, naturally, but still he made them go, and what became of them I don't know. We would steam along all night, and in the morning along would come one of these cruisers, to get at us, thinking we were a man-o'-war, and ask "Who are you?" Dorst would stand up, with his yellow stripes on, and say, "We are the Gussie."

Talk about fluent profanity. If you ever heard it, it was going on then. That is only one instance of the perfect helter-skelter that prevailed everywhere. But we all came back heroes. Dorst got a promotion. He would have been hung in any other army.

Now I will carry you in a capsule draught from 1763 to 1916, and I want to just call your attention to this chunk of wisdom: Where the American flag has flown, liberty has been established. Where the English flag has been placed, liberty has been established. My German friends told me the moment the war broke out, "bang" would go their colonies. When

I was in Kaio-chau the Germans had been there a year. You remember that the German policy has been as clear and scientifically perfect as their submarine warfare to-day. Kaio-chau was the culmination of their aspirations in the East. the year of Dewey in Manilla. Anyway, to do the thing scientifically, as the Germans do, it is not enough to have the force, but you must be able to lie about it, to create the sentiment for colonial expansion. The German Emperor sent out a couple of missionaries, but they were not wanted, and so, of course, the Chinamen cut off their heads. Anybody that knows China wonders not that their heads were cut off, but that they staved on so long. Now, the moment these missionaries got that golden crown the Enperor assimilated to himself an area of Chinese territory, about as big as the whole France, with a population of about that of France, and with the port of Kaio-chau, so that he was justified in remarking, if his crop of missionaries only held out, he would own the earth.

Now, the Chinese are very polite, as well as long-suffering, and when the German vessels came into the port and fired a few shots, they apologized that, as not having any powder, they could not return the salute.

Von Diedrichs said he would dispense with the salute, so long as they handed him over Kaio-chau. When I was there they were erecting a monument to von Diedrichs.

That was the same man that went into Manila Bay and did everything that was possible to show that the German diplomacy was behind the move to get the Philippines the moment there was a chance. You read Dewey's book. It is absolutely true, and yet von Diedrichs was ordered to come out in an official document and give Dewey the lie on every point. That is diplomacy, but it is not playing the game. There was an eloquent remark the other day in some of our papers, as to the testimony given by some of our officials, that there was no misstatement, but that there were some "retessences." I like the word "retessences," because I do not understand it. When I propose to call a man a liar the next time I shall call him a "retessionist."

Now, I am going to stop, because I see the time is late, and you can speed away to your back countries. It has been a tremendous honor to be before you. The mere fact of your

wanting anyone that is not running for office to speak to you is a great honor. I am only the school trustee of a little village school, because there is no salary attached to the office. If there was a salary I would very likely be blackballed.

In closing this thing, I want to say something that is near my heart. It is taken from a poem, the writer of which is dead. He wrote a little book of poems. The man is dead from yellow fever, and he closes one of his verses by saying:

"God bless you, dear old comrade, wherever you may be,
However far the distance, you are always here with me.
I have known you and have loved you, since years of stress began,
God bless you, Colonel Thompson, for you're God's own gentleman."

The Pennsylvania running into rough weather on her trial trip.

BANQUET SPEECHES

Thursday Evening, April 13, 1916

COLONEL ROBERT M. THOMPSON, TOASTMASTER

Addresses by
HON. DAVID JAYNE HILL
HON. HENRY BRECKINRIDGE
CLARENCE OUSLEY

BANQUET SPEECHES

Thursday Evening, April 13, 1916

COLONEL ROBERT M. THOMPSON, TOASTMASTER

Members of the Navy League, Ladies and Gentlemen, Honored Guests:

We bid you welcome! Once more it is our privilege to come here and declare our love for our country, our interest in the navy, our loyalty to the Navy League.

This is our eleventh annual banquet. For thirteen years we have been teaching the same lesson. We have declared that we stand for peace at any price in our home land. We have declared that a strong and adequate and efficient navy is the only true insurance of peace and freedom from invasion. Battleships are cheaper than battles. We have made a fight. It has been a good fight. We are winning. Let us persevere, and instead of saying, "We are winning," let us say, "We have won."

To-night we have with us so many and such fine orators that it would be foolish for me to occupy too much of your time, so with your permission I am going to pass at once to our regular routine, and I ask you to fill your glasses to the health of our Commander-in-Chief, the President of the United States.

By long custom that toast is set aside not to be replied to. As the first toast to which we will ask a response, I am going to give you our true first line of defense, the State Department, and I am going to ask the man whose reputation is known to all of you, which was acquired in performing duties under that Department to reply to it.

Gentlemen, I give you the Department of State, and I ask Mr. David Jayne Hill to reply.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT HON, DAVID JAYNE HILL

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen:

Certainly our president is a rapid change artist in the invention of surprises. I, for one, came to this banquet in the expectation of quietly enjoying a good meal and hearing several postprandial speeches in which others would make the indiscreet remarks, and enjoying triumphing over the embarrassment of being called upon to speak.

But now, to speak for the State Department — why, I have only visited the State Department these last years very occasionally. I think it is thirteen or fourteen or fifteen years since I had any official connection with it, and I suppose that, from many points of view, I am about the last one of all present to speak for it now.

I represent — so far as I have any representative capacity whatever — another period, not to say another school of diplomacy. Of course, I mean no reflection by this. Time's noblest offspring is the last, says the poet, and this may be just as true in diplomacy as in any of the arts, sciences, in poetry, in literature, in invention, or in whatever you please. I am simply classing myself as a gentleman did some time ago, a former minister to a foreign country, who was placed on the program of a chamber of commerce with a "D. D." attached to his name. He remarked, when he arose to speak, that he had never received the degree of Doctor of Divinity.

"Oh, no," said the president of the college in the town, "Certainly not, but that does not stand for Doctor of Divinity; that stands for 'defunct diplomat.'"

Now, our first line of defense — hardly anybody who claims to be a diplomatist should be called upon to speak for it. They usually write for it. Diplomatists are note-makers rather than speakers, and, if you were to send me the necessary paper and it would lie still while I wrote upon it, I could in three weeks send you a response that I have no doubt would be very satisfactory.

But let us make no mistake. Note writing is not the chief function of the diplomatist. In fact, the whole value of a note depends upon what goes before it, how it is delivered, and what comes after it. What goes before it — because these scintillating coruscations of diplomacy which we now and then see in public documents are not usually spontaneous inspirations from the sky. They are rather the crystallization of oral negotiations. The note properly follows the conversation, and the first line of defense is not expressed in the note, but in the conversation; and when that note is received, the receiving government ought to be in a position to know exactly what it means.

And then the manner in which the note is delivered. There is a way of saying, "Excellence, I have the pleasure to hand you a delightful document, the perusal of which you will no doubt greatly enjoy." and there is another way, a way that carries a different significance, an accompanying gravity and solemnity, the conversation being clothed in ominous silence.

What I mean to say is that the whole value of the first line of defense is in its being a defense. If it is nothing but a line, it is not necessarily a defense at all. What a risk we take in putting the gage of battle into the hands of one or two men who may carelessly throw it down. What a responsibility it is to command a battleship, or to command a division. How much greater is the responsibility of being able, with a few strokes of the pen, with a few words casually uttered, to plunge your country into war. It is an immense responsibility. It implies that the man who holds this power in his hands be surcharged with a sense of his responsibility.

What is it he is to defend? Defend the country from war? Why, yes, if possible with honor. But this first line of defense is not primarily to keep the peace; it is to guard the rights, the honor, and the interests of the nation. Of course this can not be done unless there is an intelligent appreciation of what the honor, the rights, and the interests of the nation are, and it must be a matter of pure intellectual insight and firm resolve, and the world must know that a nation stands back of it. The first line of defense is no line of defense at all unless the army and navy are there to support it, and in that case it can speak with power and authority.

And what are the army and navy unless the people are back of them?

I should like to talk to you all the evening, now that I have started. I should like to show you some of the various aspects of diplomacy. Do you fancy for a moment that there is any weakness in our fleet, that there is any lack of completeness of organization in our navy, that there is any defection, any treason among our people that foreign diplomacy does not know? I have heard men say, "You gentlemen who have these conventions of National Security Leagues and of Navy Leagues, should not expose the weakness of the country." There is no form or degree of weakness of which the country has any conception that is not known in every capital of Europe.

I thank you, Mr. President, for giving me an opportunity to make this brief introduction to the subject, and you will now, I dare say, call upon the real lines of defense.

REMARKS BY COLONEL THOMPSON

It is my intention to give you a real feast of oratory tonight. For that reason I have carefully avoided giving notice to anybody of my intention to call upon him for a speech until just five minutes before he is called upon to get up. So what we are going to get is going to be red hot from the heart — the truth as a man can tell it.

I am going to give you for your next toast, not as we usually and conventionally give it, "The Navy," because, as we study the question, I think we of the Navy League are growing a little broader in our views. We believe, and we have always believed, in the great value of the navy, in its absolute necessity, but we recognize the necessary connection with the army. We recognize the enormous value of cooperation, of union. In union there is strength and I am going to give you as the toast to-night, "The United Services, the Army and the Navy."

I am going to call upon the Honorable Henry Breckinridge, to respond to that toast.

THE UNITED STATES, THE ARMY AND THE NAVY

HON. HENRY BRECKINRIDGE
Late Assistant Secretary of War

Mr. Chairman:

You have rightly and generously, I think, coupled the two respective elements of the national defense, but you have not made the picture a whole. As I conceive it, the national defense consists of three elements — the Army, the Navy, and Colonel Thompson.

It is said that this is a war of munitions, that it is a war of organization, that it is a war of matter and material. That is true, but it is — as all war has been from the foundation of the world and as all wars will be until the end of wars, or the end of the world, whichever may come first — a war of men. The human spirit now is, as ever, predominant and conquering over any contrivance or machine that may be devised by man. I say to you seriously and with all earnestness that as deficient as are the two other elements of the national defense, I would not have Colonel Thompson subtracted, with his patriotic and zealous and inspiring spirit, from the life of this country, if for him I could get in return a combination of the greatest dreadnought that has ever been built and a full-blown German Army corps added to our army.

Mr. Chairman, you give me the toast of the sister Services. Of course, our minds and my mind go out to our own services, the army and the navy. But should we not think for a moment of all the armies and the navies of the world, of whose accomplishments we are the heirs? I thank the Providence that has ruled over the destinies of mankind that the pacifist has not been in vogue throughout the history of the world. If those good Greek soldiers of old had been pacifists, the tide of Persian Orientalism would have swept aside Greek civilization to the detriment of all mankind. We are the heirs of the heroism of the armies of Greece.

If the miserable creed of pacifism had been in vogue in ancient Rome, the great twin sciences of government and of law had not been so developed in the peninsula of Italy, but would have been overcome by the barbarian hordes that beat against the borders of Rome, to the lasting inpoverish-

ment of the human race. And we are the heirs of the glorious history of the arms and the courage of Rome.

And if Charles Martel had been a pacifist, the Saracen would have overrun Europe. We are the heirs of the glories of the armies of Charles Martel.

And so of the great English fleet that destroyed the Armada and made possible the growth and continuation and development of that system of liberty which was the cause for and has been the salvation of this republic of America.

And so the armies of George Washington. If George Washington had been a pacifist, America would now be a colony. If Abraham Lincoln had been a pacifist, and the soldiers that marched under the banner of the Union had been pacifists, this nation would not be a nation — it would be a group of antipathetic confederacies.

So we owe a great debt of gratitude to all the armies and all the navies that from the foundation of the world have been fighting the fights of human liberty and of civilization, that we in our day and generation may enjoy the fruits thereof. And I say to you now, as I have said upon many occasions, that if the miserable creed of pacifism gains root in this country, so that we do fail to recognize what we do owe to the valor and the glory of the past, it will be the beginning of the end of our nation.

For the history of the world has been the same up to this date for all nations: first, weakness, then strength, then the slackening hand, and then decay. And if now we do not compass ourselves about with the organized and trained and adequate strength to hold our liberties untarnished from the assault of anyone, it will be the beginning of the end for our country, as that same evolution has been the beginning of the end of all other nations that have ever been upon the face of the earth.

I might say by way of specification that I individually and personally, and all of you, as citizens, owe a great deal to the present army and navy of the United States. I wish to say that the three years of my intimate association with these two services — and I was fortunate enough to be able to associate rather largely with both — have been the very best and most valuable years of my life. It was my good

fortune to be shipmate, as it were, or, better, a stowaway, aboard a vessel of the United States that was carrying a group of naval officers to Europe to act as "garnerers-in" of what information might be obtained for our benefit during this war; and I wish to say I prize as one of the best experiences of my life being thrown into close contact with those splendidly equipped and patriotically consecrated officers of the navy, who every day taught me something that I could never have learned elsewhere, and that will be with me as an asset until I die.

And so it is with the officers of the army. For three years I have been going to school to them. I had nothing to teach them. I had all to learn from them; and I will say that there is no body of men that tread the earth who are more zealous in their profession, who are more earnest under the weight of the great responsibilities they have upon them; that there is no class of men who set before their eyes a higher ideal than the officers of the United States Army.

And as my eye travels to the right about six feet from where I stand, I wish to make public acknowledgement of the fact that I will carry imaged in my mind and in my heart as the beau ideal of all that the American citizen and all that the American soldier should be for accomplishment and character, the impress of the life, of the work and of the personality of Hugh Lenox Scott.

People speak affectionately of our flag, and they compose many alliterations and allegories concerning it. It is the most beautiful flag in the world, and we often hear it said that the red stripes of that flag represent the blood of patriots poured out upon the field of honor for our liberties, for our interests. And I wish you to rise, if you will, to-night, and drink with me to the two fountain heads and sources of those streams of blood that have been so gloriously shed and have so beautifully streamed in color upon our flag—the Army and the Navy of the United States of America.

REMARKS BY COLONEL THOMPSON

Ladies and Gentlemen, I am delighted with our new director. I think you will all be satisfied with my method of getting speeches for you,

Now if you want to carry away something that you could be proud of, something crowded with the greatest memories of the last fifty years, I wish you could have the photograph of these three men.— [General Young, General Scott, and Admiral Fiske.] If there are any names in our history that we could be prouder of, I do not know where to find them. If there is anything in our form of government, if there is anything great or inspiring in the fundamental and underlying ideals, here they are exemplified. And now Delegates, comes the toast, which we all of us may drink with especial warmth, for we are a little bit like the Scotchman, proposing a toast, who said: "Here's to us. Wha's like us? Domned few."

There is one result of our thirteen years' work. We have made enemies. The man or society that goes through life without making enemies is not worth bothering about.

Sometimes a man's enemies turn out to be friends. longer a man lives the more he finds out." To-day we have found out something. A certain gentleman, well-meaning, exceedingly fortunate in business affairs, an accumulator on a gigantic and sudden scale, is now engaged in a laudable effort to distribute his receipts. Among other things, having some itching for notoriety, he decided to spend a large sum of money in advertising his opinions about the Navy League. I have taken the ground all the time that this was a fortunate thing for us, for, after all, we are but a feeble folk financially.— I won't admit we are feeble in any other way.— and when we seek publicity and it has to be paid for. it is difficult for us to obtain it. So this good gentleman has set aside a fund,— I am told by people in a position to know, he has actually put to one side five million dollars.— and entrusted certain gentlemen with the distribution of this large sum amongst the newspapers of the country, and the newspapers are accepting it, and some of them are making a proper use of it. I want to inform you as to what that use is.

In the Chicago "Daily Tribune," published on April 11, in the center of the first page, in display type, headed "Announcement." appears this statement: "The sum to be paid by Mr. Henry Ford for the advertisement in to-day's Tribune, page 13, of his views in opposition to National Defense, is contributed by the Tribune to the patriotic work of the Navy League. This sum will be \$887.04. It will be remitted to the Treasurer of the Navy League upon its receipt."—"The Editors of the Tribune."

Well, I was delighted to receive that information, and a moment's consideration made me decide that it was proper we should express our gratitude to the source from which these blessings flow. So taking advantage of the Western Union, I forwarded to Mr. Ford our thanks, as follows:

"Henry Ford, Detroit, Michigan — The Navy League of the United States thanks you for the first cash contribution which it has received from you, through the hands of the Chicago Daily Tribune. Keep up the good work.

Robert M. Thompson,

President of the Navy League of the United States.

If there be any newspaper reporters here, will they please read, mark, and inwardly digest, and send the result of that digestion to their own editors?

Now Ladies and Gentlemen, I am going to give you another toast. Fortunately we have another director of the Navy League on tap, one who has come to us from the great State of Texas, leaving important duties, forgetting serious engagements. He has come here because he loves the Navy League. He loves its work, and, inspired by the patriotism which inspires all of us, he is here to do his duty. In addition to that, he knows how to make exceedingly good speeches, and you are going to get the benefit of that knowledge.

So here's to the Navy League,—God bless it and prosper its work!—the first and greatest peace society in the land!

Mr. Clarence Ousley, of Texas, will please reply.

Will you please stand and drink to that?

THE NAVY LEAGUE

CLARENCE OUSLEY

I delight to report from the far Southwest, not for the purpose of contributing to the great service in which you are engaged — because I feel incapable of contribution — but for the purpose of receiving the inspiration of this wonderful occasion, and to pledge what effort I may be able to command to the further development of the noble undertaking represented by this the earliest and the greatest of the peace societies.

At the outset, permit me to remind you that yours is a work of education. Only eighteen months ago there were few of us who did not indulge the fond dream of these whom we are now prone to rebuke — that the world had come nearly, if not quite to the end of the war. I submit that two years ago the great majority of the people of the United States had come to believe — I confess I had — that we were at the beginning of the time, not of the millenium, but of peace relations so intimate and friendly that diplomacy and arbitration would take the place of the sword. I had the privilege, about three years ago, of standing in that great peace temple at the Hague, and I uttered a silent rejoicing and praise to the Almighty that the nations of the world would hereafter come to this place to settle in peacful deliberation the contentions which aforetime had plunged them into war.

I remind you of this state of public mind, because it is necessary for us to realize something of the popular attitude which must be overcome before we can hope for sufficient preparedness. Convincing as have been the events of the last year and a half to discerning minds, there is still a feeling that somehow this European riot of passion and strife is only an exceptional and shocking phenomenon, a sort of convulsion, which will not recur, and which therefore need not be recognized as the occasion for a rule of action.

Public education is a very slow process. You may plant a seed, fertilize the soil to the utmost of scientific composition, and cultivate it with all possible skill, and yet you cannot bring it into fruit and flower before the ordained season of its maturity. You may cram a child's mind with learning, but you cannot make him thoughtful until he reaches the age of the adult. The public is but another kind of organism, and the cultivation or the education of its mind is comparable to the cultivation of the plant or the education of the child. Hence we must enter upon the work of education with patience as well as with earnestness.

We must realize also that men in high station charged with responsibilities of Statesmanship and confronted with these new portents can proceed no faster than the public will follow; for this is a democracy and no public policy will endure that has not the approval of a majority of the people. Therefore I have a particular sympathy with the lonely man in the White House who perhaps knows better than we realize how difficult it is to develop in the public mind the sustaining influence of the popular judgment which is necessary in moving forward to the discharge of new and great responsibilities until now not recognized, except by the few far-seeing men like yourselves, who years ago perceived two great truths: the first that mankind had not conquered its passions and would upon ordinary human provocation again engage in war; and the other, that ample preparation is the only insurance of peace.

This happy social occasion is not the time to indulge in too much serious reflection. But there is another thought in my mind in this connection, which I beg your indulgence to express. There is still another aspect other than those mentioned in preceding addresses: of the development of the army and navy as the first line of defense. Not so long ago as time is measured in the life of nations, this was a divided country. We fell apart some fifty-odd years ago into bitter sections. Do we quite realize as we sit here to-night in this delightful reunion, in this exhibition of the real reunion of these States, that it has been only a few years that we have been able thus to sit in complete oneness of sentiment and spirit?

Why, it has been only in very recent times that I found myself proud to be called a "Yankee." I declare the truth that when I was a boy I looked with resentment upon that

beautiful flag, and I did not come to tolerate it and respect it until I learned the history of my country. Now, thank God, I adore it as the rainbow of promise of the world's happiness and freedom. Thoughweall pray that the time may never come when it will be called to that far field of battle where is now raging the greatest contest for human liberty in the history of the world, let us see to it that if in duty it should be called to that dread action, it will not return with the stain of dishonor.

The point I am coming to is that we are now happily cured of that sectional estrangement, though it has taken us nearly fifty years to recover. Meanwhile, we are falling into class antagonisms more dangerous than sectional antagonisms, because when sections fall apart their differences are clearly defined; they meet, man to man as it were, and settle their controversies as we did fifty years ago, once and But class consciousness and class antagonisms reach into every neighborhood and into every quarter of the Union. We need somehow to visualize to the common mind what the common mind does not readily conceive — the intangible, but none the less commanding sovereignty of the nation. We need somehow to put a tangible object before the thoughtless mind and to have impressed upon that mind the vital truth that government is not a thing to serve only in domestic policing, but that government is a thing to serve the whole welfare; and, more than all, that the government is a thing to be served as the instrument of preserving the peoples' free institutions.

These last few months have developed the alarming fact that there is a class, or that there are classes, among us who seem to have forgotten their oath of allegiance to this flag when they found asylum and opportunity in this fair and fruitful land. The fact that in this republic anywhere there can be found one man, not to say many men and societies of militant men, who, in the hour of peril to the nation, will dare affirm their superior devotion to other powers, is in itself admonition enough that we must strengthen the army and the navy, and that we must mobilize the spirit of American democracy and declare anew:

This is the house of my fathers,
And I am my father's son,
As ye are to be who abide here,
If so we be many in one.
Wide are the portals and open
To all who come hither or go,
But the rule of the House I insist on,
And who disobeys is my foe.

My firstlings were got of much loving,
Far-faring on mountain and veldt,
Of Saxon and Slav, Jew and Gentile,
Of Teuton and Latin and Celt.
But though we be kin I disown you
If still ye your mother prefer,
For she let you go unregretting —
A burden and hindrance to her.

I've sheltered and coddled and fed you —
As seeds of my loins ye have been;
Ye sit in the seats of my children,
And meeds of my favor may win;
For ye had abjured all allegiance
To potentate power or throne;
On the sword and faith of a soldier
You swore unto me — me alone.


Let grief for the sorrows of kindred
In motherlands whelping of war;
Of prayers and loving and grieving
Send solace anear and afar.
The call of the blood is beseeming,
And weeping becometh a son,
But the oath of a man is his honor
Till ever his race is run.

So here is the rule — I command it:
Nor Teuton nor Saxon be ye,
But all who abide in this household
The sons of this Fatherland be.
For here is but one lord and master,
One country, one flag, and one name,
And they shall be alien and hated
Who fail of its weal or its fame.

REMARKS BY COLONEL THOMPSON

Ladies and Gentlemen, it is an old and true saying, "Enough is better than a feast." When you have had the best, why ask for more? I did feel that in the midst of this convention we had reached that period which in the old-fashioned camp meetings was called "Experience time," when all the brethren and sisters who were moved by the spirit could stand up and tell their experiences, and perhaps we would have enjoyed it to-night. But time has slipped away — slipped away in a wonderful fashion. Every minute has been filled with something good. If there be a man or a woman here who leaves this hall without a fresh consecration to country, without appreciating more truly than ever before what loyalty, what duty, and what devotion means, then I am sorry for them.

Ladies and Gentlemen, it is my feeling that right here we should say good-night. If that be your will, if I do not hear a voice to the contrary, I shall call this meeting dissolved



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